



Democratic Security and Defence Policy

PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC - MINISTRY OF DEFENCE



REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA
2003



Contents

Letter from the President	5
Introduction by the Minister of Defence	8
I. Democratic Security and Defence Policy	12
■ Democratic Security	12
■ Democracy and Human Rights	14
■ Territorial Control and Co-ordinated Action of the State	15
■ Co-operation and Solidarity	17
■ Efficiency and Economy	18
■ Transparency and Legality	18
■ National Policies and Local Responses	19
■ National Defence	19
■ Multilateralism and Shared Responsibility	19
■ Security and Development	21
■ The Option of Negotiation	22
II. Threats	23
■ Terrorism	23
■ The Illegal Drugs Trade	25
■ Illicit Finance	27
■ The Traffic of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives	28
■ Kidnapping and Extortion	28
■ Homicide	29
III. Strategic Objectives	31
■ Consolidation of State Control throughout Colombia	31
■ Protection of the Population	31
■ Elimination of the Illegal Drugs Trade in Colombia	31
■ Maintenance of a Deterrent Capability	32
■ Transparent and Efficient Management of Resources	32
IV. Six courses of action: Co-ordinate, Strengthen, Consolidate, Protect, Co-operate and Communicate	33
A. Co-ordinating State Action	33
■ National Defence and Security Council	33
■ Joint Intelligence Committee	33
■ Ministry of Defence	34
■ Support Structures	35



B. Strengthening State Institutions 35

- Strengthening the Judicial System 35
- Strengthening the Armed Forces 37
- Strengthening the National Police 38
- Strengthening Intelligence 39
- Strengthening State Finances 40

C. Consolidating Control of National Territory 41

- Cycle of Recovery and Consolidation 41
- Recovery of State Control over Territory 42
- Maintenance of State Control over Territory 42
- Consolidation of State Control over Territory 42
- Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones 42
- Integrated Border Security Plan 43
- Urban Security 43
- Elimination of the Illegal Drugs Trade 44
- Dismantling of the Financial Structures of Terrorists and Illegal Drugs Traffickers 46

D. Protecting the Rights of Colombians and the Nation`s Infrastructure 47

- Protection of Persons at Risk 47
- Protection of Victims of Forced Displacement 47
- Protection against Terrorism 48
- Protection against Kidnapping and Extortion 49
- Protection of the Demobilised and Child Combatants 53
- Protection against Recruitment of Children and Adolescents by the Illegal Armed Groups 54
- Protection of the Economic Infrastructure 55
- Protection of the Roads 56

E. Co-operating in the Security of all 57

- The Security of Solidarity 57
- Co-operation Networks 57
- Reward Programme 58
- International Co-operation 58

F. Communicating State Policy and Action 60

- Terrorism and Communication 60
- Public Diplomacy 61

V. Financing and Assessment 62

Table of Responsibilites 63

Letter from the President, Álvaro Uribe Vélez

Restoring order and security – a basic prerequisite for the strengthening of civil liberties and human rights – is a central concern of this Government. Democratic Security is what is required to guarantee the protection of the citizens. If the State protects all its citizens equally and without discrimination, all Colombians will be able fully to enjoy their rights.

Democratic Security has a number of guiding principles and a set of policies that we are putting into practice. This document presents the roadmap of what we have done and what we have yet to do, so that Government officials, members of the Armed Forces and the National Police, as well as citizens in general understand our security policy as a whole and contribute to its achievement.

Democratic Security differs from the notions of security expounded by authoritarian regimes, which are based on ideological hegemony and political exclusion. This Government rejects the idea of “National Security” of bygone eras in Latin America, which considered certain ideological groups or political parties as the “enemies within”. We believe that all are welcome in a democracy. The opposition, those who disagree with the ideas of the Government or of their own party, will receive the same protection as those who support or agree with the Government.

Security and democracy are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, security guarantees the room for debate and dissent – the oxygen of all democracies – so that differences of opinion are not also risks to one’s personal security. However, a clear line must be drawn between the right to disagree and criminal conduct. Only when the State rigorously punishes crime and combats impunity will the space for opposition and criticism be fully guaranteed.

The antithesis of democratic politics is terrorism. The terrorist uses violence to impose his will on others, at the expense of the lives of thousands of civilians. That is what we witnessed in the attacks on the El Nogal Club in Bogotá and in the city of Neiva. We witnessed it, too, in Fortul, Arauca, where terrorists tricked a child with a bicycle bomb which they later activated, putting an end to his life. There can only be one response to terrorism: its defeat. Those who continue to engage in such criminal conduct will feel all the weight of the law.



We Colombians will not give in to this threat. We will defeat it with the support of all citizens. The key concept here is solidarity. Solidarity between citizens and solidarity with the security forces. This principle, a pillar of our constitution, is essential for peaceful coexistence, for the successful integration of Colombian society. The massive show of support of the population in co-operating with the authorities has made clear the determination of Colombians to put an end to terrorism.

We also need the support and co-operation of other countries, especially those of the region, in order to stop terrorism and its ally, the illegal drugs trade. We must freeze terrorist assets, pursue their men and bring them before the law. As I have said on many occasions: those who choose to shelter terrorists will end up being their victims. In the fight against terrorism it is not the sovereignty of nations that counts, but the sovereignty of democracy. It is a struggle between the sovereignty of democratic nations against the sovereignty of terrorism. A fight of all against terrorism.

We require efficiency with transparency. Efficiency measured in results and transparency measured in the strictest respect for human rights. In Colombia, we are lucky to count on an Armed Forces and a National Police that have a tradition of respect for democracy and the Constitution like no others in the continent. Efficiency framed by transparency and the strict observance of the law will be the basis of our actions.

We will regain the security of our citizens without limiting their freedoms. Colombia has always been an example in Latin American of press freedom. It has never occurred to us to restrict this right through the imposition of exceptional or permanent regulations. We only ask that journalists, like all citizens, act responsibly when it comes to disclosing information that may endanger the security of all.


All our actions will be plain and for all to see. The Armed Forces and the National Police represent the coercive element of the Constitution. They have a mandate to protect the life, liberty and property of all citizens. They are not “actors” in a war or conflict and should not be put implicitly on the same level as the terrorist organisations which they confront. They will fight these organisations with absolute determination, whether they come from the left or the right. The legitimacy of our institutions is built on our resolve to fight on a par all organisations, groups or persons who threaten the security of our citizens, institutions and democracy.

We are as willing to embrace those who abandon violence as we are determined to defeat terrorism. Just as we will not give up before defeating the last of the terrorists, we welcome into our demobilisation programme all those who wish to make a speedy peace with the Colombian State. We call upon young people both from the countryside and from the cities who have been tricked or forced into joining the terrorist organisations to lay down their arms and stop the suffering they inflict on society and their own families. We are prepared to take in all those who abandon violence, to provide them with security and educational opportunities so that they may re-enter society. And we ask those who still harbour political convictions or ideals to reject violence and to demobilise or reach a peace agreement with the Government. They will have all the guarantees so that they may exercise their political opposition.

Security is not achieved simply through the efforts of the Armed Forces and the National Police. This is an effort of the entire State and of all Colombians. A strong state structure, supported by citizen solidarity, guarantees the rule of law and the respect of rights and civil liberties.

The rule of law also guarantees development and economic prosperity. Every time a kidnapping occurs, investors' confidence is deeply affected, capital dispersed and employment lost. When Democratic Security develops a policy to eliminate kidnapping, it is defending the citizens and their basic social rights.

We have made progress, but there is a long road ahead. This is a long-term effort, which requires political perseverance to obtain concrete results, so that we may sustain our permanent demand for support from the citizens, so that all Colombians pay their taxes with full conviction, so that soldiers and policemen know they can count on their support. We will not rest until we have made Democratic Security a reality for all Colombians.



Casa de Nariño,
16 June 2003





Introduction by the Minister of National Defence, Marta Lucia Ramírez de Rincón

8

Guaranteeing the security of all Colombians is the responsibility not just of the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces and the National Police, but also of the entire Colombian State and of all of society. When President Uribe asked me to gather in one document both the conceptual framework of Democratic Security and the security policies of the Government, I set up a team with members from the Ministry of Defence, the Armed Forces, the War College and the National Police to analyse and design the most adequate solutions to the security problems of the country, following the guidelines of the President. The result of that exercise is presented here in this document.

Transparency and openness were our guiding principles. If the citizens' security is the responsibility of all, it is certainly above all the responsibility of Government. So we first had to start by opening up a discussion about security with other Government Ministries, in order to find joint solutions. Within the framework set by the President, we have worked out a joint security policy that assigns a central role to the prompt administration of justice, the better management of Government finances, the extension of public diplomacy and a well-functioning public administration, particularly at the local level.

We have thus drawn up a long-term state policy that involves not only the Executive, but also the other branches of power. We have designed special interministerial strategies to deal with kidnapping, for example, to demobilise the illegal armed groups, to protect the nation's infrastructure, to eliminate the illegal drugs business and to dismantle the finances of the terrorist organisations. We are convinced that in this way we not only fulfil our duty to protect the population, but we also secure the space for democratic debate. On the basis of these strategies we brought together all Government Ministries in order to establish a plan with clear priorities, responsibilities and programmes for each institution.

Just as important for the design of our security policy was the participation of different sectors of civil society. Through a long consultation process, in which we circulated the first drafts of this document and organised various discussion fora, we received comments and opinions from intellectuals, academics, private sector representatives and from many others who enriched the document with their observations and criticisms.

All kinds of interested citizens sent us their recommendations. At the same time, the regional security councils that the President heads week after week in all corners of Colombia allowed us to complement the Government's vision with that of those who suffer first hand the effects of terrorism and insecurity. We have taken account of all these proposals and concerns.

This represents a radical change. We Colombians have long thought that citizens' security was a problem for the National Police and the Armed Forces. For years there was a great vacuum in the activity of other state institutions in some critical areas of our geography and our democracy. It is precisely that vacuum that explains the growth of the drugs business and consequently of the terrorist organisations in large areas of our country. That is why the achievement of complete state territorial control, so as to guarantee the rule of law and democratic governance, is one of the pillars of this policy.

The security forces are totally committed to fulfilling their duty. In the last few years, their commanders have seen through a successful professionalisation process that has increased their response capacity, their mobility, and most of all has secured them very high levels of support from the public. The seriousness with which the Armed Forces and the National Police have applied themselves to the learning and spreading of a human rights culture is unparalleled in our continent and certainly in any other country that faces the security challenges that Colombia faces today.

As a result of this combination of ethics, professionalism and increased efficiency on the part of the security forces, the illegal armed groups have recognised that they are in a military cul-de-sac. Faced with that obstacle and lacking popular support, they have instead decided to unleash their capacity for destruction on the civilian population through the most atrocious acts of terrorism. Day after day they take the lives of innocent civilians or kidnap them in numbers that far exceed the violence of other such groups in Latin America. Their own organisations subsist thanks only to the terror with which they discipline their men and maltreat their women – and to the resources of the drugs trade with which they buy political support, both in Colombia and abroad.

The professionalisation of the security forces has also gained them high levels of recognition and trust from Colombians, who identify with their soldiers and policemen. The security forces will continue to be strengthened and will be a key element in guaranteeing the citizens' security. We have created new mobile brigades, high-altitude battalions, *campesino* soldier platoons – soldiers who perform their national service



in their places of origin – special anti-terrorist units, mobile *carabintero* squads, and we are extending the coverage of the National Police to all municipalities in the country.


Every effort will be made to complement the professionalisation process with increased co-ordination and ‘jointness’, both within the security forces as well as between these and other state investigative and judicial bodies. Intelligence co-ordination is a good example. From the beginning of the current Government, the Ministry of Defence has led joint meetings of the intelligence services of the Armed Forces, the National Police, DAS and CTI of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. We are already reaping the benefits of such mechanisms.

10

The security forces will take the first step in the effort to articulate a comprehensive response to Colombia’s security challenges. But the next step must be taken by the whole of the State and then by all of society. The civilian population cannot be a target of aggressions. But we Colombians all have not only the right, but also the duty to participate actively in the strengthening of our democracy, to support our institutions, to back the efforts of our security forces and to show solidarity with the victims of forced displacement, terrorism and violence in general. A strong democracy and a nation built on citizen solidarity are the best guarantee of our rights.

I have no doubt that with the leadership of President Uribe and a long-term security policy that has our citizens’ support we shall achieve our goal of individual security, the strengthening of the rule of law, the protection of democracy and, consequently, the well-being of all Colombians. Which is nothing less, as the President has pointed out, than the realisation of the principles and goals on our coat of arms: liberty and order.

Various academics and representatives of the private sector who had the opportunity to comment on this document pointed out the necessity of assuring the continuity of the policy over a long period in order to achieve its goals. That is why we have proposed that it be adopted as a state policy for the next ten years.



Ministry of Defence,
16 June 2003



I. Democratic Security and Defence Policy

12

1. *Democratic Security and Defence Policy* is a framework document in which the Government has set out the basic principles of Democratic Security, in order to protect the rights of Colombians and to strengthen the rule of law and the authority of democratic institutions, with the support of the citizens. The Democratic Security and Defence Policy is a long-term state policy which will unfold in co-ordination with all Government ministries and other branches of power. True security hinges on the capacity not only of the security forces to exercise the coercive power of the State, but also of the judiciary to guarantee the efficient administration of justice, of the Government to fulfil the constitutional responsibilities of the State, and of Congress to legislate without losing sight of security as the public good *par excellence*.
2. This document contains the general directives which will serve as guidelines for all plans and strategies to be formulated by Government Ministries, the Armed Forces and the National Police, and all other state institutions, which will set benchmarks and timetables in order to fulfil the objectives of this policy.
3. This document first sets out the basic principles of the policy; secondly, it describes the main threats to Colombian democracy and to the security of individual citizens; thirdly, it lists the strategic objectives which must be met in order to counter these threats; and finally, it describes the courses of action to be taken to fulfil these objectives.

