

GOVERNMENT POLICY OUTLINED.

Secretary Olney Tells Ambassador Bayard What Course to Pursue.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 17.—The first letter in relation to the Venezuelan question was dated July 20 last, when Secretary Olney wrote to Ambassador Bayard as follows:

"I am directed by the President to communicate to you his views upon a subject to which he has given much anxious thought and respecting which he has not reached a conclusion without a lively sense of its great importance as well as of the serious responsibility involved in any action now to be taken.

"It is not proposed, and for the present purposes it is not necessary, to enter into any detailed account of the controversy between Great Britain and Venezuela respecting the western frontier of the colony of British Guiana. The dispute is of ancient date, and began at least as early as the time when Great Britain acquired by the treaty with the Netherlands of 1814 the establishments of Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice. From that time to the present the dividing line between these establishments (now called British Guiana) and Venezuela has never ceased to be a subject of contention. The claims of both parties, it must be conceded, are of a somewhat indefinite nature. On the one hand, Venezuela, in every constitution it has acquired since she became an independent State, has declared her territorial limits to be those of the Captaincy General of Venezuela in 1810. Yet, out of moderation and prudence, it is said, she has contented herself with claiming the Essequibo line—the line of the Essequibo River, that is to be the true boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana. On the other hand, at least an equal degree of indefiniteness distinguishes the claim of Great Britain. It does not seem to be asserted, for instance, that in 1814 the 'establishments' then acquired by Great Britain had any clearly defined western limits which can now be identified and which are either the limits insisted upon to-day, or, being the original limits, have been the basis of legitimate territorial extensions. On the contrary, having the actual possession of a district called the Pomaron District, she apparently remained indifferent as to the exact area of the colony until 1840, when she commissioned an engineer, Sir Robert Schomburgk, to examine and lay down its boundaries. The result was the 'Schomburgk line,' which was fixed by metes and bounds, was delineated on maps, and was at first indicated on the face of the country itself by posts, monograms, and other like symbols.

Venezuela's Complaint.

"If it was expected that Venezuela would acquiesce in this line, the expectation was doomed to speedy disappointment. Venezuela at once protested, and with such vigor and to such purpose, that the line was explained to be only tentative—part of a general boundary scheme concerning Brazil and the Netherlands as well as Venezuela—and the monuments of the line set up by Schomburgk were removed by the express order of Lord Aberdeen. Under these circumstances, it seems impossible to treat the Schomburgk line as being the boundary claimed by Great Britain as matter of right, or as anything but a line originating in considerations of convenience and expediency. Various other boundary lines have since 1840 from time to time been indicated by Great Britain, but all as conventional lines—lines to which Venezuela's assent has been desired, but which in no instance, it is believed, has been demanded as matter of right. Thus, neither of the parties is to-day standing for the boundary line indicated upon strict legal right—Great Britain having formulated no such claim at all, while Venezuela insists upon the Essequibo line only as a liberal concession to her antagonist.

Venezuela Early Protested.

"Several other features of the situation remain to be briefly noticed—the continuous growth of the undefined British claim, the fate of the various attempts at arbitration of the controversy, and the part in the matter heretofore taken by the United States. As already seen, the exploitation of the Schomburgk line in 1840 was at once followed by the protest of Venezuela and by proceedings on the part of Great Britain which would be fairly interpreted only as a disavowal of that line. Indeed, in addition to the facts already noticed—Lord Aberdeen himself in 1841 proposed a line beginning at the River Morocco, a distinct abandonment of the Schomburgk line. Notwithstanding this, however, every change in the British claim since that time has moved the frontier of British Guiana further and further to the westward of the line thus proposed. The Granville line of 1851 placed the starting point at a distance of twenty-nine miles from the Morocco, in the direction of Punta Barima. The Rosebery line of 1884 placed it west of the Guiana River, and about that time, if the British authority known as the 'Statesman's Year Book' is to be relied upon, the area of British Guiana was suddenly enlarged by some 33,000 square miles, being stated at 76,000 square miles in 1885 and 109,000 square miles in 1887. The Salisbury line of 1890 fixed the starting point of the line in the mouth of the Amacuro, west of the Punta Barima, on the Orinoco. And, finally, in 1893, a second Rosebery line carried the boundary from a point to the west of the Amacuro as far as the source of the Cumano River and the Sierra of Usupamo. Nor have the innumerable claims thus enumerated been claims on paper merely.

"An exercise of jurisdiction corresponding more or less to such claims, has accompanied or followed closely upon each and has been the more irritating and unjustified, of course, do so only through peaceful methods, any resort to force as against its powerful adversary being out of the question. Accordingly, shortly after the drawing of the Schomburgk line, an effort was made to settle the boundary by treaty and was apparently progressing toward a successful issue when the negotiations were brought to an end in 1844 by the death of the Venezuelan Plenipotentiary, Venezuela, in 1848, entered upon a period of civil commotions, which lasted for more than a quarter of a century, and the negotiations thus interrupted in 1844 were not resumed until 1876. In that year Venezuela offered to close the dispute by accepting the Morocco line proposed by Lord Aberdeen. But, without giving reasons for his refusal, Lord Granville rejected the proposal and suggested a new line, comprehending a large tract of territory all pretension to which seemed to have been abandoned by the previous action of Lord Aberdeen. Venezuela refused to assent to it, and negotiations dragged along without result until 1882, when Venezuela concluded that the only course open to her was arbitration of the controversy. Before she had made any

definite proposition, however, Great Britain took the initiative by suggesting the making of a treaty which should determine various other questions, as well as that of the disputed boundary.

Arbitration Was Accepted.

The result was that a treaty was practically agreed upon with the Gladstone Government in 1886, containing a general arbitration clause under which the parties might have submitted the boundary dispute to the decision of a third power or of several powers in amity with both. Before the actual signing of the treaty, however, the Administration of Mr. Gladstone was superseded by that of Lord Salisbury, which declined to accede to the arbitration clause of the treaty, notwithstanding the reasonable expectations of Venezuela to the contrary, based upon the Premier's emphatic declaration in the House of Lords that no serious Government would think of not respecting the engagements of its predecessor.