Democratic Security

4. The general objective of the Democratic Security and Defence Policy is to strengthen and guarantee the rule of law throughout Colombia, through the reinforcement of democratic authority. That is, through the free exercise of authority by democratic institutions, the effective application of the law and the active participation of the citizen in matters of common interest.
5. The strengthening of the rule of law is the essential prerequisite to achieving the aim of Democratic Security: the protection of each

«The general objective of the Democratic Security and Defence Policy is to strengthen and guarantee the rule of law throughout Colombia, through the reinforcement of democratic authority.»

and every citizen, as stipulated by the Constitution. If the rule of law is firmly established throughout Colombian territory, then the rights and freedoms of the citizen will be protected; and the more the citizen feels protected, the more citizen participation and security increases.

«The strengthening of the rule of law is the essential prerequisite to achieving the aim of Democratic Security: the protection of each and every citizen.»

6. Security is not regarded primarily as the security of the State, nor as the security of the citizen without the assistance of the State. Rather, it is the protection of the citizen and democracy by the State with the solidarity and co-operation of the whole of society. Democratic Security is thus based on three pillars:

■ *The protection of the rights of all citizens*, regardless of gender, race, origin, language, religion or political ideology. All citizens, both those living in the country and those living in the city, are equal before the law and enjoy the same rights. The peasant, the businessman, the priest, the trade unionist, the school teacher, the human rights activist, the university professor, the journalist, the soldier and the policeman will all receive the same protection from the State, without discrimination.

■ *The protection of democratic values, plurality and institutions*. Pluralistic political debate depends upon the existence of a safe environment which allows the free expression of opinion and the free exercise of democratic authority. Politicians, both in Government and in opposition, need security to exercise their mandate or to participate in the political process without fearing for their personal security. Those who attack, kidnap or threaten mayors, councillors, governors, deputies, members of Congress and other political leaders are not only attacking an individual citizen, but the democratic will of the people as well. The Democratic Security and Defence Policy seeks to protect all political leaders, while securing the democratic framework and the opportunities for citizen participation provided by the Constitution.

■ *The solidarity and co-operation of all citizens in defence of democratic values*. It is the role of the State to uphold the rights of the citizen and to provide the institutional mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. However, the proper functioning of institutions also requires the active participation, solidarity and commitment of the citizen. Democratic participation consists not only in the use of the vote, but also in the observation and promotion of the civic values which uphold pluralistic political debate, in playing an active role in public affairs and in the defence of the freedom of each individual.

«Security is not regarded primarily as the security of the State, nor as the security of the citizen without the assistance of the State. Rather, it is the protection of the citizen and democracy by the State with the solidarity and co-operation of the whole of society.»



7. This is, in short, a policy *for the protection of the population*. It is a mistake to think, as some do, that there are only two ways forward in Colombia: ‘the path of peace’, which is the responsibility of the political leadership, and ‘the path of war’, which is the responsibility of the Armed Forces. This would free the political leadership and society in general from their responsibility to contribute to the security of all citizens, thus abandoning a threatened population to its fate and assigning to the Armed Forces and the National Police a task which they cannot accomplish on their own. Security is not principally a matter of coercion: it is the constant and effective presence of democratic authority, based on the collective effort of the whole of society (18)¹.

«Security is not principally a matter of coercion: it is the constant and effective presence of democratic authority, based on the collective effort of the whole of society.»

8. Secondly, so long as there is impunity and a lack of respect for the law and democratically constituted authority, the population will remain under threat, regardless of any possible negotiations with illegal armed groups. Unless the democratic institutions are strengthened, there will always be organisations, groups or persons that will continue to profit – whether they adduce political motives or not – from the absence of authority in order to wield arbitrary power over the population, to extort in return for ‘protection’ and to profit from the trade in illegal drugs.

Democracy and Human Rights

9. Unlike other regions of the hemisphere, where the rights of the citizen were eroded by the excessive use of power on the part of the State, the rights of Colombian citizens have been threatened mainly by the historic inability of Colombian institutions to assert their authority throughout the country and to provide citizens with continuous and reliable protection against the threat and arbitrary action of illegal armed groups. Despite the reinforcement and the extension of the reach of democracy as a result of the 1991 Constitution, the actions of the illegal armed groups over the last ten years have led to the rapid erosion of the authority of democratic institutions. Together with the illegal drugs traffickers, these organisations destroy the legal order and thereby open up areas of impunity not only for their illegal activities, but also for many other forms of crime. Their attempt to destroy or replace democratic institutions where their authority is weak not only undermines democratic governance, but also exposes the population to a reign of intimidation, violence and terror.

«Unless the democratic institutions are strengthened, there will always be organisations, groups or persons that will continue to profit – whether they adduce political motives or not – from the absence of authority in order to wield arbitrary power over the population, to extort in return for ‘protection’ and to profit from the trade in illegal drugs.»

10. The strengthening of democratic authority is thus an essential prerequisite to guaranteeing a respect for human rights. It is often

¹ Numbers in brackets refer to the corresponding paragraphs.

forgotten that human rights are more than just maxims of behaviour; they are the foundation and the *raison d'être* of the Constitution. If they are to have their full force, democracy must be sovereign and the State must be capable of upholding the law throughout the territory .

«Human rights are the foundation and the *raison d'être* of the Constitution. If they are to have their full force, democracy must be sovereign and the State must be capable of upholding the law throughout the territory.»

11. A proper respect for human rights, which is both a basic condition and an objective of democracy, can only be achieved when democracy is strong and bridges the gap between the law and real life: when the laws and institutions of the State are effective, political debate is not under threat and the citizen can play an active role, participating in community affairs, overseeing the authorities and in general showing solidarity with others.
12. The strengthening of the rule of law requires not only effective institutions, active citizen participation and the prevalence of judicial norms which guarantee rights and liberties; it also requires the Government to act in accordance with law. The security of Colombians will be re-established within the law and the democratic framework, which will itself become stronger as security improves. This will guarantee that the law and the respect for human rights prevail over the arbitrary abuses of the illegal armed groups. There will never be reconciliation without total respect for human rights (24).

15

Territorial Control and Co-ordinated Action of the State

«The security of Colombians will be re-established within the law and the democratic framework, which will itself become stronger as security improves.»

13. The prerequisite for the strengthening of the rule of law is the gradual consolidation of state control over the whole of Colombian territory. Without state territorial control it is not possible to guarantee the proper functioning of the justice system, which is hindered in many areas of the country by the intimidation which prosecutors, judges and local authorities suffer at the hands of illegal armed groups and drugs traffickers. And without the full application of the law, the population is exposed to the threats and arbitrary power wielded by the illegal armed groups and loses its rights and freedoms.
14. The security forces will initiate the process of consolidating State control of the territory, establishing their permanent and definitive presence in all municipalities with the help of mobile brigades and other units of the Armed Forces and the National Police. Units composed of professional soldiers, *campesino* soldiers and National Police *carabineros* will guarantee that territorial control is maintained (89). However, the responsibility for citizen security



cannot rest exclusively on their shoulders, for the reasons already mentioned (7). All state entities will contribute to the consolidation of democratic authority throughout Colombia.

15. The proper functioning of the judicial system, in particular, is the key to security, peaceful coexistence and a strong democracy. Just as the realisation of human rights requires the active participation of the citizens, so does citizen participation require the free exercise of political and civil rights, which are the basis of human rights. In other words, they require the rule of law, which is strengthened as confidence increases in the capacity of the judiciary to mediate conflicts effectively and impartially throughout the entire territory and across society. Without prompt and effective justice uncertainty prevails, thus providing the citizen with a pretext for taking security into his own hands. The ‘privatisation’ of security is no less a threat than the aggression suffered by those who try to protect themselves in this way. The protection and strengthening of the justice system, which requires territorial control, is at the heart of the Democratic Security and Defence Policy.

16. The effectiveness of the measures to consolidate territorial control hangs on the degree of co-ordination achieved between different state institutions. It will be a government priority to ensure that state action at all levels is carried out in a co-ordinated and integrated manner and that it has the support of the citizens. Nationally, responsibility for policy co-ordination will lie with the National Defence and Security Council (59), which will advise the President of the Republic on the relevant security priorities and responsibilities of government departments, the Armed Forces and the National Police. Local security councils will contribute to policy co-ordination in their areas (60), with the support and advice from the academic and private sectors. In order to achieve the unity of action which the circumstances demand, the Government will ensure that this policy is developed in conjunction with other branches of power, which share responsibility in the restoration of security.

17. At operational level, interagency support structures will ensure the co-ordination between different state bodies, to guarantee effective judicial action (66). They will not, however, all be of a uniform structure; the instruments at their disposal will depend on the nature of the threat. Where territorial control is weak, the main emphasis will be on the Armed Forces and the National Police. However, where territorial control is not under threat but there is, for example, a high degree of impunity, the judicial authorities will require less support from the Armed Forces and the National Police. The

«The prerequisite for the strengthening of the rule of law is the gradual consolidation of state control over the whole of Colombian territory.»

«The protection and strengthening of the justice system, which requires territorial control, is at the heart of the Democratic Security and Defence Policy.»

support structures will be aimed mainly at creating the necessary security conditions so that the judicial authorities can work in a concentrated and effective manner. The Democratic Security and Defence Policy is one whole and will be implemented simultaneously across the country.

Co-operation and Solidarity

«Active citizen participation, co-operation in the administration of justice and support for the authorities all play a major part in the strengthening the justice system and democracy and, consequently, in the strengthening of the rule of law. Above all, citizen co-operation is based on the principle of *solidarity* which forms the basis of a social and democratic State.»

«The Government supports the co-operation projects and the solidarity promoted by the NGOs in Colombia and will encourage a closer relationship between these organisations and the Colombian State, in the understanding that they operate within the democratic system.»

18. Ultimate responsibility for upholding the rights and freedoms of the citizen lies with the State, in accordance with its constitutional obligations. However, security is also the result of a collective effort by the citizens: it is the responsibility of all. Active citizen participation, co-operation in the administration of justice and support for the authorities all play a major part in the strengthening the justice system and democracy and, consequently, in the strengthening of the rule of law. These are constitutional duties which every citizen must strive to fulfil; but above all, citizen co-operation is based on the principle of *solidarity* which forms the basis of a social and democratic State. If common interest takes precedence over individual interest, if every Colombian shows as much solidarity towards those living in remote areas as he does towards his relatives or his neighbours, if he exercises his right and fulfils his duty to participate in the formation, exercise and control of political power, he will increase solidarity, strengthen the institutions and improve security.
19. In promoting solidarity the Government will work not only with the citizens in general but also with all sectors of civil society, such as academia, the private sector, non-governmental organisations dealing with development and human rights, local civic associations and the Church. The Government supports the co-operation projects and the solidarity promoted by the NGOs in Colombia and will encourage a closer relationship between these organisations and the Colombian State, in the understanding that they operate within the democratic system. The humanitarian work of NGOs and their promotion of a culture of human rights is a key complement to the efforts of state institutions. It is therefore in the interest of both the Government and NGOs that such organisations not be abused by illegal armed groups, as has occasionally – and fortunately exceptionally – occurred in the past.
20. Solidarity also demands a financial contribution to the security of all citizens; it is not possible to meet the security needs of the people unless taxes are paid. The proper payment of taxes is an integral part of citizen solidarity.



Efficiency and Economy

21. State institutions must have an effective response capacity to guarantee the security of the citizens. The Armed Forces and the National Police in particular must retain the initiative and the capacity to deter, prevent and respond efficiently and effectively to any attack on the population. Where a threat exists, available resources will be used to mount an immediate response in order to prevent the destruction of villages, the displacement of citizens, the kidnapping of civilians, the assassination of policemen and soldiers, or any other act of terrorism.
22. Just as citizens are expected to contribute to the strengthening of the security forces through the payment of taxes, so will the Government and the security forces work within the principles of efficiency, transparency and economy, to ensure that every *peso* spent contributes to security. Savings will be made wherever possible and used to strengthen the Armed Forces and National Police. Administrative reforms will be introduced along with strict budgetary controls. Cases of corruption will be severely punished. The citizen, too, should make a contribution to the economy drive by demanding accountability from the authorities and reporting any waste or corruption. The Armed Forces and the National Police will strive to achieve the right balance between operational and support personnel, endeavouring to have more soldiers and policemen in operational areas. At the same time, they will review their logistical processes, with help and advice from the private sector, so as to improve efficiency.

«Just as citizens are expected to contribute to the strengthening of the security forces through the payment of taxes, so will the Government and the security forces work within the principles of efficiency, transparency and economy, to ensure that every peso spent contributes to security.»

Transparency and Legality

23. All government actions will be transparent and open to public scrutiny. The strengthening of a culture of honesty and openness with effective mechanisms and tools to eradicate corruption is a matter of priority. An example will be set in the planning and implementation of contracts, the prevention of conflicts of interest and the rules governing ineligibility and incompatibility. Compliance with the constitutional principles of morality, effectiveness, economy, speed, impartiality, openness and the transparent use of public resources will ensure the best possible results for the citizen. Greater transparency and greater efficiency will translate into greater credibility.
24. All government action must take place within the framework of the law. The Government will rigorously uphold human rights and

«All government actions will be transparent and open to public scrutiny. The strengthening of a culture of honesty and openness with effective mechanisms and tools to eradicate corruption is a matter of priority.»

«Any human rights violation or abuse by a member of the Armed Forces and the National Police or any other state body will be punished at once.»

International Humanitarian Law, as required by the Constitution and the Law. Any violation or abuse by a member of the Armed Forces and the National Police or any other state body will be punished at once. A central aim of Democratic Security is the legitimacy of institutions in the eyes of the citizen and the community. This legitimacy depends on the application of these principles and the strictest respect for the law by the State.

National Policies and Local Responses

25. The Democratic Security and Defence Policy is an integral state strategy with national courses of action. But the Government's response will be tailored to local conditions and involve local authorities and society. The variety of factors which affect security, the disintegration of command structures within the illegal armed groups and their frequent merging with organised crime, as well as the different sources which fund these organisations, mean that different solutions must be found to suit different local conditions. Local authorities will therefore share responsibility with the National Government for the design and implementation of action plans tailored to their needs.

19

National Defence

26. The need to focus on internal security does not imply a neglect of external defence, which will receive the necessary attention. Colombia will remain faithful to her tradition of peaceful relations with her neighbours and respect for international law, but will maintain a deterrent capability with sufficient projection to ensure respect for her national sovereignty and territorial integrity, while keeping a strategic defensive posture. However, the nature of the threats which Colombia faces, particularly terrorism and the illegal drugs trade, means that, as in the case of many other countries which today face similar threats, the distinction between internal security and national defence has become blurred.

«Local authorities will share responsibility with the National Government for the design and implementation of action plans tailored to their needs.»

Multilateralism and Shared Responsibility

27. The use of terrorism to destabilise the State is the greatest threat to democracy in Colombia and the world. Colombian illegal armed groups have made civilians their prime target, in premeditated acts using non-conventional weapons. The kidnapping and murder of civilians, the destruction of infrastructure and the use of explosives against the people have all been recognised by the international community for what they are: acts of terrorism.



28. The strategies and actions against terrorism will be part of a state policy that will be subject to neither partisan nor bureaucratic interests and will comply fully with the international treaties signed by Colombia. This will be a national effort: an effort of the entire State and all citizens. The fight against terrorism, however, goes beyond national boundaries and calls for a multilateral response. Growing evidence of the involvement of international terrorist networks with illegal armed groups in Colombia demonstrates an urgent need for international co-operation against terrorism and the implementation of international agreements signed since 11 September 2001, especially UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism of 3 June 2002 and the Lima Agreement of the Andean Community of 17 June 2002. International co-operation is needed without delay to close the loopholes that allow terrorist groups to obtain finance, to move around or to act, using third countries as bases.

«Colombian illegal armed groups have made civilians their prime target, in premeditated acts using non-conventional weapons.»

29. The global illegal drugs trade is equally a danger to the stability of the State and to the citizens' security. Its power to corrupt puts democracy at risk; together with terrorism, it poses a threat not only to Colombia, but also to much of the Western Hemisphere, especially those countries in which the judiciary and state institutions are weak. The Government will not allow Colombian territory to go on being used by international illegal drugs trafficking organisations and is determined to eliminate the illegal drugs trade entirely from its territory. However, like terrorism, the illegal drugs trade is a transnational problem; the solution does not lie in a single country. It is also well known that illegal drugs traffickers and terrorists use the same channels to obtain supplies and launder money. Often a single organisation is involved in both activities (42). The United Nations Security Council has acknowledged in Resolution 1373 the fact that terrorism and illegal drugs trafficking are intertwined and emphasises the need to co-ordinate an international response to these crimes:

«The Government will not allow Colombian territory to go on being used by international illegal drugs trafficking organisations and is determined to eliminate the illegal drugs trade entirely from its territory.»

“4. [The Security Council] notes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organised crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasises the need to enhance co-ordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security”

«The United Nations Security Council has acknowledged in Resolution 1373 the fact that terrorism and illegal drugs trafficking are intertwined and emphasises the need to co-ordinate an international response to these crimes».

«There is no greater inequality in Colombia than in the access to security: it is the poor who are the least protected, who are displaced from their land and who suffer at first hand the terror of the illegal armed groups».

For precisely this reason, Colombia has been lodging formal requests for more than ten years with international organisations for a greater commitment from the international community to resolving the global illicit drugs problem in each and every one of its manifestations. More effective and efficient action against the demand for illegal drugs and against money laundering, the smuggling of chemical precursors and the trafficking of weapons is required (41). Different countries may and in fact do have different conceptions of how to deal internally with the illegal drugs problem; but these differences must not be allowed to obscure the shared responsibility which comes from being part of this criminal business.

Security and Development

30. Security is not the only concern of the Government, but it is the first. There is no greater inequality in Colombia than in the access to security: it is the poor who are the least protected, who are displaced from their land and who suffer at first hand the terror of the illegal armed groups. The World Bank comes to a similar conclusion in its study *Voices of the Poor* (2000), based on various testimonies from different regions of the world: “*The term ‘security’ seems to describe one of poor people’s major concerns... Poor people are vulnerable in many ways: their work and livelihoods are more at risk; they live in the most insecure areas, their assets are the most insecure, their housing is the most liable to damage, they have the least with which to protect themselves...* ”.
31. It is not just the protection of their rights which depends upon security. Economic development and employment opportunities also require a climate of security that encourages investment, trade and local authority spending for the benefit of community, all of which have suffered constant predation by illegal armed groups.
32. Security does not just bring economic improvements, it also strengthens society and provides more opportunities for the citizens, especially the less well off, to take responsibility for community affairs by becoming involved in political decisions, in their own economic projects and in overseeing the authorities. The Constitution and Law 134 of 1994 provide the legal bases for the strengthening of citizen participation, but this has yet to result in a sufficiently active participation at local level, partly because of the risks and threats that come with exercising political leadership in those regions where the illegal armed groups conduct their criminal activities.



33. Security contributes in this way to the empowerment of the citizen which is nothing less than the realisation of the autonomy and responsibility implicit in their rights and their equality before the law. Empowerment of the citizenry in turn contributes to security, as it encourages a sense of belonging and participation in the development of a common project.

34. Security is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the empowerment of the citizen. If a citizen is to enjoy all his freedoms, he needs an environment which helps him develop his capabilities. Education is crucial for increasing citizen participation and achieving equality. For that reason, the Government will revolutionise education through the creation of more than 1,500,000 school places. The Government's answer to the illegal armed groups' promotion of violence as a way of life will be to provide children with access to a school. Education fosters a culture of non-violence and stimulates a greater sense of belonging to our country and of our national values. The educational revolution and other measures to generate economic growth and development are the subject of the National Development Plan of the Government.

«Security contributes to the empowerment of the citizen which is nothing less than the realisation of the autonomy and responsibility implicit in their rights and their equality before the law.»

The Option of Negotiation

35. The Government has left the door open to negotiations with those who opt for democratic politics, provided they agree to a strictly enforced cease-fire. This will reduce violence and ensure the respect for human rights. The Government's position is this: an urgent cessation of hostilities, and patient negotiation and disarmament. Those who reintegrate themselves into society and a democratic way of life will be given the security guarantees for participating in politics that are the right of all in a democracy.

II. Threats

36. The security of the citizens, of democracy and of the national interest, as defined by the Constitution, is today exposed to a number of serious interrelated threats which often transcend national boundaries. These are not the only dangers facing Colombian democracy. Corruption, for example, is a major threat, as is common criminality. Both will receive the full attention of the Government. However, the following threats are those which pose an immediate danger to the stability of the country, its democratic institutions, and the lives of Colombians:

- Terrorism
- The illegal drugs trade
- Illicit finance
- The traffic of arms, ammunition and explosives
- Kidnapping and extortion
- Homicide

23

Terrorism

37. Terrorism is the main method used by the illegal armed groups to destabilise Colombian democracy. The United Nations Secretary General has said: “*The only common denominator among different variants of terrorism is the calculated use of deadly violence against civilians for political purposes*” (Security Council, 12 November 2001). This is precisely what is happening in Colombia, as can be seen from the growing number of civilians assassinated or massacred by illegal armed groups in the last five years:

«The United Nations Secretary General has said: *The only common denominator among different variants of terrorism is the calculated use of deadly violence against civilians for political purposes.*»

	Civilians Assassinated ²		Civilians Assassinated in massacres ³	
	FARC & ELN	AUC	FARC & ELN	AUC
1997	531	78	126 (23)	30 (6)
1998	549	216	183 (26)	111 (16)
1999	910	743	146 (26)	408 (61)
2000	1.075	1.012	202 (36)	701 (102)
2001	1.060	1.028	158 (25)	281 (42)
2002	952	405	312 (35)	59 (12)

² Source: Ministry of Defense

³ The murder of 4 or more civilians at one time in one place. The numbers in brackets refer to the number of massacres.



Certain groups of civilians are particularly threatened. In the first seven months of 2002, for example, 41 indigenous people⁴ and 29 teachers⁵ were murdered. Other forms of terror against the civilian population include the forced displacement of around 300,000⁶ people from their land, terrorised by the threats and assassinations carried out by the illegal armed groups. Off-duty soldiers and policemen in civilian clothing are also constantly targeted, especially by the FARC. In 2002, 66 police officers⁷ and 27 soldiers⁸ died in this way.

«Terrorism threatens not just the integrity of the individual, but also the democratic will of the people. In 2002, 144 political leaders and government officials were murdered by illegal armed groups.»

38. The use of violence against the representatives of democracy is particularly serious. It is not just the integrity of the individual that is under threat, but also the democratic will of the people. In 2002, 144 political leaders and government officials were murdered by illegal armed groups (83 by the FARC and 23 by the AUC) including 71 councillors, 23 regional officials, 12 mayors and a female senator⁹. In addition, 124 government officials and political leaders, including a female presidential candidate, were kidnapped (53). More than 600 mayors received death threats¹⁰ and many have had to move their offices to the department capital, thus losing direct contact with those who elected them.
39. The economic infrastructure has also suffered the effects of terrorism. In 2001, a single oil pipeline was blown up 170 times by the illegal armed groups, costing the nation US\$520 million¹¹. Oil and its derivatives represent more than one third of Colombian exports and are the main source of funding for the health and education services. Over the last 15 years, pipelines have been blown up more than 950 times by the ELN and the FARC. More than 2.8 million barrels of oil have been spilled into the rivers, fields and woods of Colombia. The energy infrastructure has suffered, too. Since 2000, more than 1,200 electricity pylons have been blown up¹².
40. The illegal armed groups have established links with international terrorist groups. Their exchange of technology and other resources constitutes a serious problem for Colombia; but it also poses a threat to the countries from which these other groups originate, as they use the resources obtained from the Colombian groups to

«Over the last 15 years, oil pipelines have been blown up more than 950 times by the ELN and the FARC. More than 2.8 million barrels of oil have been spilled into the rivers, fields and woods of Colombia.»

4 13 by the FARC and 7 by the AUC. Source: National Police.
 5 6 by the FARC and 5 by the AUC; the perpetrators of the remaining cases have not been established with certainty. Source: National Police.
 6 Source: Social Solidarity Network.
 7 Source: National Police – Crime Research Centre.
 8 Source: National Army.
 9 Source: National Police.
 10 Source: National Police.
 11 Source: Ecopetrol.
 12 Source: ISA.

strengthen themselves at home. There is thus a common interest in tackling these transnational threats together by implementing the UN Security Council Resolution 1373.

The Illegal Drugs Trade

«In 1982, some 13,000 hectares of coca were grown in Colombia; the FARC had around 1,800 armed men. Twenty years later, in 2002, the cultivation of coca accounted for 102,000 hectares¹⁴; FARC membership had risen to 16,900¹⁵. Cultivation had multiplied by a factor of 8 and FARC membership by a factor of 9.»

«The ever increasing involvement of the FARC and the AUC in the illegal drugs business, which today goes as far as controlling routes and international commercialisation, has contributed to the loss of ideological discipline and consequently to their downward spiral into terrorism.»

41. The illegal drugs trade at all stages of production, from cultivation through to processing, export, distribution and the laundering of proceeds, threatens the stability of democratic institutions and the cohesion of society by distorting the economy and encouraging corruption and lax standards. It has cost the lives of thousands of judges, journalists, politicians, policemen and soldiers. It has also become the main source of funding for the terrorist activities of the illegal armed groups and a major threat to the biodiversity of Colombia, one of the richest on the planet.
42. The dispute between the FARC and the illegal self-defence groups over the coca growing areas largely determines the geography of violence in Colombia. More than half of all FARC fronts are based in coca production areas, which goes far to explain the organisation's rapid expansion. In 1982, some 13,000 hectares of coca were grown in Colombia; the FARC had around 1,800 armed men¹³. Twenty years later, in 2002, the cultivation of coca accounted for 102,000 hectares¹⁴; FARC membership had risen to 16,900¹⁵. Cultivation had multiplied by a factor of 8 and FARC membership by a factor of 9. The AUC is also involved in the illegal drugs trade and their expansion has been even faster: their membership increased from 2,800 in 1995 to 12,000 in 2002¹⁶. The ever increasing involvement of both organisations in the illegal drugs business, which today goes as far as controlling routes and international commercialisation, has contributed to the loss of ideological discipline and consequently to their downward spiral into terrorism. It is through the use of terror that they try to control the local population and, in the areas of coca cultivation, they subject it to neofeudal production conditions.
43. The traffic of chemical precursors is an integral part of the illegal drugs trade; without them drugs could not be produced. However, despite committing themselves to its regulation through the ratification of the 1988 Vienna Convention, few countries exercise any effective control over the production and trade of these precursors. Penalties for infringement of the law tend to be light or non-existent.