Since then, Venezuela, on the one side, has been offering and calling for arbitration, while Great Britain, on the other, has responded by insisting upon the condition that any arbitration should relate only to such of the disputed territory as lies west of a line designated by herself. As this condition seemed inadmissible to Venezuela, and as, while the negotiations were pending, new appropriations of what is claimed to be Venezuelan territory continued to be made, Venezuela, in 1887, suspended diplomatic relations with Great Britain, protesting "before her British Majesty's Government, before all civilized nations, and before the world in general against the acts of spoliation committed to her detriment by the Government of Great Britain, which, at no time and on no account, will recognize as capable of altering in the least the rights which she has inherited from Spain, and respecting which she will ever be willing to submit to the decision of a third power.

Why Venezuela Quit.

"Diplomatic relations have not since been restored, though what is claimed to be new and flagrant British aggressions forced Venezuela to resume negotiations on the boundary question in 1890, through its Minister in Paris and a special envoy on that subject, and in 1893, through a confidential agent—Señor Michelena. These negotiations, however, met with the fate of other like previous negotiations, Great Britain refusing to arbitrate except as to territory west of an arbitrary line drawn by herself. All attempts in that direction decisively terminated in October, 1893, when Señor Michelena filed with the Foreign Office the following declaration: 'I perform a most strict duty in raising again, in the name of the Government of Venezuela, a most solemn protest against the proceedings of the colony of British Guiana, constituting encroachments upon the territory of the republic, and against the declaration contained in your Excellency's communication that her Britannic Majesty's Government considers that part of the territory as pertaining to British Guiana, and admits no claim to it on the part of Venezuela. In support of this protest I reproduce all the arguments presented to your Excellency in my note of the 29th of last September and those which have been exhibited by the Government of Venezuela on the various occasions when they have raised the same protest.

Britain Held Responsible.

"I lay on her Britannic Majesty's Government the entire responsibility of the incidents that may arise in the future from the necessity to which Venezuela has been driven to oppose, by all possible means, the dispossession of a part of her territory, for by disregarding her just representation to put an end to this violent state of affairs through the decision of arbiters, her Majesty's Government has herself created and imposes upon her the painful, though peremptory, duty of providing for her own legitimate defense.

"To the territorial controversy between Great Britain and the Republic of Venezuela, thus briefly outlined, the United States have not been, and indeed, in view of its traditional policy, could not be, indifferent. The note to the British Foreign Office by which Venezuela opened negotiations in 1876 was at once communicated to this Government. In January, 1881, a letter of the Venezuelan Minister at Washington respecting certain alleged demonstrations at the mouth of the Orinoco, was thus answered by Mr. Everts, then Secretary of State: 'In reply I have to inform you that in view of the deep interest which the Government of the United States takes in all transactions tending to attempted encroachments of foreign powers upon the territory of any of the republics of this continent, this Government could not look with indifference at the forcible acquisition of such territory by England, if the missions of the vessels now at the mouth of the Orinoco should be found to be for that end. This Government awaits, therefore, with natural concern, the more particular statements promised by the Government of Venezuela, which it hopes will not be long delayed.'

"In the February following Mr. Everts wrote again on the same subject, as follows: 'Referring to your note of the 21st of December last, touching the operations of certain British war vessels in and near the mouth of the Orinoco River, and to my reply thereto of the 21st ult., as well as to the recent occasions in which the subject has been mentioned in our conferences concerning the business of your mission, I take it to be fitting now, at the close of the incumbency of the office I hold, to advert to the interest with which the Government of the United States cannot fail to regard any such purpose with respect to the control of American territory as is stated to be contemplated by the Government of Great Britain, and to express my regret that the further information promised in your note with regard to such designs had not reached me in season to receive the attention which, notwithstanding the severe pressure of public business at the end of an administrative term, I should have taken pleasure in bestowing upon it. I doubt not, however, that your representations in fulfillment of the awaited additional orders of your Government will have like earnest and solicitous consideration at the hands of my successor.'

Arbitration Suggested.

In November, 1882, the then State of negotiations with Great Britain, together with a copy of an intended note suggesting recourse to arbitration, was communicated to the Secretary of State by the President of Venezuela, with the expression of the hope that the United States would give him its opinion and advice, and such support as it deemed possible to offer Venezuela, in order that justice should be done her. Mr. Frelinghuysen replied in a dispatch to the United States Minister at Caracas, as follows:

This Government has already expressed its view that arbitration of such disputes is a convenient resort in the case of failure to come to a mutual understanding, and intimated its willingness, if Venezuela should so desire, to propose to Great Britain such a mode of settlement. It is felt that the tender of good offices would not be so profitable if the United States were to approach Great Britain as the advocate of any prejudged solution in favor of Venezuela. So far as the United States can counsel and assist Venezuela it believes it best to confine its reply to the renewal of the suggestion of arbitration and the offer of all its good offices in that direction. This suggestion is the more easily made, since it appears from the instruction sent by Señor Salas to the Venezuelan Minister in London on the same 15th of July, 1882, that the President of Venezuela proposed to the British Government the submission of the dispute to arbitration by a third power.

You will take an early occasion to present the foregoing considerations to Señor Salas, saying to him that, while trusting that the direct pro-

posal for arbitration already made to Great Britain may bear good fruit, it is, indeed, it has not already done so by its acceptance in principle, the Government of the United States will cheerfully lend any needful aid to press upon Great Britain, in a friendly way, the proposition so made; and at the same time you will say to Señor Salas (in personal conference, and with the formality of a written communication) that the United States, while advocating strongly the resources of arbitration for the adjustment of international disputes affecting the States of America, does not seek to put itself forward as their arbitrator; that, viewing all such questions impartially and with no intent or desire to pre-judge their merits, the United States will not refuse its arbitration if asked by both parties, and that, regarding all such questions as essentially and distinctively American, the United States would always prefer to see such contentions adjusted through the arbitration of an American rather than a European power.

Minister Guzman's Plan.