13 Source: National Army.

14 Source: National Police – Anti-Narcotics Department.

15 Source: National Army.

16 Source: National Army.



44. Consumption drives the illegal drugs business. The highest consumers are the United States, Europe and, increasingly, South America, all of whom suffer the social consequences of the sale and use of illegal drugs. This is a transnational threat like no other. It calls for a joint approach which pays the same degree of attention to curbing demand, consumption, the traffic of chemical precursors and money laundering as it does to the production, transport and distribution of illegal drugs.
45. Consumers should be aware of the ecological damage and loss of life for which they share responsibility. The Amazon Basin is under threat from the continued cultivation of coca. The sowing of one hectare of coca, for example, requires the felling of 3 hectares of virgin forest¹⁷. In the last ten years, 1,361,475 hectares have been deforested in this way. Tree felling also turns the Amazon soil acid and causes erosion. This increases the sediment in the rivers and causes floods. The felling and burning of forest in order to cultivate coca produces around one quarter of Colombia's total CO² emissions, thus exacerbating the problem of climate change¹⁸. In addition, the pesticides used by the coca growers are among the most toxic in existence. For example Paraquat, which is banned in all industrialised countries, is often used by the coca growers; yet it is both carcinogenic and neurotoxic and remains in the soil for 25 years, interfering with the life cycle of the Amazon forest. In 2000, 4,506,804 litres of such herbicides, insecticides and fungicide were used in the cultivation of coca¹⁹. The processing of the coca leaf and coca paste are no less damaging to man and his environment. The widespread use of sulphuric acid (1,709,380 litres in 2000²⁰) or potassium permanganate, for example, endangers the lives of the coca growers and is a serious threat to aquatic life. Vast quantities of gasoline (357,741,451 litres in 2000 – equivalent to one week's worth of consumption throughout Colombia²¹) are tipped indiscriminately into the rivers and soil of Colombia every year.
46. Poppy growing also destroys the cloud forest in the Andes. The cloud forest absorbs large amounts of humidity in excess of rainfall levels and so acts as a control mechanism for the flow of water to the river basins. Its destruction causes erosion which increases the amount of sediment in the river beds. This in turn causes major floods which endanger the ecosystem, the local economy and the

«The Amazon Basin is under threat from the continued cultivation of coca. The sowing of one hectare of coca requires the felling of 3 hectares of virgin forest. In the last ten years, 1,361,475 hectares have been deforested in this way.»

«Poppy growing causes erosion which increases the amount of sediment in the river beds. This in turn causes major floods which endanger the ecosystem, the local economy and the lives of those living along the river banks. It also destroys Colombia's water reserves.»

17 Source: National Police – Anti-Narcotics Department.

18 Source: González, Fabio and Rodríguez, Humberto: *Inventario Preliminar de Gases de Efecto Invernadero, Fuentes y Sumideros*. Academia Colombiana de Ciencias Exactas, Físicas y Naturales,

20 Source: National Police – Anti-Narcotics Department.

20 Source: National Police – Anti-Narcotics Department.

21 Source: National Police – Anti-Narcotics Department.

lives of those living along the river banks. It also destroys Colombia's water reserves.

Illicit Finance

«Illicit finance is connected to a whole range of criminal activities which go beyond the illegal drugs trade, but which also finance terrorism: kidnapping, extortion, the theft of hydrocarbons and contraband.»

47. Illicit finance, usually associated with the laundering of profits from the illegal drugs trade, merits separate mention. The laundering of revenue obtained from the commercialisation of cocaine and heroine – most of which remain in the international banking system – contributes directly to terrorism, while at the same time upsets financial markets, encourages contraband and the under-invoicing of imports, generally distorts the Colombian economy and leads to corruption. Illicit finance is connected to a whole range of criminal activities which go beyond the illegal drugs trade, but which also finance terrorism: kidnapping, extortion, the theft of hydrocarbons and contraband. Contraband in particular is frequently used to launder money. Not only does this deprive the Government of taxes, but it also undermines the Colombian economy by artificially reducing prices and opens up channels for the trafficking of arms and drugs. It also feeds the informal economy used by terrorists and illegal drugs traffickers to cover up their activities. Contraband is thus a transnational problem which should be tackled by the international community and the producer companies who, either involuntarily or in connivance with the smugglers, make the contraband business easy and lucrative.

48. It is becoming increasingly clear that terrorists use illegal drugs money to finance their activities and launder that money through the same channels as the illegal drugs traffickers. A number of international agreements and resolutions have highlighted the need to control the sources of terrorist funding, including: the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (29); the Organisation of American States Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism; the Andean Community Lima Agreement; the European Union Common Position 2001/939/PESC of 27 December 2001; the Special Recommendations on the Financing of Terrorism issued on 31 October 2001 by the OECD Financial Action Task Force; and the 1999 UN International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The Colombian Government is doing all it can to comply with the requirements contained in these conventions and hopes that all other States will do the same.

«Contraband in particular is frequently used to launder money. Not only does this deprive the Government of taxes, but it also undermines the Colombian economy by artificially reducing prices and opens up channels for the trafficking of arms and drugs.»



The Traffic of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives

49. The traffic of arms, ammunition and explosives is linked both to the illegal drugs trade and to terrorism. Both the AUC and the FARC exchange illegal drugs for weapons on the international market, as was evidenced by the captures of a Brazilian drugs trafficker at a FARC camp and of AUC members in Costa Rica, all accused of exchanging arms for illegal drugs. Vast quantities of weapons – thousands of rifles and millions of cartridges – have arrived in Colombia in recent years from Central America or, through third countries, from Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Arms trafficking networks that benefit from the tolerance and sometimes active participation of government officials in neighbouring countries are responsible for bringing weapons into Colombia by air, sea or land.
50. Arms trafficking is no less a danger than illegal drugs trafficking and should be subject to the same degree of control and the same penalties. Since 1988, Colombia has been in the vanguard of the drive within a number of multilateral fora to counter arms trafficking. Colombia backs all international mechanisms which urge nations to exercise effective control over the trafficking of arms and explosives, such as the Inter-American Convention against the Production and Illegal Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives, the UN Action Programme for the Prevention, Control and Eradication of the Illegal Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons or the Andean Community Lima Agreement.
51. In particular, the Colombian Government will promote any mechanism which increases transparency in the production and sale of weapons, in order to prevent arms from moving from the legal to the illegal trade and the import of weapons for re-export to third parties. It will also support the creation of an international system of arms marking which will indicate their origin and control their circulation.

Kidnapping and Extortion

52. In Colombia, kidnapping and extortion is more than just a criminal or police problem. Like illegal drugs trafficking, it constitutes a fundamental means of financing the terrorist acts committed by the illegal armed groups. Kidnapping and extortion each bring in between US\$200 and 350 million annually. In 2002, more than 2,000 Colombians from all walks of life were kidnapped by these organisations (943 by the FARC, 777 by the ELN, 183 by the

«Both the AUC and the FARC exchange illegal drugs for weapons on the international market, as was evidenced by the captures of a Brazilian drugs trafficker at a FARC camp and of AUC members in Costa Rica, all accused of exchanging arms for illegal drugs».

In Colombia, kidnapping and extortion is more than just a criminal or police problem. Like illegal drugs trafficking, it constitutes a fundamental means of financing the terrorist acts committed by the illegal armed groups.

illegal self-defence groups and 116 by dissident groups²²). The ransoms paid for these individuals, especially for foreigners for whom particularly large sums are demanded, finance terrorism and undermine democracy.

« The ransoms paid for kidnappings, especially for those of foreigners for whom particularly large sums are demanded, finance terrorism and undermine democracy».

53. Kidnapping is also used by the illegal armed groups as a method of political blackmail. In 2002, some 124 government officials and political leaders were kidnapped (82 by the FARC, 30 by the ELN and 6 by the AUC), including a presidential candidate, 19 mayors, 25 councillors, one governor, 19 deputies and 3 members of Congress²³.
54. Kidnapping and extortion discourage investment. They also have serious psychological impact on the individuals concerned and their families, while society at large lives with a feeling of constant vulnerability. The fear and experience of kidnapping fragment society. Of the more than 3,200 kidnappings which occurred on average each year between 1998 and 2002, around 700 are committed by common criminals who more often than not have been 'subcontracted' by the illegal armed groups²⁴. Meanwhile, as these groups and networks develop, they spread their know-how and technology and establish structures which can easily be expanded. Terrorists and common criminals are both involved in an inhumane industry which, like the murder of civilians, has no possible justification and endangers the stability of the country.

29

Homicide

«Over the last decade, around 25,000 Colombians have been murdered every year in both urban and rural areas of the country. However, Colombia has not always suffered such levels of violence. Between 1971 and 1991, the homicide rate quadrupled from 22 to 86 per 100,000 of the population.»

55. Over the last decade, around 25,000 Colombians have been murdered every year in both urban and rural areas of the country²⁵. These levels of homicide are not only a threat to the security of the citizens, but also to the proper functioning of democracy. However, Colombia has not always suffered such levels of violence. Between 1971 and 1991, the homicide rate quadrupled from 22 to 86 per 100,000 of the population. Since then, even though rates have fallen slightly, homicide numbers remain much the same. The incidence of homicide is not evenly distributed throughout the country. Some 50 municipalities containing less than a quarter of the population account for more than half the total number of deaths. By contrast, Bogotá has managed to reduce its homicide rate by half in the last decade to well below the rate of many other major cities of the continent²⁶. Very often the municipalities where the homicide rate is the highest are those over which the illegal armed

22 Source: Fondelibertad.

23 Source: Fondelibertad

24 Source: Fondelibertad.

25 Source: National Police – Crime Research Centre.

26 Source: National Police – Crime Research Centre.



groups are fighting for control, or which have sources of finance such as coca, oil or gold which these groups covet.

56. The homicide epidemic of the last two decades, which resulted in some of the highest rates in the world, is not due to a natural inclination towards violence on the part of the individual Colombian. It is, rather, the result of institutional weakness and a climate of impunity promoted by the illegal armed groups and illegal drugs trafficking. It is not so much their activities but rather the indirect impact of those activities which encourages homicide. The more they undermine the judicial system and spread their money laundering, weapons trafficking and murdering skills, the more they create areas of impunity where homicide and common crime can flourish.

III. Strategic Objectives

57. The following five strategic objectives must be met in order to counter the threats to Colombian security and fulfil the general aim of the Democratic Security and Defence Policy, which is to strengthen the rule of law throughout the country. Each objective contains a number of specific objectives which will serve as benchmarks for the evaluation of the strategic objectives:

I. CONSOLIDATION OF STATE CONTROL THROUGHOUT COLOMBIA

- Gradual restoration of the presence of the Armed Forces and the National Police in all municipalities.
- Increase in judicial action against crimes of high social impact.
- Strengthening and extension of the administration of justice and state institutions in areas where state control has been strengthened.
- Reduction of human rights violations.

II. PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION

- Dismantling of terrorist organisations.
- Reduction of kidnapping and extortion.
- Reduction of homicide.
- Prevention of forced displacement and facilitation of the return of displaced populations to their place of origin.
- Reintegration into society of organisations, groups or individuals who renounce violence.

III. ELIMINATION OF THE ILLEGAL DRUGS TRADE IN COLOMBIA

- Interdiction at sea, on rivers and on land of the traffic of illegal drugs and chemical precursors.
- Eradication of coca and poppy cultivation.
- Dismantling of illegal drugs trafficking networks.
- Confiscation of the property and finances of illegal drugs traffickers.



IV. MAINTENANCE OF A DETERRENT CAPABILITY

- Protection of land, sea and river borders.

V. TRANSPARENT AND EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES

- Achievement of greater impact through the most efficient use of resources.
- Savings through a review of the administrative structures and processes.
- Development of transparency and accountability mechanisms.

IV. Six Courses Of Action: Co-ordinate, Strengthen, Consolidate, Protect, Co-operate and Communicate

58. The following six courses of action are the policies which the Government will pursue in order to achieve its strategic objectives. They all contribute to the fulfilment of those aims:

- *Co-ordinating* state action
- *Strengthening* state institutions
- *Consolidating* control of national territory
- *Protecting* the rights of all Colombians and the nation's infrastructure
- *Co-operating* for the security of all
- *Communicating* state policy and action

33

A. CO-ORDINATING STATE ACTION

National Defence and Security Council

59. State response to security issues affecting its citizens has perhaps suffered most from the lack of effective co-ordination between state institutions. Government bodies, especially the Armed Forces and the National Police, will in future act in a co-ordinated and unified manner in conjunction with other state bodies. The National Defence and Security Council will be the forum in which the President will liaise with his ministers, the Armed Forces and the National Police on the implementation of the Democratic Security and Defence Policy. It will issue directives setting out the roles and responsibilities of each institution, supervise their implementation and evaluate the results.

60. Regional authorities will set up security councils with advisory committees that will include academics, businessmen and members of civil society, to advise on public policy, contribute know-how and participate in the solution of security problems. At local level, district and municipal security councils will liaise with the regional councils and the National Defence and Security Council to oversee policy implementation in their areas.

«The National Defence and Security Council will be the forum in which the President will liaise with his ministers, the Armed Forces and the National Police on the implementation of the Democratic Security and Defence Policy.»



Joint Intelligence Committee

61. The Joint Intelligence Committee will be responsible for co-ordinating state intelligence services and will be composed of the directors of those services. Its tasks will be to produce consolidated strategic intelligence analysis so that the President and the Minister of Defence may have the information necessary for decision-making; to translate government security policy into intelligence requirements; and to co-ordinate an allocation of tasks which encourages specialisation and avoids needless duplication. A technical secretariat will provide support services and maintain records.
- 34 62. Regional intelligence committees, similar to and with the same objectives of the Joint Intelligence Committee, will meet periodically. These regional committees will extend the co-ordination of intelligence to regional levels, encouraging horizontal exchange of information and avoiding the time-delays that come with excessive centralisation of the management of intelligence.

«The Joint Intelligence Committee will produce consolidated strategic intelligence analysis so that the President and the Minister of Defence may have the information necessary for decision-making, translate government security policy into intelligence requirements, and co-ordinate an allocation of tasks which encourages specialisation and avoids needless duplication.»

Ministry of Defence

63. The Ministry of Defence will be responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the Armed Forces and the National Police with those of other government institutions. For that purpose, it will undergo structural reform and will issue policy guidelines for the Armed Forces and the National Police to ensure that they meet their Democratic Security objectives. In the first place, it will see to it that allocated resources have a larger impact on security through improved administration and more effective planning. The Ministry of Defence is developing a supplies system through which the Armed Forces and the National Police are able to obtain at the lowest possible price high quality equipment which can be easily deployed and kept in a state of readiness. To this end a centralised system has been established which is open, transparent and demands high standards and offset arrangements from the suppliers.
64. One of the priorities of the Defence Ministry will be to contribute to the creation of jobs by ensuring that the resources allocated to security benefit national industries whenever possible and by seeking technology transfer.
65. The Ministry of Defence will co-ordinate the implementation of the security policy, so that the work of the Armed Forces and the National Police goes hand in hand with that of other state bodies

«The Ministry of Defence will see to it that allocated resources have a larger impact on security through improved administration and more effective planning.»

and has the support of citizens. It will also establish a series of committees through which the private sector may contribute its knowledge to the security effort and supervise the use of resources assigned to the defence sector.

«The support structures function as teams in which the security forces, the judicial authorities, and the state investigative and control bodies work together. Each organisation exercises its own authority but works in close co-ordination with the others on the methodical investigation and analysis of crime.»

«The Government will present legislation to Congress that will facilitate an effective and successful fight against terrorism, in accordance with the obligations of Resolution 1373 of the Security Council of the United Nations.»

Support Structures

66. Interagency support structures will be set up to co-ordinate the action of regional and local state bodies and facilitate the work of the judicial authorities. The support structures are not hierarchical in nature; rather, they function as teams in which the security forces, the judicial authorities, and the state investigative and control bodies work together. Each organisation exercises its own authority but works in close co-ordination with the others on the methodical investigation and analysis of crime. Operational success in bringing criminals to justice very much depends on that co-ordination: protection from the Armed Forces and the National Police enables the criminal investigation authorities to operate properly, whilst a successful investigation guarantees in turn the success of the work of the Armed Forces and the National Police, as the criminal process becomes more effective. Specialised prosecutors with the required knowledge to investigate each crime in detail will thus be able to work without fear of threats and intimidation. The support structure that investigates terrorist attacks against the oil infrastructure in Arauca is a good example. Here prosecutors, attorneys, the DAS, the Army and the National Police have been working side by side with excellent results. Such support structures not only ensure that the justice system is protected and that state action is effective, but also provide a control mechanism which guarantees that they remain within the law and uphold human rights.

35

B. STRENGTHENING STATE INSTITUTIONS

Strengthening the Judicial System

67. Colombia needs modern legislation to counter violence and insecurity. The Government will present legislation to Congress that will facilitate an effective and successful fight against terrorism, in accordance with the obligations of Resolution 1373 of the Security Council of the United Nations. In order to deal with the terrorist threat successfully the legal framework must be updated. If necessary, a number of Articles in the Constitution will be amended without affecting civil rights or liberties. Priority will be given to the fight against crimes which most affect society. An integrated crime



policy will enable the State to pursue individuals, such as terrorists and illegal drugs traffickers, who represent the greatest danger to society and democracy and to ensure that their conduct is penalised as severely as possible in the strictest of prison regimes.

68. The Colombian Government will launch an all-out attack on impunity in order to reduce crime levels, especially the number of homicides and kidnappings. The whole of the state investigatory and penal system will be strengthened and targeted particularly at the perpetrators of murder and violence against certain members of society, such as trade unionists, teachers, human rights activists and journalists, who have all been the victims of intolerance and impunity.

«The Colombian Government will launch an all-out attack on impunity in order to reduce crime levels, especially the number of homicides and kidnappings.»

36

69. The reform of the Government's crime policy will include the abolition of early prison release for individuals who have committed crimes which are deemed a threat to the stability of the country. The principles of restorative justice will apply to crimes which are punishable with prison. The rights of the victim will prevail. The penalties for crimes committed by minors and for carrying illegal weapons will be reviewed.

70. The Government will support the rationalisation of the administration of justice and the professionalisation and specialisation of its employees. Equally, the Government has promoted the constitutional reform of the Public Prosecutor's Office and the introduction of an accusatorial system which will strengthen its investigatory powers. It will also draft a law to speed up justice and make it more accessible to the citizen. It will increase the number of hearings and encourage the use of alternative procedures, such as arbitration and conciliation, for civil, commercial, administrative and family cases, in order to clear the backlogs in the system. Access to "Casas de Justicia y Paz" will be improved so that those who live in remote areas have access to the justice system and the institutions of the State.

«Access to "Casas de Justicia y Paz" will be improved so that those who live in remote areas have access to the justice system and the institutions of the State.»

71. The upgrade of the countries prisons will be continued and extended and the identification and distribution of the prison population will be improved. Municipalities and Departments will be required to comply with their financial obligations towards maintenance of prisons.

72. A system will be developed whereby information can be shared by all bodies involved in the criminal justice system. It will provide data from the time of arrest or the start of an investigation right through to the point at which any sentence is completed.

Strengthening the Armed Forces

«The authority of the Armed Forces lies in the high degree of legitimacy which the civil population attributes to them. In order to maintain and reinforce that legitimacy they will continue to pay particular attention to upholding and defending human rights.»

«Compulsory military service will be reformed through a bill presented to Congress, based on the principle of equality. Equal citizens have equal obligations. In future the service will be transparent, democratic and without discriminations. Everyone will serve under the same conditions, regardless of their level of education.»

73. The Armed Forces will concentrate their efforts on defending Colombia's sovereignty, the integrity of the territory and the constitutional order. They will protect the civilian population from any threats, dismantle the terrorist organisations, protect the Nation's infrastructure and defend the country's borders, as part of the overall aim of consolidating the rule of law in Colombia. Their actions will always be based on the principles of efficiency, economy, transparency and legality (21-24).
74. The authority of the Armed Forces lies in the high degree of legitimacy which the civil population attributes to them. In order to maintain and reinforce that legitimacy they will continue to pay particular attention to upholding and defending human rights.
75. The process of professionalisation of the Armed Forces will continue and they will be strengthened in five different areas:
 - More resources will be allocated to increasing, reorganising and training manpower to improve mobility.
 - Funding will be spent on improving the quality of personnel and the calibre, maintenance and state of readiness of equipment.
 - Intelligence gathering, processing and analysis will be improved, as will co-ordination so that it is available when needed and operational capability is available when there is intelligence.
 - Intensive training in human rights and international humanitarian law for the Armed Forces and the National Police has been successful in the past and will continue.
 - Equipment and matériel will be used to the best effect in order to ensure the availability of a deterrent capability to defend Colombian sovereignty.
76. Compulsory military service will be reformed through a bill presented to Congress, based on the principle of equality. Equal citizens have equal obligations. In future the service will be transparent, democratic and without discriminations. Everyone will serve under the same conditions, regardless of their level of education. At the same time, the role of the *campesino* soldier will be strengthened to enable more soldiers from rural areas to perform their military service in their own regions. This will allow



them to retain their links with the community and will strengthen the trust between the population and the security forces.

77. The Armed Forces will retain a deterrent capability by maintaining and modernising the strategic equipment needed to guarantee the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Colombia, and to defend her borders, territorial waters, continental shelf and air space. The protection of borders will be a priority, as it is through the borders that the illegal drugs leave and the illegal weapons enter the country.

Strengthening the National Police

78. The mission of the National Police will be to protect the rights and freedoms of the public, by fighting crime, criminality and terrorism in accordance with the priorities established by a comprehensive crime policy. All inhabitants will receive the same protection from the National Police, which will return to all municipalities. Its efforts will be centred, on the one hand, on the development of a policy which promotes crime prevention and social harmony; and on the other hand, on the drastic reduction of common crime and the dismantling of terrorist and illegal drugs trafficking organisations, through the investigation and conviction of their members.

79. The main resource of the National Police are its men and women. The training of its members so that they may fulfil their tasks adequately, within the framework of the principles of efficiency, economy, transparency and legality, will be a priority. The National Police will maintain their absolute commitment to the respect, defence and promotion of human rights.

80. The priorities for strengthening the National Police are as follows:
- To extend the National Police coverage in a planned and organised manner to the municipalities where there is no police presence at the moment.
 - To increase patrols in rural areas by creating 62 new Mobile Carabinero Squadrons.
 - To build fortified rural police stations.
 - To strengthen the highway police.
 - To boost the technical capability of the Judicial Police.
 - To co-ordinate city security plans and strengthen the police force with 10,000 new patrols and 10,000 regular auxiliaries.
 - To draw up local security plans and enlarge Local Security Fronts.
 - To promote the work of, and collaboration with, the Civic Police.

«The Armed Forces will retain a deterrent capability by maintaining and modernising the strategic equipment needed to guarantee the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Colombia, and to defend her borders, territorial waters, continental shelf and air space.»

«The mission of the National Police will be to protect the rights and freedoms of the public, by fighting crime, criminality and terrorism in accordance with the priorities established by a comprehensive crime policy.»

- To prevent terrorism by building citizen co-operation networks working more closely with the local community, companies, businesses and other state institutions.

Strengthening Intelligence

«All measures that contribute to the integration of intelligence will be taken, such as encouraging the horizontal exchange of information between agencies, the strengthening of trust through the secure use of information, the responsible protection of sources and the joint announcement of operational successes.»

«The DAS will increase its analysis and strategic intelligence production capability, boost its counterintelligence activities and focus at tactical level on dismantling the structures which provide logistical support to the illegal armed groups and organised crime.»

81. The co-ordination mechanisms between the security and intelligence agencies will be strengthened to guarantee effective action against criminal organisations. Operational success depends on adequate and opportune intelligence. For this reason, all measures that contribute to the integration of intelligence will be taken, such as encouraging the horizontal exchange of information between agencies, the strengthening of trust through the secure use of information, the responsible protection of sources and the joint announcement of operational successes. The Joint Intelligence Committee and the regional intelligence committees (61-62) will concentrate mainly on the production and analysis of strategic intelligence. At tactical level, the different intelligence services will be encouraged to co-ordinate, co-operate, specialise and complement each other and to define clearly their functions and responsibilities. The National Police, the Armed Forces, the DAS and the Public Prosecutor's Office will work together on the collection and exchange of intelligence in order to improve their operational effectiveness.
82. Special attention will be paid to strengthening the counterintelligence capability of the state security services. Particularly vulnerable areas of operational security are being reviewed, including the handling and transmission of information and communications. Technological improvements will be introduced, including an enhanced capability for officers and analysts and tighter financial security, in preparation for an aggressive campaign aimed at identifying and disrupting sources which endanger the implementation of the Democratic Security and Defence Policy. Corruption cases involving leaked information will be punished severely. The counterintelligence effort serves not only to improve operational results and to prevent the manipulation of information: the degree of co-ordination between the intelligence services depends also on the effectiveness of counterintelligence. All counterintelligence work will be closely supervised.
83. The DAS will increase its analysis and strategic intelligence production capability in co-ordination with the other members of



the Joint Intelligence Committee. It will also boost its counterintelligence activities, which will concentrate not only on threats to the Government, but also on anything which affects democratic governance. At tactical level, it will focus on dismantling the structures which provide logistical support to the illegal armed groups and organised crime.

Strengthening State Finances

84. The Democratic Security and Defence Policy also aims to strengthen the economy and generate employment by encouraging productivity and the return of investment. Greater security will translate into better and more efficient services in energy, transport and communications, all of which are vital to company development and thus to sustained economic growth. This in turn will reduce the high levels of unemployment, which favour the activities of the illegal armed groups.

85. The Democratic Security and Defence Policy, like social investment, cannot be implemented without some fiscal adjustment. This is the only way to guarantee and sustain the required level of public funding. The Government has therefore obtained Congressional approval for both a referendum and tax and pension reforms which will provide resources to improve security. It is also looking at ways of reducing the number of ministries and other government departments in order to eliminate duplication, reduce costs and make the state structure more effective.

86. The Government will impose severe penalties for tax evasion. A citizen cannot expect to benefit from state services if he does not contribute to their funding by paying taxes, even special taxes when necessary. The use of tax revenue will be subject to strict accountability rules (65). The National Customs and Taxation Directorate will be strengthened to ensure effective tax collection and data protection. A new law on the forfeit of property obtained through illegal activities will enable the State to recover land and other assets for the benefit of society.

«The Government will impose severe penalties for tax evasion. A citizen cannot expect to benefit from state services if he does not contribute to their funding by paying taxes, even special taxes when necessary.»

«Consolidating state control over the country will be a gradual but continuous process of containing, dismantling and deterring the illegal armed groups, protecting the population and re-establishing the authority of democratic institutions.»

C. CONSOLIDATING CONTROL OF NATIONAL TERRITORY

Cycle of Recovery and Consolidation

87. Consolidating state control over the country will be a gradual but continuous process of containing, dismantling and deterring the illegal armed groups, protecting the population and re-establishing the authority of democratic institutions. The idea is to create a virtuous circle of long term recovery and consolidation which will gradually restore an atmosphere of security throughout the country.



Recovery of State Control over Territory

88. The Government will gradually restore state presence and the authority of state institutions, starting in strategically important areas. Once the intelligence services have identified and located a threat the Armed Forces and the National Police will begin the recovery process with an offensive operation. Reinforcements will be provided when necessary.