Gen. Guzman Blanco, the Venezuelan Minister to England in 1884, appointed with special reference to pending negotiations for a general treaty with Great Britain, visited Washington on his way to London, and, after several conferences with the Secretary of State respecting the objects of his mission, was thus commended to the good offices of Mr. Lowell, our Minister at St. James': 'It will necessarily be somewhat within your discretion how far your good offices may be profitably employed with her Majesty's Government to these ends, and, at any rate, you may take proper occasion to let Lord Granville know that we are not without concern as to whatever may affect the interests of a sister republic of the American Continent and its position in the family of nations.

"If Gen. Guzman should apply to you for advice or assistance in realizing the purposes of his mission, you will show him proper consideration, and, without committing the United States to any determinate political solution, you will endeavor to carry out the views of this instruction."

Arbitration Offered.

The progress of Gen. Guzman's negotiations did not fail to be observed by this Government, and in December, 1886, with a view to preventing the rupture of diplomatic relations—which actually took place in February following—the then Secretary of State, Mr. Bayard, instructed our Minister to Great Britain to tender the arbitration of the United States, in the following terms: 'It does not appear that at any time heretofore the good offices of this Government have been actually tendered to avert a rupture between Great Britain and Venezuela. As intimated in my Mem. 68, our inaction in this regard would seem to be due to the reluctance of Venezuela to have the Government of the United States take any steps having relation to the action of our Government which might, in appearance even, prejudice the resort to further arbitration or mediation which Venezuela desired. Nevertheless, the records abundantly testify our friendly concern in the adjustment of the dispute; and the intelligence now received warrants me in tendering through you to her Majesty's Government the good offices of the United States to promote an amicable settlement of the respective claims of Great Britain and Venezuela in the premises.

"As proof of the impartiality with which we view the question, we offer our arbitration, if acceptable, to both countries. We do this with the least hesitancy, as the dispute turns upon simple and readily ascertainable historical facts.

"Her Majesty's Government will readily understand that this attitude of friendly neutrality and entire impartiality touching the merits of the controversy, consisting wholly in a difference of facts between our friends and neighbors, is entirely consistent and compatible with the sense of responsibility that rests upon the United States in relation to the South American republics. The doctrines we announced two generations ago, at the instance and with the moral support and approval of the British Government, have lost none of their force or importance in the progress of time, and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States are really interested in conserving a status the wisdom of which has been demonstrated by the experience of more than half a century.

"It is proper, therefore, that we should convey to Lord Salisbury, in such sufficiently guarded terms as your discretion may dictate, the satisfaction that would be felt by the Government of the United States in perceiving that its wishes in this regard were permitted to have influence with her Majesty's Government.

Great Britain Declined.

This offer of mediation was declined by Great Britain, with the statement that a similar offer had already been received from another quarter, and that the Queen's Government was still not without hope of a settlement by direct diplomatic negotiations. In February, 1888, having been informed that the Government of British Guiana had, by formal decree, laid claim to the territory traversed by the route of a proposed railway from Ciudad Bolivar to Cuacipati, Mr. Bayard addressed a note to our Minister to England from which the following extracts are taken:

The claim now stated to have been put forth by the authorities of British Guiana necessarily gives rise to grave disquietude, and creates an apprehension that the territorial claim does not follow historical traditions or evidence, but is apparently indelible. At no time hitherto does it appear that the district of which Cuacipati is the centre has been claimed as British territory, or that such jurisdiction has ever been asserted over its inhabitants, and if the reported decree of the Governor of British Guiana be, indeed, genuine, it is not apparent why any line of railway from Ciudad Bolivar to Cuacipati should enter or traverse territory within the control of Great Britain.

It is true that the line claimed by Great Britain as the western boundary of British Guiana is uncertain and vague. It is only necessary to examine the British Colonial Office list for a few years back to perceive this. In the issue for 1877, for instance, the line runs nearly southerly from the mouth of the Amacuro to the junction of the Cullinga and Takutu Rivers. In the issue of 1887, ten years later, it makes a wide detour to the westward, following the Yururi. Cuacipati lies considerably to the westward of the line officially claimed in 1887, and it may perhaps be instructive to compare with it the map which doubtless will be found in the Colonial Office list for the present year.

It may be well to refer to the note of Lord Salisbury the great gratification it would afford this Government to see the Venezuelan dispute amicably and honorably settled by arbitration or otherwise, and our readiness to do anything we properly can to assist in the settlement of the same.

In the course of your conversation you may refer to the publication in The London Financier of Jan. 24, (a copy of which you can procure and exhibit to Lord Salisbury,) and express apprehension lest the widening pretensions of British Guiana to possess territory over which Venezuela's jurisdiction has never heretofore been disputed may not diminish the chances for a practical settlement of the controversy.

If, indeed, it should appear that there is no fixed limit to the British boundary claim, our good disposition to aid in a settlement might not only be defeated, but be obliged to give place to a feeling of grave concern.

Blaine's Stand Reviewed.

Information having been received in 1889 that Barima, at the mouth of the Orinoco, had been declared a British port, Mr. Blaine, then Secretary of State, authorized Mr. White to confer with Lord Salisbury for the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Venezuela on the basis of a temporary restoration of the status quo, and on May 6, 1890, sent the following telegram to our Minister to England, Mr. Lincoln:

Mr. Lincoln is instructed to use his good offices with Lord Salisbury to bring about the resumption of diplomatic intercourse between Great Britain and Venezuela as a preliminary step toward the settlement of the Venezuelan dispute by arbitration. The joint proposals of Great Britain and the United States toward Portugal, which have just been brought about, would seem to make the present time propitious for submitting to Lord Salisbury a proposal for arbitration. He is requested to propose to Lord Salisbury, with a view to an accommodation, that an informal conference be had in Washington or in London at a special meeting of the three powers. In such conference the position of the United States is one solely of impartial friendship toward both litigants. It is, nevertheless, desired that you shall do all you can consistently with our attitude to induce some accord between the contestants, by which the merits of the controversy may be fairly ascertained, and the rights of each party justly confirmed. The neutral position of this Government does not comport with any expression of opinion on the part of this department as to what these rights are, but it is confident that the shifting footing on which the British boundary question has been resting for so long a past, is an obstacle to such a correct appreciation of the nature and grounds of her claim as would alone warrant the formation of any opinion.

In the course of a special mission, 1890, Venezuela sent Lord Salisbury a proposal to bring about the resumption of diplomatic relations with Great Britain, through the good offices of the United States Minister. But the mission failed, because the British Government, steadily adhered to by Venezuela, was the reference of the boundary dispute to arbitration. Since the close of the negotiations initiated by Señor Michelena, the controversy between Great Britain and the United States, as well as to Venezuela, has represented it to have reached an acute stage—making definite action by the United States imperative—and has not ceased to excite the services and support of the United States in aid of its final adjustment. These appeals have not been received with indifference, and our Ambassador to Great Britain has been uniformly instructed to exert all his influence in the direction of the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Venezuela, and in favor of arbitration of the boundary controversy. The Secretary of State, in a communication of Mr. Bayard, bearing date July 13, 1894, used the following language:

A Peaceable Settlement Desired.

"The President is inspired by a desire for a peaceable and honorable settlement of the existing difficulties between an American State and a powerful transatlantic nation, and would be glad to see the re-establishment of such diplomatic relations between them as would promote that end.

"I can discern but two equitable solutions of the present controversy. One is the arbitration of the rights of the disputants, as the respective successors to the historical rights of Holland and Spain over the region in question. The other is to create a new boundary line in accordance with the dictates of mutual expediency and consideration. The two Governments have

ing so far been unable to agree on a conventional line, the consistent and conspicuous advocacy by the United States and England of the principles of arbitration and their recourse thereto in settlement of important questions arising between them makes such a mode of adjustment especially appropriate in the present instance, and this Government will gladly do what it can to further a determination in that sense."

The President's Views.

Subsequent communications to Mr. Bayard direct him to ascertain whether a Minister from Venezuela would be received by Great Britain. In the annual message to Congress of Dec. 3 last the President used the following language:

"The boundary of British Guiana still remains in dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela. Believing that its early settlement, on some just basis alike honorable to both parties, is in the line of our established policy to remove from this hemisphere all causes of difference with powers beyond the sea, I shall renew the efforts heretofore made to bring about a restoration of diplomatic relations between the disputants and to induce a reference to arbitration a resort which Great Britain so conspicuously favors in principle and respects in practice, and which is earnestly sought by her weaker adversary." And Feb. 22, 1895, a joint resolution of Congress declared that the President's suggestion "that Great Britain and Venezuela refer their dispute as to boundaries to friendly arbitration be earnestly recommended to the favorable consideration of both parties in interest."

The important features of the existing situation, as shown by the foregoing recapitulation, may be briefly stated:

1. The title to territory of indefinite but confessedly very large extent is in dispute between Great Britain on the one hand and the South American Republic of Venezuela on the other.
2. The disparity in the strength of the claimants is such that Venezuela can hope to establish her claim only through peaceful methods—through an agreement with her adversary, either upon the subject itself or upon an arbitration.
3. The controversy, with varying claims on the part of Great Britain, has existed for more than half a century, during which period many earnest and persistent efforts have been made to bring about a friendly agreement have proved unsuccessful.
4. The utility of the endeavor to obtain a conventional line being recognized, Venezuela, for a quarter of a century, has asked and striven for arbitration.
5. Great Britain, however, has always and continuously refused to arbitrate except upon the condition of a renunciation of a large part of the Venezuelan claim, and of a concession to herself of a large share of the territory in controversy.
6. By frequent interpositions of its good offices at the instance of Venezuela, by constantly urging and promoting the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries, by pressing for arbitration of the disputed boundary, by offering to act

as arbitrator, by expressing its grave concern whenever new illegal instances of British aggression upon Venezuela territory have been brought to its notice, the Government of the United States has made it clear to Great Britain, and to the world, that the controversy is both in its honor and its interests are involved, and the continuance of which it cannot regard with indifference.

This Country's Position.
The accuracy of the foregoing analysis of the existing status cannot, it is believed, be challenged. It shows that status to be such that those charged with the interests of the United States are now forced to determine exactly what those interests are and what course of action they require. It compels them to decide to what extent, if any, the United States may and should intervene in a controversy between and primarily concerning only Great Britain and Venezuela. It shows that the Government is bound to see that the integrity of Venezuelan territory is not impaired by the pretensions of its powerful antagonist. Are such rights and duties to be left to the United States? or not? The United States has already done all, if not more than all, that a purely sentimental interest in the affairs of another country could justify it in pushing its intervention further would be unbecoming and undignified, and might well subject it to the charge of impertinent intermeddling with affairs of which it has no right to concern itself.

On the other hand, if any such right and duty exist, their due exercise and discharge will not permit of any action that shall not result in the accomplishment of the end in view. The question thus presented, as matter of principle and regard being had to the settled national policy, is one of such difficulty of solution and of such momentous practical consequences dependent upon its determination requires that it should be carefully considered, and that the grounds of the conclusion arrived at should be fully and frankly stated.

That there are circumstances under which a nation may justly interpose in a controversy to which two or more other nations are the direct and immediate parties is an admitted canon of international law. The doctrine is ordinarily expressed in terms of the most general character, and is, and has been, incapable of more specific statement. It is declared, in substance, that a nation may avail itself of this right whenever what is done or proposed by any of the parties is seriously and directly menacing to its own integrity, tranquillity, or welfare. The propriety of the rule when applied in good faith will not be questioned in any quarter. On the other hand, it is an inevitable, though unfortunate, consequence of the wide scope of the rule that it has only too often been made a cloak for schemes of wanton spoliation and aggrandizement. We are concerned at the time, however, not so much with the general rule as with a form of it which is particularly characteristic of ordinary American. Washington, in the solemn admonitions of the farewell address, explicitly warned his countrymen against entanglements with the politics or the controversies of European powers. "Europe," he said, "has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be regarded with jealousy and suspicion; the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course."