Maintenance of State Control over Territory

89. Once the Armed Forces and the National Police have re-established control over an area, units comprising professional soldiers, *campesino* soldiers and National Police *carabineros* will maintain security and protect the civilian population. This will enable state organisations and criminal investigation authorities to work in the area. Together with representatives of the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Attorney General's Office, the Judicial Police and the DAS, the Armed Forces and the National Police will form a support structure (66), which will be responsible for identifying and bringing to justice members of the illegal armed groups and those who commit crimes which have a major impact on society.

«Once the Armed Forces and the National Police have re-established control over an area, units comprising professional soldiers, *campesino* soldiers and National Police *carabineros* will maintain security and protect the civilian population.»

Consolidation of State Control over Territory

90. Once a basic level of security has been established, the State will embark upon a policy of territorial consolidation, re-establishing the normal operation of the justice system, strengthening local democracy, meeting the most urgent needs of the population, broadening state services and initiating medium to long term projects aimed at creating sustainable development. Ministries and other government departments involved in these projects will follow directives from the National Defence and Security Council, so that projects are executed once territorial control has been consolidated and are thus not the threats and extortion of the illegal armed groups.

« The State will embark upon a policy of territorial consolidation, re-establishing the normal operation of the justice system, strengthening local democracy, meeting the most urgent needs of the population, broadening state services and initiating medium to long term projects aimed at creating sustainable development.»

Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones

91. The process of territorial consolidation began with two rehabilitation and consolidation zones in municipalities of Arauca, Bolivar and Sucre. A sentence of the Constitutional Court determined the end of these special measures, but the consolidation programmes will continue to operate in these two areas. The examples of Montes de María in Bolivar and Sucre and Arauca show the need to

strengthen the presence of the State through a greater and more active presence of the Armed Forces and the National Police, which allows the Public Prosecutor's Office and the Judiciary to eradicate the extremely high levels of impunity and the Government and local authorities to strengthen social investment. In the case of Arauca, this investment depends on the correct use of local government money, which will be protected in order to avoid their diversion to terrorist organisations, as has occurred in the past.

«The exercise of state sovereignty cannot be limited to the control of borders. It also implies a more efficient exercise of the State's functions in these areas and the improvement of the quality of life of their populations.»

Integrated Border Security Plan

92. An Integrated Border Security Plan will run in parallel with the rehabilitation and consolidation zones as a means of boosting the presence of the State in border areas. The exercise of state sovereignty cannot be limited to the control of borders. It also implies a more efficient exercise of the State's functions in these areas and the improvement of the quality of life of their populations. The Ministries of Defence, Education, Interior, Health and Foreign Affairs will work side by side with the Armed Forces and the National Police, DAS and DANE on a population census, on setting up supply programmes to meet the most urgent needs and on finding medium to long term solutions to satisfy security, health and education requirements of the border areas. The Government will also seek to increase co-operation with neighbouring countries (134), in order to prevent the abuse of the border territories by terrorist and illegal drugs trafficking organisations.

43

Urban Security

«The local authorities and the National Police will draw up security plans to encourage peaceful coexistence, reduce crime and prevent the spread of the problems of the countryside into urban areas.»

93. The local authorities and the National Police will draw up security plans to encourage peaceful coexistence, reduce crime and prevent the spread of the problems of the countryside into urban areas. The security situation of the majority of cities calls for a response tailored to their problems; but the principles behind the six courses of actions of the Democratic Defence and Security Policy remain just as relevant. In particular, it is essential that the local authorities, together with the national authorities:
- Co-ordinate the response of the State. The mayors and local authorities have the responsibility of formulating security policies which integrate the efforts of the Armed Forces and the National Police with those of other government agencies, as well as contributing to the financing of security schemes.
 - Protect and strengthen the authority of state institutions, in particular of the justice system.



- Encourage the participation and co-operation of each and every citizen in the achievement and maintenance of security.
 - Develop reliable systems of information and statistics for an accurate assessment of the local security needs and formulate the appropriate responses.
 - Develop mechanisms to establish targets, evaluate the performance of the authorities responsible for citizen security, correct problems and demand results.
94. Without a firm commitment from the local authorities it is not possible to guarantee citizen security. The case of Bogotá shows that perseverance in the formulation and execution of security policies and targets, together with active citizen participation through mechanisms, such as the Local Security Fronts, produces results. Similar experiences can be found in many of the major cities of the world: alliances between the authorities and the citizenry are the quickest and surest way of restoring security. The “Local Security Contracts” that have successfully been put into practice in France are an example of how government can effectively co-ordinate and guide citizen support to combat urban insecurity. The co-ordination of policies to prevent and clamp down on crime, together with active citizen participation and the support of the private sector which creates employment opportunities and fosters economic development is the best formula to restore security in the cities.

«The case of Bogotá shows that perseverance in the formulation and execution of security policies and targets, together with active citizen participation through mechanisms, such as the Local Security Fronts, produces results.»

Elimination of the Illegal Drugs Trade in Colombia

95. During the 1990s, large scale coca cultivation was displaced to Colombia, whereupon the problem of illegal drugs trafficking, usually associated with the power of drug traffickers to destabilise and corrupt, became a territorial issue. The illegal armed groups fought each other for control of the cultivation and sale of the illegal drugs which provided their main source of income (42). The solution lies, therefore, in consolidating state control of the territory concerned, so that crop eradication is effective, and in continuing to dismantle the illegal drugs trafficking groups whose illegal activities constitute one of the greatest threats to the consolidation of the rule of law.
96. The Colombian Government has set itself the task of eliminating the cultivation, processing and distribution of narcotics from the country (29). This is an ambitious goal, but the Government cannot settle for anything less, as the struggle between the illegal armed

The solution to the problem of illegal drugs trafficking lies in consolidating state control of the territory concerned, so that crop eradication is effective, and in continuing to dismantle the illegal drugs trafficking groups whose illegal activities constitute one of the greatest threats to the consolidation of the rule of law

groups for control of the cultivation and sale of illegal drugs is one of the greatest threats to the population. The Government will therefore embark upon an integrated plan which will allow it to act effectively against each link in the chain of the illegal drugs trade, using the following strategies:

«The Government will step up interdiction in the air, on land, at sea and on rivers of the flow of both illegal drugs and the chemical precursors needed for their production.»

- *Interdiction.* Every effort will be made to ensure that the deterrent effect of interdiction on illegal drugs production and sales reduces the incentive to plant illegal crops. The Government will step up interdiction in the air, on land, at sea and on rivers of the flow of both illegal drugs and the chemical precursors needed for their production.
- *Eradication.* All illegal coca and poppy crops in any area will be eradicated by aerial fumigation with glyphosate or another product which is equally effective and does not harm the environment, or by manual eradication. All the technical and legal regulations will be observed to ensure the greatest efficiency and the protection of the environment. Farmers and indigenous people who wish to take part in projects which encourage the production of sustainable and profitable crops will have to break all ties with the illegal drugs trade.
- *Social programmes.* Sustainable development programmes for growers will be one of the main tools used to put an end to the cultivation of illegal crops and bring the growers into the legal economy. Alternative programmes must be realistic, sustainable and provide an income for farming and indigenous families who currently live from the proceeds of coca and poppy cultivation. These programmes must also have financial support from all the countries involved in the illegal drugs trade, on the basis of the principle of co-responsibility. Reforestation programmes, for example, could pay farmers to plant and care for trees on land formerly used to cultivate illegal drugs. This encourages environmental conservation and a shift to the legal economy, which should bring sustainable development.
- *Dismantling illegal drugs trafficking networks,* focusing on their human resources, property, finances and trade networks.
- *Strengthening the legal framework.* The law will be tightened in order to dismantle the illegal drugs trafficking networks and tackle their activities more effectively. The laws governing the nullification of property ownership and asset confiscation have been reviewed and updated for that purpose.
- *Reduction of consumption.* The Rumbos programme will continue its work of raising awareness and trying to reduce drug consumption within Colombia.

«Alternative programmes must be realistic, sustainable and provide an income for farming and indigenous families who currently live from the proceeds of coca and poppy cultivation. These programmes must also have financial support from all the countries involved in the illegal drugs trade, on the basis of the principle of co-responsibility.»



Dismantling of the financial structures of terrorists and illegal drugs traffickers

97. The Government will place particular emphasis on dismantling the financial structures of terrorist and illegal drugs trafficking organisations, in line with international agreements. The Joint Intelligence Committee is to join forces with other specialist agencies to form a committee to counter money laundering. This will improve the exchange of information and make it easier to co-ordinate financial intelligence gathering with the ability of the appropriate agencies to act on such intelligence. The Government will also establish mechanisms for co-operation with the financial entities of the private sector and society in general so that money laundering can be reported quickly. It will also establish control mechanisms over the use of government funds, in particular of oil royalties (91, 126), which have frequently been captured through extortion and corruption by terrorist organisations to finance their activities in various regions of the country. It will urge other States to meet their commitments by freezing terrorist bank accounts and denying them access to their financial systems (48).

98. The Financial Analysis and Information Unit (UIAF) will play a leading role in the collection of money laundering information. Its objectives are the following.

- *Data centralisation*: to develop of policies, procedures and tools to strengthen the fight against money laundering.
- *Data systemisation*: to improve the quality of information received from national and international sources.
- *Information analysis*: to detect potential money laundering cases and report them to the authorities.

In this way the mistakes of the past will be avoided. These included the weak implementation of regulations, the poor handling of vast amounts of information and a lack of co-ordination both between the different agencies responsible for identifying money laundering operations and between these and the law enforcement agencies. The objective is fully to co-ordinate financial intelligence with operations against the terrorist and illegal drugs trafficking organisations.

«The Government will establish mechanisms for co-operation with the financial entities of the private sector and society in general so that money laundering can be reported quickly.»

«The Government It will also establish control mechanisms over the use of government funds, in particular of oil royalties which have frequently been captured through extortion and corruption by terrorist organisations to finance their activities in various regions of the country.»

D. PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF COLOMBIANS AND THE NATION'S INFRASTRUCTURE

99. The basic mechanism for protecting the lives and rights of Colombian citizens is the strengthening of the rule of law over Colombian territory. However, many Colombians require special attention as they have suffered and continue to suffer directly at the hands of the illegal armed groups.

«The Interior Ministry Programme for the Protection of Persons at Risk has received a significant increase in funds so that individuals whose lives, integrity, security or liberty are under threat, such as political activists, trade unionists, community leaders, journalists and human rights activists, are properly protected.»

Protection of Persons at Risk

100. The Interior Ministry Programme for the Protection of Persons at Risk has received a significant increase in funds so that individuals whose lives, integrity, security or liberty are under threat, such as political activists, trade unionists, community leaders, journalists and human rights activists, are properly protected. The Programme will also provide protection and security measures for the hundreds of mayors, councillors and other democratic representatives who currently find themselves under threat. The Protection Group of the Human Rights Department of the Interior Ministry will carry out the Protection of Persons at Risk Policy, on the basis of the following principles:

- Recognition of the legitimacy of the activities of each of the protected groups.
- Strengthening of the protection measures directed at assuring the rights of the target population.
- Interagency co-ordination with the Armed Forces and the National Police, with the aim of extending the links of trust between these entities and the representatives of those groups under protection.

101. A Risk-Evaluation and Regulation Committee will advise and supervise each one of the protection programmes. The committee, made up representatives of Government Ministries and officers of the National Police and the DAS will discuss the most adequate protection measures for those citizens at risk and oversee their adoption. Central, departmental and regional meetings on interagency co-ordination will contribute to a better understanding of the risk-situations and formulations of adequate responses to these threats.

Protection of Victims of Forced Displacement

102. Year after year hundreds of thousands of Colombians are displaced from their land and made destitute by the illegal armed groups.

«The Social Solidarity Network will work with regional authorities and other organisations to formulate plans which will enable displaced families, with their agreement, to return to their homes.»



This requires urgent action on the part of the State and *solidarity* on the part of society. The Social Solidarity Network will work with regional authorities and other organisations to formulate plans which will enable displaced families, with their agreement, to return to their homes. The Government, in co-ordination with the Armed Forces and the National Police, will first restore security to the area and then provide the community with resources in the form of small loans, food and community-escort programmes.

103. In accordance with Decree 2007 of 2001 on the recognition and protection of the property rights of displaced communities, the Government, with support from the World Bank Post Conflict Fund, will assist displaced Colombians in the recovery of property and, particularly, land lost through forced displacement. The Social Solidarity Network will develop programmes to help those who cannot or do not want to return to their homes to settle in other areas. The Government will seek the support of the private sector and society in general to find long term solutions to the problem of displaced Colombians.

«The Government, in co-ordination with the Armed Forces and the National Police, will first restore security to the area and then provide the community with resources in the form of small loans, food and community-escort programmes.»

Protection against Terrorism

104. To protect the lives and dignity of Colombians, the Government will take a firm stand against the increasing use of terrorism, particularly in the major cities. The objective is to create a simple and effective system, backed by the necessary legislation to assure the protection of citizens. This system comprises the following elements:

- Interagency co-ordination mechanisms that facilitate the fulfilment of tasks, assign clear responsibilities, centralise information and keep an institutional memory.
- Intelligence-gathering capacity not only for the prevention of terrorist acts but also to dismantle terrorist networks; and short intelligence cycles to move rapidly from information to action.
- Rapid reaction forces which act in an efficient and effective manner upon receiving information.
- A technical capacity for the extraction of forensic evidence from the sites of terrorist attacks and its adequate processing, with the aim of bringing the terrorists to justice as quickly as possible and thus preventing future attacks.

«To protect the lives and dignity of Colombians, the Government will take a firm stand against the increasing use of terrorism, particularly in the major cities.»

«The *solidarity* of the citizens and their co-operation with the authorities is a key factor, without which it will be impossible to defeat the terrorists.»