The Monroe Doctrine.
During the Administration of President Monroe, this doctrine of the farewell address was first considered in all its aspects and with a view to all its practical consequences. The farewell address, while it took America out of the field of European politics, was silent as to the part Europe might be permitted to play in America. Doubtless it was thought that the latest addition to the family of nations should not make haste to prescribe rules for the guidance of its older members and the expediency and propriety of serving the powers of Europe with notice of a complete and distinctive American policy, excluding them from interference with American political affairs, might seem dubious to a generation to whom the French alliance, with its manifold advantages to the cause of American independence was fresh in mind. Twenty years later, however, the situation had changed. The lately born nation had greatly increased in power and resources, had demonstrated its strength on land and sea, and the conflicts of arms as in the pursuits of peace, and had begun to realize the commanding position on this continent which the character of its soil and its remoteness from the chief scene of European contentions combined to give to it. The Monroe Administration, therefore, could not but have applied and apply the logic of the farewell address by declaring, in effect, that American non-interference in European affairs necessarily implied American non-interference in American affairs.

What Monroe Believed.
Conceiving unquestionably that complete European non-interference in American concerns would be cheaply purchased by complete American non-interference in European concerns, President Monroe, in the celebrated message of Dec. 2, 1823, used the following language:

In the way of the American powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which are too obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense of which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed felicity, this whole Nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any intervention for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. . . .

Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the Government de facto as the legitimate Government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these concerns, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their system to any portion of either the continent without endangering our peace and happiness, nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren are left to themselves, would they not rather be left to their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference. It is the policy of the Monroe Administration, however, did not content itself with formulating a correct rule for the regulation of the relations between Europe and America. It aimed also to secure the practical benefits to result from the application of the rule. Hence the message just quoted declared that the American continents were fully occupied by European powers. In this spirit and this purpose, also, are to be attributed the passages of the same message which treat any infringement of the rule against interference in American affairs on the part of the powers of Europe as an act of unfriendliness to the United States. It is realized that it was futile to keep down such a rule unless its observance could be enforced. It was manifest that the United States was the only power in the hemisphere capable of enforcing it. It was, therefore, courageously declared, not merely that Europe ought not to interfere in American affairs, but that any European power doing so would be regarded as antagonizing the interests and inviting the opposition of the United States.

America Not Open to Colonization.
That America is in no part open to colonization, though the proposition was not universally admitted at the time of its first enunciation, has long been universally conceded. We are now concerned, therefore, only with that other practical application of the Monroe doctrine, the disregard of which by a European power is to be deemed as an act of unfriendliness toward the United States.

What the United States Demands.
The precise scope and limitations of this rule cannot be too clearly apprehended. It does not establish any general protectorate by the United States over other American States. It does not relieve any American

State from its obligations as fixed by international law nor prevent any European power directly interested from enforcing such obligations or from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them. It does not contemplate any interference in the internal affairs of any American State or in the relations with whom and other American States. It does not justify any attempt on our part to change the established form of government of any American State, or to prevent its people of such State from altering that form according to their own will and pleasure.

The rule in question has but a single purpose and end, and that is to prevent European power or combination of European powers shall forcibly deprive an American State of the right and power of self-government and of shaping or itself its own political fortunes and destinies.

That the rule thus defined has been the accepted public law of this country ever since the promulgation cannot fairly be denied. Its promulgation by the Monroe Administration at that particular time was unquestionably due to the inspiration of Great Britain, which at once gave to the open and unqualified admission, which has never been withdrawn. But the rule was decided upon and formulated by the Monroe Administration, and it is not an American doctrine of great import to the safety and welfare of the United States, after the most careful consideration by a Cabinet which numbered in its members John Quincy Adams, Calhoun, Crawford, and Wirt, and which, before acting, took both Jefferson and Madison into its counsel. Its promulgation was not a device to proclaim by the entire people of the country, irrespective of party. Three years after, Webster declared that the doctrine involved the honor of the country. "I look upon it," he said, "as part of its treasures of reputation, and, for one, I intend to guard it." and he added: "I look on the message of December 2, 1823, as a part of our history. I will help neither to erase it nor to tear it out; nor shall it be by any means obliterated or blotted. It did honor to the sagacity of the Government, and I will not diminish that honor."

The Action of Congress.
Though the rule thus highly eulogized by Webster has never been formally affirmed by Congress, the House, in 1864, declared against the Mexican monarchy sought to be set up by the French as not in accord with the policy of the United States, and in 1889 the Senate expressed its disapproval of the connection of any European power with a canal across the Isthmus of Darien or Central America. It is manifest that if a rule has been openly and solemnly declared and acted upon by the executive branch of the Government for more than seventy years, without express repudiation by Congress, it must be conclusively presumed to have its sanction. Yet it is certainly no more than the exact truth to say that every Administration since President Monroe's has had occasion to examine and consider the Monroe doctrine, and has in ment. Presidents have given it emphatic endorsement in their messages upon it. In messages to Congress, and Secretaries of State have time after time made it the theme of diplomatic representation.

For, if the practical results of the rule be sought for, is the record either meagre or obscure. Its first and immediate effect was, indeed, most momentous and far reaching. It was the controlling factor in the emancipation of South America, and the independent States which now divide that region between them are largely indebted for their freedom to it. Since then the most striking single achievement of the United States in its history has been credited to the rule is the evacuation of Mexico by the French, upon the termination of the civil war, and also indebted to it for the provisions of the Hay-Bulwer treaty, which both neutralized any inter-oceanic canal across Central America and expressly excluded Great Britain from occupying or exercising any dominion over any part of Central America. It has been used in the case of Cuba as if justifying the refusal to yield the sovereignty of Spain will be respected, the island will not be permitted to become the possession of any other European power. It has been influential in bringing about the definite relinquishment of our supposed claims by Great Britain over the Mosquito coast. President Polk, in the case of Yucatan, and the proposed voluntary transfer of that country to Great Britain, relied upon the Monroe doctrine when he declared in a special message to Congress on the subject that the United States could not consent to any such transfer, and that what the same spirit Secretary Fish affirmed in 1870 that President Grant had but followed "the teachings of all our history" in declaring in his annual message of that year that existing dependencies were no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one European power to another, and that when the present color of the world they are to become independent powers. Another development of the rule, though apparently not necessarily required by either its letter or its spirit, is its effect in the objection to arbitration of South American controversies by a European power. American questions, it is said, are for American decision, and the United States, the United States went so far as to refuse to mediate in the war between Chili and Peru jointly with Great Britain and France. Finally, on the grounds that the rule was the authority of the Monroe doctrine, and the prestige of the United States as its exponent and sponsor would be seriously impaired, Secretary Bayard recently insisted the enforcement of the Pelletier claim against Haiti.