- Active citizen co-operation, based on the common values of respect for the dignity of the people and the rejection of violence.

These elements must be part of the policies and strategies to achieve security and peaceful coexistence which all the mayors' offices will develop with the National Police (93). In the case of Bogotá, a support structure (66) will co-ordinate the response of the different regional and national entities against terrorism. The Government will support this effort through the creation of special military urban antiterrorism forces in the main cities and by seeking international co-operation to prevent and counteract the technology and knowledge transfer which has enabled the illegal armed groups to plan particularly brutal terrorist attacks. Equally, the efforts to improve co-ordination between the intelligence services (81) will have the fight against terrorism as one of its main objectives.

49

105. Success, however, does not depend on international co-operation and co-ordination alone: the *solidarity* of the citizens and their co-operation with the authorities is a key factor, without which it will be impossible to defeat the terrorists. The authorities will develop prevention programmes, extending the links between the Armed Forces and the National Police and the private sector, the private security companies, public businesses, and society in general, in order to establish a warning network which will assure the protection of the population and the country's infrastructure (131).

Protection against Kidnapping and Extortion

«The core of the fight against kidnapping is the dismantling of the criminal organisations that systematically commit these offences. Interagency support structures for the centralisation of investigations and of strategic and operational intelligence, will conduct the dismantling of specific groups and organisations.»

106. The Government has outlined a long-term state policy to combat kidnapping and extortion (52-54). This policy has the following objectives:

- *General Objective:* To reduce the number of cases of extortion and kidnapping.
- *Specific Objectives:* The general objective will be achieved through a series of strategic courses of action directed at (i) increasing the punishments for committing these crimes and (ii) consolidating the citizens' level of trust in and the international community's belief in the capacity of the Colombian State to confront extortion and kidnapping.

All the programmes and actions of the various government entities to combat extortion and kidnapping will be explicitly directed at



achieving these objectives. These activities are encompassed within the following strategic courses of action.

107. The dismantling of kidnapping organisations:

■ The core of the fight against kidnapping is the dismantling of the criminal organisations that systematically commit these offences. Interagency work groups, acting as support structures (66) for the centralisation of investigations and of strategic and operational intelligence, will conduct the dismantling of specific groups and organisations. These support structures will be associated with a team of specialised public prosecutors.

50

■ These teams will work with the Financial Analysis and Information Unit (98), in order to obtain detailed knowledge of the way in which money flows through the criminal organisations and their structures, and to apply the law of termination of ownership of funds used or received from kidnapping and extortion.

■ In order to support the achievement of these objectives, resources will be allocated for: (i) the purchase of electronic intelligence and investigation equipment according to technological advances; (ii) the training of joint teams from the Armed Forces, the National Police, the DAS, the CTI and the Public Prosecutor's Office in investigation, the collection of evidence and the management of crime scenes; and (iii) the reward payment programmes for information leading to results.

108. An increase in the number of rescues of kidnapped people:

■ The structure, location and jurisdiction of the specialised anti-kidnapping GAULA groups will be evaluated and redefined. Their procedures will be brought into line with the National Police, the Armed Forces, the DAS and the Public Prosecutor's Office. The levels of operative training will be improved and the capacity of reaction will be maintained through continuous assessment.

Counter-corruption and counter-intelligence schemes, and scheduled and random exercises will be conducted in the GAULA groups and in each organism involved in the fight against these crimes, as well as in those in which the criminal organisations can infiltrate and interfere with the work of the authorities or facilitate their criminal activities.

«The structure, location and jurisdiction of the specialised anti-kidnapping GAULA groups will be evaluated and redefined. Their procedures will be brought into line with the National Police, the Armed Forces, the DAS and the Public Prosecutor's Office.»

«The criteria for the classification and management of statistics will be standardised and detailed information on every case will be maintained. A decentralised information system will be put into place which can be accessed by all the organisations involved in the fight against extortion and kidnapping.»

«A systematic analysis of the evolution, characteristics, features, regional patterns and modus operandi of extortion and kidnapping will be conducted, with the aim of anticipating new trends, of supporting decision-making and of determining more precisely the cost structure of kidnapping.»

«The Colombian Government will request effective co-operation and initiatives from international governments against the practices that facilitate or favour these crimes. International co-operation networks for intelligence, training and information technology will be established.»

109. The optimisation of information and the knowledge of the kidnapping organisations in order to facilitate decision-making and the dismantling of these organisations and their finances:

- The criteria for the classification and management of statistics will be standardised and detailed information on every case will be maintained. A decentralised information system will be put into place which can be accessed by all the organisations involved in the fight against extortion and kidnapping. This system will collect all the relevant information and data on these crimes, which will support decision-making. The priority is to construct a database which will permit the review of each individual case of kidnapping.
- A systematic analysis of the evolution, characteristics, features, regional patterns and modus operandi of extortion and kidnapping will be conducted, with the aim of anticipating new trends, of supporting decision-making and of determining more precisely the cost structure of kidnapping.

110. The implementation of a system of reception and follow-up of cases:

- A system of collection and follow-up of cases will be established in order to: (i) ensure a direct, stable and friendly relationship with the victims and their relatives; (ii) produce better judicial, tactical and strategic information; (iii) deal adequately with and respond to the information on cases filed; and (iv) ensure that the GAULA concentrate on cases of extortion and kidnapping.

111. The consolidation of an international agenda against extortion and kidnapping:

- The Colombian Government will request effective co-operation and initiatives from international governments against the practices that facilitate or favour these crimes. International co-operation networks for intelligence, training and information technology will be established.

112. The strengthening of the preventive capacity of the State and the citizenry:

- Widespread information and awareness campaigns will be carried out to encourage individuals to: (i) denounce cases of extortion and kidnapping; (ii) report suspicious activities to the authorities; (iii) rely on the support of the State and resist the payment of ransoms.



- The Government will establish simple and effective communication channels to facilitate the reporting of these crimes. Prevention campaigns directed at high-risk groups will be conducted.
- The voluntary adoption of a code of conduct will be encouraged in unions, businesses, schools, universities, families, among others, to facilitate the rapid detection of suspicious actions or situations, which may lead to extortion or kidnapping.
- The Government will update its warning and communication technologies and will support its use through the continuous improvement of reaction times of the security and investigative organisms of the State.
- The alliances made by criminal organisations in order to obtain information on potential victims and make it easier to carry out the crime will be identified, as will their sources of information.
- A prison security and intelligence programme will be launched to eliminate kidnapping and extortion networks organised from within prisons, to minimise the acquirement of criminal skills by serving prisoners and to obtain valuable information for the dismantling of these criminal organisations.

113. The establishment of adequate legislation:

- The judicial elements necessary for improvement in the fight against extortion and kidnapping will be identified and presented for consideration in Congress, within a new counter-kidnapping and counter-extortion judicial initiative.

114. The establishment of benchmarks:

- From the start, the development of this policy will be directed at the establishment of a review and evaluation system, based on management and impact indicators, which will allow: (i) the understanding of the effects of the policies and their implementation and (ii) the redirection of the strategy or policy, if necessary.

115. The development of a work-scheme:

The President will review all policy decisions in the fight against kidnapping and extortion. These decisions will be presented for approval by the National Defence and Security Council (59). In order to ensure proper communication, co-ordination and action by all the organisms involved, the National Council for the Fight Against Kidnapping (CONASE), headed by the Ministry of Defence, will assign resources and tasks and will constantly monitor

«The voluntary adoption of a code of conduct will be encouraged in unions, businesses, schools, universities, families, among others, to facilitate the rapid detection of suspicious actions or situations, which may lead to extortion or kidnapping».

«A prison security and intelligence programme will be launched to eliminate kidnapping and extortion networks organised from within prisons, to minimise the acquirement of criminal skills by serving prisoners and to obtain valuable information for the dismantling of these criminal organisations».

the policies implemented by the entities it represents, with the support of the Office of the Vice President.

Protection of the Demobilised and Child Combatants

«The Government has invited all Colombians who belong to illegal armed groups, both adults and children, to lay down their arms. The demobilisation programme, established by Decree 128 of 2003, offers a viable, flexible and rapid way of starting a new life, returning to the nuclear family and abandoning a clandestine life.»

«The aim of this policy is to rehabilitate and dignify the demobilised, especially the young, thus facilitating their reintegration into society and saving lives.»

116. The Government has invited all Colombians who belong to illegal armed groups, both adults and children, to lay down their arms. The demobilisation programme, established by Decree 128 of 2003, offers a viable, flexible and rapid way of starting a new life, returning to the nuclear family and abandoning a clandestine life. This commitment should come not only from the State and its institutions, but also from society in general including the private sector, the Church and civil organisations.
117. The aim of this policy is to rehabilitate and dignify the demobilised, especially the young, thus facilitating their reintegration into society and saving lives. Those who have demobilised will receive psychological advice and will be offered education and technical training for 18 months, enabling them to live a dignified life and to help their families and society in general.
118. A person wishing to cut his ties with the illegal armed groups should go to a military or police commander, a public prosecutor, a representative of the ombudsman or any other civilian or judicial authority and declare his personal and voluntary intention to lay down his arms. That authority will then hand him over to the competent authorities, which in the case of an adult is the Ministry of Defence and for a minor is the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF). They will meet the initial humanitarian needs of the individual. Those who demobilise will be certified within a short period of time by the Operational Committee for the Laying Down of Arms, which will become a permanent decision making body. In order to speed up the demobilisation process, the Public Prosecutor's Office will form a unit of prosecutors entirely dedicated to establishing the legal position of those individuals who abandon their weapons, having analysed their judicial past and the seriousness of the crimes committed.
119. The authorities will provide the necessary documents, such as civil register papers, identity card, military and police record, so that the demobilised can reconstruct their identity. All state institutions will then work together to reintegrate the individual into the social and economic life of the country.



120. The Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme will be a special priority section of the Government's general education, health and employment policies. The Government will also set up a series of strategic alliances with the private sector, NGOs, religious communities – nationally and internationally – and friendly countries with a view to establishing programmes and projects and obtaining further funding.

121. The Government will ensure the individual's access to all state resources. Access to health services will be provided through the Social Security System and to education and training through agreements with local governments, the National Apprenticeship Service (SENA), the Colombian Institute for Overseas Educational Credit and Technical Studies (ICETEX), the Public Administration School (ESAP) and other educational establishments. The individual will also benefit from job creation programmes supported by the Colombian Fund for the Modernisation and Technological Development of micro, small and medium sized business (FOMIPYME). Alternative employment opportunities will be explored with both the private and the public sectors.

122. Just as the State and society are committed to granting certain rights and benefits, the demobilised adult or minor has a duty to his country and the society which receives him. He must not be involved in criminal activities, obey the law, complete his reintegration programme and any training courses and undertake an activity which is both useful and productive. Any relapse will result in the immediate loss of all state benefits.

Protection against Recruitment of Children and Adolescents

123. The programme to demobilise the six or seven thousand children and adolescents estimated by UNICEF and ICBF to be in the ranks of the illegal armed groups will be complemented with policies to prevent their recruitment in the first place. The focus of such policies will be on the high-risk populations groups. Preventive programmes will be launched, to: (i) prevent the illegal armed groups from tricking individuals into membership; (ii) reinforce the attention paid to family violence and the mistreatment of children; (iii) ensure children remain in school; and (iv) generally promote a culture of peaceful coexistence and resolution of conflicts.

124. Special attention will be paid to the problem of unemployment in rural areas, especially among the young, in order to prevent hundreds

«The Government will ensure the individual's access to health services, through the Social Security System, and to education and training through agreements with local governments and educational establishments.»

«Preventive programmes will be launched, to prevent the illegal armed groups from tricking individuals into membership, to reinforce the attention paid to family violence and the mistreatment of children, to ensure children remain in school, and to generally promote a culture of peaceful coexistence and resolution of conflicts.»

of adolescents from falling prey to the promises of a salary and other ruses used by the illegal armed groups to recruit adolescents – when they do not force them to join their ranks. Unemployment in these areas is also a result of the activities of these groups, which threaten those who generate employment in agriculture, commerce, service and construction.

«Special attention will be paid to the problem of unemployment in rural areas, especially among the young, in order to prevent hundreds of adolescents from falling prey to the promises of a salary and other ruses used by the illegal armed groups to recruit adolescents – when they do not force them to join their ranks.»

125. The Government has presented its various employment generation policies in its National Development Plan. The social projects encouraging the replacement of the cultivation of illicit crops with the cultivation of corn, cotton, sugarcane, coffee and reforestation, aim to diminish rural unemployment, to protect the environment and to prevent the recruitment of adolescents by the illegal armed groups. Increased access to credit for small producers, tax incentives and agriculture machinery will foster production, while specialised training programmes will assist the rural worker.

55

Protection of the Economic Infrastructure

126. The Government is developing special programmes to prevent and eliminate terrorist attacks on the coal, electricity, oil and telecommunications infrastructure, ports and airports, as well as to prevent the theft of fuel. A support structure will co-ordinate the work of the Army, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the DAS, DIJIN and the Attorney General's Office (66). The basis of these programmes will be as follows:

«The Government is developing special programmes to prevent and eliminate terrorist attacks on the coal, electricity, oil and telecommunications infrastructure, ports and airports, as well as to prevent the theft of fuel.»

- A reliable system for the collection of information and intelligence based on citizen co-operation.
- A proper understanding of the threat and the motivation of the terrorist.
- Armed Forces and National Police patrols in critical areas; and the creation of rapid reaction units capable of neutralising terrorist acts.
- The creation of inter-agency support structures which can investigate and analyse crime.
- The securing of the correct use of the royalties generated by the mining and petroleum industries; and the encouragement of company investment in the local community to improve the quality of life.