The Haitian Case.
"The United States," he said, "has proclaimed herself the protector of this Western World, in which she is by far the strongest power, from the intrusion of European sovereignties. She can point with proud satisfaction to the fact that over and over again she has declared effectively that serious indeed would be the consequences if European hostile foot should, without just cause, tread those States in the New World which have emancipated themselves from European control. She has announced that she would cherish, as it becomes her, the territorial rights of the States of the Western Hemisphere, and that she would not merely, as in the eyes of the law, equal to even the greatest of nationalities, but in view of her distinctive policy as entitled to be regarded by her as the object of a peculiar reverence. She has bound to say that if we should sanction, by reprisals in Haiti, the ruthless invasion of her territory and independence, which by which facts now before us disclose, if we approve by solemn Executive action and Congressional assent that invasion, it will be difficult for us hereafter to assert that in the New World, of whose rights we are the peculiar guardians, these rights have never been invaded by ourselves."

The foregoing enumeration not only shows the many instances wherein the rule in question has been affirmed and applied, but also demonstrates that the Venezuelan boundary controversy in any view within the scope and spirit of the rule, as uniformly accepted and acted upon. A doctrine of American public law thus long and firmly established and supported could not easily be ignored in a proper case for its application, even were the considerations upon which it is founded obscure or questionable. No such objection can be made, however, to the Monroe doctrine, understood and defined in the manner already stated. It rests, on the contrary, upon facts and principles that are both intelligible and incontrovertible.

That distance and 3,000 miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between a European and an American State unnatural and inexpedient will hardly be denied. But physical and geographical considerations are the least of the objections to such a union. Europe, as Washington observed, has a set of primary interests which are peculiar to herself. America is not interested in them, and ought not to be vexed or complicated with them. Each great European power, for instance, to-day maintains enormous armies and fleets in self-defense and for protection against any other European power. What have the States of America to do with that condition of things, or why should they be impoverished by wars or preparations for wars, which they cannot or results they can have no direct concern? If all Europe were to suddenly fly to arms over the fate of Turkey, would it not be reasonable to expect that the United States should find itself inextricably involved in the miseries and burdens of the contest? If it were, it would prove to be a partnership in the cost and the loss of the contest, and not in any ensuing benefits. What is true of the material is no less true of what may be termed the moral interests involved. Those pertaining to Europe are peculiar to

her, and are entirely diverse from those pertaining and peculiar to America.

Nothing in Harmony.
Europe, as a whole, is monarchical, and, with the single important exception of the Republic of France, is committed to the monarchical principle. America, on the other hand, is devoted to the exactly opposite principle—to the idea that every people has an inalienable right of self-government, and in the United States of America has furnished to the world the most conspicuous and conclusive example and proof of the excellence of free institutions, whether from the standpoint of natural rights or of individual happiness. It cannot be necessary, however, to enlarge upon this phase of the subject. Whether moral or material interests be considered, it cannot be universally conceded that those of Europe are irreconcilably diverse from those of America, and that any European control of the latter is necessarily both incongruous and injurious.

If, however, for the reasons stated, the forcible intrusion of European powers into American politics is to be deprecated, it is to be deprecated should be resisted and prevented—such resistance and prevention must come from the United States. It would be a mockery to say that it made the part of attack. But if they come at all, they must also come from it when any other American State is attacked, since the United States has the strength adequate to the exigency.

It is true, then, that the safety and welfare of the United States are so concerned with the maintenance of the independence of the American States, that the United States European power as to justify and require the interposition of the United States to prevent its interference in the Americas. The question can be candidly answered in but one way. The States of America, South as well as North, by geographical proximity by racial sympathy by similarity of governmental constitutions, are friends and allies, commercially and politically, of the United States. To allow the subjugation of any of them by a European power is of course completely to reverse that situation and signifies the loss of all the advantages incident to their natural relations to us, and to all. The people of the United States have a vital interest in the cause of popular self-government. They have secured the right for themselves, and they desire to see it for all. Infinite blood and treasure. They have realized and exemplified its beneficent operation by a career unexampled in point of success and greatness of achievement. They believe it to be for the healing of all nations, and that civilization must either advance or retrograde, accordingly as its supremacy is extended or curtailed.

The Position of Americans.
Imbued with these sentiments, the people of the United States might not improbably be wrought up to an active propaganda in favor of a cause so highly valued both for themselves and for mankind. But the age of crusades has passed, and they are content with such assertion of defense of the right of popular self-government as their own security and welfare demand. It is in that view more than in any other that they believe it not to be tolerated that the political control of an American State shall be forcibly assumed by a European power. The mischiefs apprehended from such a course are none the less real because not immediately imminent in any specific case, and are none the less to be guarded against because the combination of circumstances which will bring it about cannot be predicted. The civilized States of Christendom deal with each other on substantially the same principles that regulate the conduct of individuals. The greater the enlightenment the more surely every State perceives that its permanent interests require it to be governed by the immutable principles of right and justice. Each, errorless, is only too liable to succumb to the temptations offered by seeming special opportunities for its own aggrandizement, and each will impose its own safety were it not to remember that for the regard and respect of other States it must be largely dependent upon its own strength and power.

The United States is to-day practically sovereign on this continent, and its flat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interference. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good-will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized State, nor because of its wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States.