Protection of the Roads

127. The Government Road Security Programme is aimed at guaranteeing safe passage for all passenger and goods traffic on Colombia's highways. The strategy is based on the co-ordinated action of the relevant state institutions, particularly the Ministries of Defence and Transport and the Public Prosecutor's Office, with active citizen co-operation. The Programme comprises four main elements:

- The monitoring of traffic on the national road system.
- Prevention and rapid reaction by the Armed Forces and the National Police.
- The presence of the mobile units of Public Prosecutor's Office which will speed up the prosecution of those who attack the security and freedom of our citizens on our roads.
- Co-operation between the citizen and the authorities in the protection of the highways.

128. In order to do this, the following programmes will be implemented:

- *A Highway Strategic Information Centre*, which will collect information nationally and respond quickly and effectively to security incidents on the roads and co-ordinate the role of the various state institutions involved in the road security strategy.
- *A Road Monitoring System*, which will support the efforts of the intelligence services to prevent crime on the roads. All information collected will be sent to the Highway Strategic Information Centre.
- *Plan Meteor*, which will co-ordinate the motorised Army companies and support the monitor and control of the roads.
- *Mobile Judiciary Units*, which will help the Armed Forces and the National Police to man road blocks, make arrests, immobilise vehicles and impound illegal goods by immediately processing the crimes as they occur.
- *Control Systems at Toll Booths*, to monitor all individuals and vehicles as they leave the city.

«The Government Road Security Programme is aimed at guaranteeing safe passage for all passenger and goods traffic on Colombia's highways. The strategy is based on the co-ordinated action of the relevant state institutions, particularly the Ministries of Defence and Transport and the Public Prosecutor's Office, with active citizen co-operation.»

«On bank-holidays, convoys ("Vive Colombia, viaja por ella") will continue to be organised on the main highways to enable our citizens to travel in peace, with the special protection of the National Police and the Armed Forces.»

«The Government will encourage the voluntary and patriotic co-operation of Colombian citizens in performing their constitutional duties and, in particular, in demonstrating the *solidarity* demanded by the modern social democratic State, to help prevent crime and terrorism, by providing information relating to the illegal armed groups.»

- *Air Monitoring*, which will support ground units, watching and monitoring the roads by supplying information quickly on any irregularities which occur on the roads.
- *Road Security Centres*, which will help in the prosecution of individuals, the monitoring of vehicles and cargoes in areas where there is a particularly high incidence of smuggling and security problems.
- *Road Guards*, to extend the capabilities of the Armed Forces and the National Police with motorised squadrons who will patrol the roads.
- *Citizen Co-operation Networks* which, with the appropriate communications equipment, will exercise their civic duties and express their solidarity by assisting the authorities in the provision of information on any irregularities which occur on the roads.

129. On bank-holidays, convoys (“*Vive Colombia, viaja por ella*”) will continue to be organised on the main highways to enable our citizens to travel in peace, with the special protection of the National Police and the Armed Forces.

E. CO-OPERATING IN THE SECURITY OF ALL

The Security of Solidarity

«A network of citizens in both urban and rural areas, in accordance with the principle of solidarity and the duty to contribute to common security, will provide the authorities with information which will help in the prevention of crime and the pursuit of criminals.»

130. The Government will encourage the voluntary and patriotic co-operation of Colombian citizens in performing their constitutional duties and, in particular, in demonstrating the *solidarity* demanded by the modern social democratic State (18), to help prevent crime and terrorism, by providing information relating to the illegal armed groups. The Government will also establish regional security committees, (65) which will enlist the support of civil society. Research on the prevention of crime and the experience of many other countries suggests that prevention based on citizen participation is more effective than coercive measures to contain crime. If 44 million Colombians support and feel support by the State, terrorism can be defeated.

Co-operation Networks

131. A network of citizens in both urban and rural areas, in accordance with the principle of solidarity and the duty to contribute to common security, will provide the authorities with information which will help



in the prevention of crime and the pursuit of criminals. They will also participate in programmes aimed at promoting a culture of security. Just like the “Neighbourhood Watch” schemes that were quickly a success in Australia and United Kingdom, these volunteers will act as an extra sets of eyes for the authorities with whom they will be in constant contact. Unlike that of the informants, this co-operation will receive no reward.

Reward Programme

132. In addition, a Programme has been set up to reward those who provide information which leads to the prevention of a terrorist attack or the arrest of members of any of the illegal armed groups. The Government will also establish a system of incentives and rewards for information about property belonging to organisations or persons with links to terrorism or illegal drugs trafficking.

«A Programme has been set up to reward those who provide information which leads to the prevention of a terrorist attack or the arrest of members of any of the illegal armed groups.»

International Co-operation

133. Security does not just depend on the efforts of all Colombians. The transnational nature of the main security threats means that co-operation between States is a necessary condition for the security of all. It calls for simultaneous action on all sides against every link in chain of the illegal drugs business. The Government will initially look for increased regional co-operation with a view to achieving the following:

- The creation of a united front by establishing co-operation mechanisms which facilitate the undertaking of joint security force operations with other countries and exercise strict control over the traffic of arms, explosives, narcotics, chemical precursors and persons.
- An increase in the exchange of financial information and intelligence in order to monitor, identify and neutralise the activities of illegal armed groups.
- The strengthening of the bilateral border commissions and the promotion of agreements which will allow the security forces to exercise more effective control along the border, especially on rivers, in our national waters and air space, and provide for the exchange of intelligence and co-ordinated patrols, checks, searches and interdiction operations.
- The fulfilment of commitments under the Andean Community Lima Agreement.

«The transnational nature of the main security threats means that co-operation between States, particularly regional co-operation, is a necessary condition for the security of all. It calls for simultaneous action on all sides against every link in chain of the illegal drugs business.»

«The Government will support the modernisation of mechanisms such as the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty or institutions such as the Inter-American Defence Board so that they are effective against the major threats of today, such as the illegal drugs trade and terrorism.»

«The exchange of technology and resources between the different Colombian illegal armed groups and international terrorist networks is a particular cause for concern in Colombia. If there is agreement on the symbiotic relationship between illegal drugs and terrorism, it is clear that real international co-operation is required against both activities.»

- The reform of the existing Inter-American Security System in line with current security threats. The Government will support the modernisation of mechanisms such as the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty or institutions such as the Inter-American Defence Board so that they are effective against the major threats of today, such as the illegal drugs trade and terrorism. The Government will also promote the ratification of the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism.

134. The only possible response to a transnational threat such as the illegal drugs trade is close international co-operation. The concept of shared responsibility should be applied to every link in the illegal drugs chain. Every country which shares responsibility for the illegal drugs problem should make a joint effort to:

- Offer alternative employment opportunities and financial support to small-scale coca and poppy farmers who voluntarily eradicate their crops.
- Eradicate coca and poppy cultivation.
- Exchange intelligence and boost technical capabilities to tackle illegal drugs trafficking networks.
- Co-ordinate the interdiction effort, especially in the air over the Caribbean and the Pacific.
- Harmonise legislation on the trafficking of illegal drugs and chemical precursors so that the penalties reflect the damage caused.
- Exchange financial information which will help identify and punish money launderers more effectively.
- Control and reduce the consumption of illegal drugs by offering treatment, rehabilitation and education.

135. The fight against terrorism and its financing requires the same degree of international co-operation. The exchange of technology and resources between the different Colombian illegal armed groups and international terrorist networks is a particular cause for concern in Colombia. If there is agreement on the symbiotic relationship between illegal drugs and terrorism (29), it is clear that similar measures should be taken against both activities. Real international co-operation against terrorism requires all States to take the following actions:



- Implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 and comply with the recommendations of the Council's Counter Terrorism Committee, which monitors their implementation, by introducing antiterrorist legislation, not harbouring terrorist groups and not allowing them to use their territory to carry out their activities and administer their finances. The fulfilment of these obligations should be automatic and should not depend upon a request from the country where the groups originate.
- Join together to achieve greater transparency in the international financial system, so that the efforts of some are not rendered useless by the reluctance of others to establish the necessary controls.
- Permanently exchange information on terrorist activity.
- Act promptly to implement Interpol arrest warrants.

60

F. COMMUNICATING STATE POLICY AND ACTION

Terrorism and Communication

136. Terrorism is a form of political violence which uses communication to spread fear and terror in both urban and rural areas. Terrorist action reflects neither military nor political strength, but rather the weakness of those who do not have the support of the people and try to impose their will through terror. It is an empty strength. The Government will keep the public fully informed of developments in all areas relating to the Defence and Democratic Security policy in order to boost confidence and encourage citizen co-operation and *solidarity*.
137. The responsible handling of information is not just a task of the Government. The media, too, should fulfil their constitutional duty by being both responsible and prudent when releasing information which endangers lives or jeopardises operations. Fulfilling these constitutional duties is an especially difficult task in a democratic country that faces a terrorist threat, as is the case in Colombia. Such organisations not only attack the freedom of the press through intimidation and violence, but also spread confusion through false information and manipulate opinion. The Government will encourage debate and reflection around such issues as the support of democratic values, the use of the media by those who attack the civilian population as a sounding board to justify their actions, and the impact of the language that is used when reporting information.

«The Government will keep the public fully informed of developments in all areas relating to the Defence and Democratic Security policy in order to boost confidence and encourage citizen co-operation and *solidarity*.»

«The Government will encourage debate and reflection around such issues as the support of democratic values, the use of the media by those who attack the civilian population as a sounding board to justify their actions, and the impact of the language that is used when reporting information.»

Public Diplomacy

138. The support of the international community is essential to the achievement of the security of our citizens. The transnational nature of the threats to Colombian democracy makes it impossible to bring long term security to the people without the assistance of other countries. In recent years Colombia has been fortunate in receiving a good deal of international support. The country's situation has been discussed in international fora, as never before. However, the nature of the problem is still misunderstood by the general public abroad. The Government, through its foreign service and military and police attachés, will undertake an exercise in public diplomacy to explain the nature of the Colombian problem in its Latin American, hemispheric and international context. Above all, Colombia requires strong institutions which fill the vacuum of authority, protect the population, guarantee their rights, reduce poverty and allow the economy to prosper. More security will mean greater incorporation into the international community, which in turn will produce a greater diversification in production, attract foreign investment and tourism, guarantee the transfer of technology and open new markets. Employment sources will thus be secured and Colombia will regain its place as an engine of growth and development in Latin America. The strengthening of institutions will guarantee the rule of law and the right of all Colombians to enjoy their freedom.

61



V. Financing and assessment

139. The implementation of the Defence and Democratic Security Policy requires significant resources at a time when the country is undergoing a period of financial difficulty. The main sources of funding are, on the one hand, the proper and efficient collection of taxes, such as the property tax earmarked specifically for security matters; and, on the other hand, the Government's commitment to fiscal adjustments such as pension and tax reform and the restructuring of state institutions which will free the resources needed for security and social spending (85). From 2005 onwards, expected additional taxation should ensure the sustainability of the democratic security policy.

140. Periodic monitoring and assessment of all programmes will ensure that the strategic objectives of the Democratic Security Policy are met. Two types of indicators, based on the aforementioned specific objectives (57), will be used:

- Management and financial indicators which measure the efficiency of resource management.
- Impact indicators which measure the effect of a policy on the security situation, using performance criteria linked to the strategic objectives.

The information gained from these assessments will make it possible to: (i) make the necessary adjustments when programmes do not yield the expected results; (ii) give transparency to the process; and (iii) create accountability mechanisms and define responsibilities.

Table of Responsibilities

Table of Responsibilities Democratic Security and Defence Policy

GENERAL AND SPECIFIC STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES	MINISTRIES												ADMIN. DEPTS.			PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMMES					OTHER STATE INSTITUTIONS			
	INTERIOR AND JUSTICE	EXTERNAL AFFAIRS	TREASURY	DEFENCE	AGRICULTURE	SOCIAL WELFARE	MINING AND ENERGY	COMMERCE	EDUCATION	ENVIRONMENT AND HOUSING	COMMUNICATIONS	TRANSPORT	CULTURE	DAS	DNP	DANE	Counter-corruption	Solidarity Network	Human Rights	Young Colombia	Plan Colombia	Attorney General	Prosecutor General	Judiciary
1. CONSOLIDATION OF STATE CONTROL THROUGHOUT COLOMBIA																								
- Gradual restoration of the presence of the Armed Forces and the National Police in all municipalities																								
* Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones																								
* Protection of the Road Network																								
- Increase in judicial action against crimes of high social impact																								
- Strengthening and extension of the administration of justice and state institutions in areas where state control has been strengthened																								
- Reduction of human rights violations																								
2. PROTECTION OF THE POPULATION																								
- Dismantling of terrorist organisations																								
- Reduction of kidnapping and extortion																								
- Reduction of homicide																								
- Prevention of forced displacement and facilitation of the return of displaced populations to their place of origin																								
- Reintegration into society of organisations, groups or individuals who renounce violence																								
3. ELIMINATION OF THE ILLEGAL DRUGS TRADE IN COLOMBIA																								
- Interdiction at sea, on rivers and on land of the traffic of illegal drugs and chemical precursors																								
- Eradication of coca and poppy cultivation																								
- Dismantling of illegal drugs trafficking networks																								
- Confiscation of the property and finances of illegal drugs traffickers																								
4. MAINTENANCE OF A DETERRENT CAPABILITY																								
- Protection of land, sea and river borders																								
5. TRANSPARENT AND EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES																								
- Achievement of greater impact through the most efficient use of resources																								
- Savings through a review of the administrative structures and processes																								
- Development of transparency and accountability mechanisms																								

Level of commitment  High  Medium  Low





comunicacion@mindefensa.gov.co

Ministerio de Defensa,
Carrera 52 - Avenida el Dorado C.A.N., Bogotá D.C.
www.mindefensa.gov.co