It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its abundant resources, combined with its isolated position, render it invulnerable of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers. All the advantages of this superiority are at once imperiled if the United States should permit European powers may convert American States into colonies or provinces of their own. The principle would be eagerly availed of, and it would be impossible to resist. It would acquire a base of military operations against us. What one power was permitted to do could not be denied to another, and it would be a matter of time before the struggle now going on for the acquisition of Africa might be transferred to South America. If it were, the weaker countries would unquestionably be absorbed, while the ultimate result might be the partition of all South America between the various European powers.

The disastrous consequences to the United States of such a condition of things are obvious. The loss of prestige, of authority, and of weight in the councils of the family of nations would be among the least of them. Our only real rivals in power, as enemies in war, would be found located at our very doors. Thus far in our history we have been spared the burdens and evils of immense standing armies, of all the other accessories of huge warlike establishments, and the exemption has largely contributed to our national greatness and glory, as well as to the happiness of every citizen.

What Would Be Meant.
But, with the powers of Europe permanently encamped on American soil, the ideal conditions we have thus far enjoyed cannot be expected to continue. We, too, must be armed to the teeth; we, too, must convert the flower of our male population into soldiers and sailors, and by withdrawing them from the various pursuits of peaceful industry, we, too, must practically annihilate a large share of the productive energy of the Nation. How a greater calamity than this could overtake us it is difficult to see. Nor are our just apprehensions to be allayed by suggestions of the friendliness of European powers, of their good will toward us, of their dispositive should they be our neighbors, to dwell with us in peace and harmony. The people of the United States have learned in the school of experience to what extent the relations of States to each other depend—not upon sentiment nor principle, but upon selfish interest. They will not soon forget in their hour of distress all their anxieties and burdens were aggravated by the possibility of demonstrations against them. National life on the part of powers with whom there is long maintained the most harmonious relations. They have yet in mind that France seized upon the apparent opportunity of our civil war to set up a puppet Government in the State of Mexico. They realize that had France and Great Britain held important South American possessions, work and benefit, that it would be necessary to destroy the greatness of the great Republic in the hemisphere by furthering its dismemberment might have been irresistible. From that grave peril they have been saved in the past, and may be saved again in the future through the operation of the sure but silent force of the doctrine proclaimed by President Monroe. To abandon it, on the other hand, disregarding both the logic of the situation and the facts of our past experience, would be to renounce a policy which has protected us against foreign aggression and a prolific source of internal progress and prosperity.

There is, then, the doctrine of American public law was founded in principle and abundantly sanctioned by precedent, which entitles and requires the United States to treat as an injury the forcible assumption by a European power of political control over an American State. The application of the doctrine to the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela remains to be made, and presents no real difficulty. Though the dispute relates to a boundary line, yet, as it is between States, it necessarily involves the right of control to be lost by one party and gained by the other. The political control at stake, too, is of no mean importance, but concerns a domain of great extent. British claim, it will be remembered, apparently expanded in two years some 33,000 square miles—and if it also directly involves the command of the mouth of the Orinoco, as of immense consequence in connection with the whole river navigation of the interior of South America.

Great Britain's False Claim.
It has been intimated, indeed, that in respect of these South American possessions Great Britain is herself an American State like any other, so that a controversy between her and Venezuela is to be settled between themselves as if it were between Venezuela and Brazil or between Venezuela and Colombia, and does not call for any justifiable United States intervention. If this view is reasonable at all, it is certainly so in plain. Great Britain as a South American State is to be entirely differentiated from Great Britain generally, and if the boundary line is to be determined by force, it is wise than by force, British Guiana, with her own independent resources, and not those of the British Empire, should be left to settle the matter with Venezuela—an arrangement which very possibly Venezuela

ed to by the United States, or that, if such position be adhered to with the result of enlarging the bounds of British Guiana, it should not be regarded as amounting, in substance, to an invasion and conquest of Venezuelan territory.

The President's Duty.
In these circumstances the duty of the President appears to him unmistakable and imperative. Great Britain's assertion of title to the disputed territory, combined with her refusal to have that title investigated, is a substantial appropriation of the territory to her own use. Not to protest and give warning that the transaction will be regarded as injurious to the interests of the people of the United States, as well as oppressive to the people of Venezuela, would be to determine by another branch of the Government, it is clearly for the Executive to leave nothing undone which may tend to render such determination unnecessary.

You are instructed, therefore, to present the foregoing views to Lord Salisbury by reading to him this communication, (leaving with him a copy, should he so desire,) and to reinforce them by such pertinent considerations as will doubtless occur to you. They call for a definite decision upon the point whether Great Britain will consent or will decline to submit the Venezuelan boundary question in its entirety to impartial arbitration. It is the earnest hope of the President that the conclusion will be on the side of arbitration, and that Great Britain will add one more to the conspicuous precedents which she has already furnished in favor of that wise and just mode of adjusting international disputes.

If he is to be disappointed in that hope, however, he is not to be anticipated, and, in his judgment, calculated to greatly embarrass the future relations between this country and Great Britain—it is his wish in itself, would be to ignore an established policy with which the honor and welfare of this country are closely identified. While the measures necessary or proper for the vindication of that policy are to be determined by another branch of the Government, it is clearly for the Executive to leave nothing undone which may tend to render such determination unnecessary.

The declaration of the Monroe message, that existing colonies or dependencies of a European power would not be interfered with by the United States, means colonies or dependencies then existing, with their limits as then existing. So it has been invariably construed, and so it must continue to be construed, unless it is to be deprived of all vital force. Great Britain cannot be deemed a South American State within the purview of the Monroe doctrine, nor if she is appropriating Venezuelan territory, is it material that she does so by advancing the frontier of an old colony instead of by the planting of new colonies. The difference is matter of form, and not of substance, and the doctrine, if pertinent in the one case, must be in the other also. It is not admitted that Great Britain has already assumed, that Great Britain is in fact usurping dominion over Venezuelan territory. While Venezuela charges such usurpation, Great Britain has already assumed, that Great Britain is in fact usurping dominion over Venezuelan territory. The United States, until the merits are authoritatively ascertained, can take sides with neither. But while this is so—while the United States must not be anticipated in circumstances at least, take upon itself to say which of the two parties is right and which is wrong—it is certainly within its rights to demand that the other shall be satisfied. Being entitled to resent and resist any sequestration of Venezuelan soil by Great Britain, it is necessarily entitled to know whether such sequestration has occurred or is now going on. Otherwise, if the United States is without the right to know and have it determined whether there is or is not British aggression upon Venezuelan territory, its right to protest against or repel such aggression may be dismissed from consideration.

The United States and the Boundary.
The right to act upon a fact the existence of which there is no right to have ascertained is simply illusory. It being clear, therefore, that the United States may legitimately insist upon the merits of the boundary question being determined, it is equally clear that there is but one feasible mode of determining them, viz., peaceful arbitration. The impracticability of any conventional adjustment has been often and thoroughly demonstrated. Even the possible of consideration is an appeal to arms—a mode of settling National pretensions unhappily not yet wholly obsolete.

If, however, it were not condemnable as a relic of itself, so one-sided a contest could not be invited nor even accepted by Great Britain without distinct disparagement to her character as a civilized State. Great Britain, however, assumes no such attitude. On the contrary, she both admits that there is a controversy and that arbitration should be resorted to for its adjustment. While she to that point her attitude leaves nothing to be desired, its practical effect is completely nullified by her insistence that the submission shall cover but a part of the controversy—that, as a condition of arbitrating her right to a part of the disputed territory, the remainder shall be turned over to her. If it were possible to point to a boundary which both parties had ever agreed or assumed to be such, either expressly or tacitly, the demand that territory should be submitted to arbitration would be a controversy—that, as a condition of arbitrating her right to a part of the disputed territory, the remainder shall be turned over to her. If it were possible to point to a boundary which both parties had ever agreed or assumed to be such, either expressly or tacitly, the demand that territory should be submitted to arbitration would be a controversy—that, as a condition of arbitrating her right to a part of the disputed territory, the remainder shall be turned over to her. If it were possible to point to a boundary which both parties had ever agreed or assumed to be such, either expressly or tacitly, the demand that territory should be submitted to arbitration would be a controversy—that, as a condition of arbitrating her right to a part of the disputed territory, the remainder shall be turned over to her.

The territory which Great Britain insists shall be ceded to her as a condition of arbitrating her claim to other territory has never been admitted to belong to her. It has been claimed and consistently so claimed by Venezuela. Upon what principle—except her feebleness as a nation—is she to be denied the right of having the claim arbitrated and upon by an impartial tribunal? No reason nor shadow of reason appears in all the voluminous literature of the subject.

It is to be so because I will it to be so," seems to be the only justification Great Britain offers. It is, indeed, intimated that the British claim to this particular territory is based upon occupation, whether acquired in or not has ripened into a perfect title by long continuance. But what prescription affecting territorial rights can be said to exist as between sovereign States? Or, if there is any, what is the legitimate consequence? It is not that all arbitration should be denied, but only that the submission should embrace an additional element, namely, the validity of the asserted prescriptive title, either in point of law or in point of fact.

Great Britain is Inconsistent.
No different result follows from the contention that, as a matter of principle, Great Britain cannot be asked to submit and ought not to submit, to arbitration her political and sovereign rights over territory. This contention, if applied to the whole or to a vital part of the possessions of a sovereign State, need not be controverted. To hold otherwise might be equivalent to holding that a sovereign State was bound to arbitrate its very existence. But Great Britain has herself shown, in various instances, that the principle has no pertinency when either the interests of the territorial area involved are not of controlling magnitude, and her loss of them as the result of an arbitration cannot appreciably affect her honor or her power. Thus, she has arbitrated the extent of her colonial territory with her own occupation, whether acquired in or not has ripened into a perfect title by long continuance. But what prescription affecting territorial rights can be said to exist as between sovereign States? Or, if there is any, what is the legitimate consequence? It is not that all arbitration should be denied, but only that the submission should embrace an additional element, namely, the validity of the asserted prescriptive title, either in point of law or in point of fact.

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By the National Arbitration Convention of 1848, the United States acquired San Juan and a number of smaller islands near the coast of Venezuela, and the boundary line was fixed in point and well illustrates both the effect to be given to long continued use and enjoyment and the fact that a truly great territory should be given to the dignity by reconsidering the most emphatic rejection of a proposition when satisfied of the obvious and intrinsic justice of the same. By the Convention of 1848, the United States acquired San Juan and a number of smaller islands near the coast of Venezuela, and the boundary line was fixed in point and well illustrates both the effect to be given to long continued use and enjoyment and the fact that a truly great territory should be given to the dignity by reconsidering the most emphatic rejection of a proposition when satisfied of the obvious and intrinsic justice of the same. By the Convention of 1848, the United States acquired San Juan and a number of smaller islands near the coast of Venezuela, and the boundary line was fixed in point and well illustrates both the effect to be given to long continued use and enjoyment and the fact that a truly great territory should be given to the dignity by reconsidering the most emphatic rejection of a proposition when satisfied of the obvious and intrinsic justice of the same.

Her Majesty's Government must, therefore, under any circumstances, maintain the right of the British Crown to the island of San Juan. The interests at stake in connection with the retention of that island are too important to admit of compromise, and your Lordship will consequently bear in mind that whatever arrangement as to the boundary line is finally arrived at, no settlement of the question will be accepted by Her Majesty's Government which does not provide for the island of San Juan reserved to the British Crown.

Thus, as already intimated, the British demand that her right to a portion of the disputed territory shall be acknowledged before she will consent to an arbitration as to the rest, seems to stand upon nothing but her ownipse dixit. She says to Venezuela, "You cannot have the land by force, because you are not strong enough; you can get none but by treaty, because an armistice, and you can take your chance of getting it by arbitration, only if you first agree to abandon to me such other portion as I may designate."

It is not perceived how such an attitude can be defended nor how it is reconcilable with that love of justice and fair play so eminently characteristic of the English race. In effect it deprives Venezuela of her free agency and puts her under virtual duress. Territory acquired by reason of it will be as much wrested from her by the strong hand as if occupied by British troops or covered by British fleets. It seems, therefore, quite impossible that this position of Great Britain should be assent-