

**PLAN COLOMBIA: REALITY
OF THE COLOMBIAN CRISIS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEMISPHERIC SECURITY**

Luz E. Nagle

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FOREWORD

As American foreign policy and military asset management expand beyond the so-called “Drug War” in Colombia, Professor Luz Nagle analyzes that country’s problems and makes recommendations regarding what it will take to achieve stated U.S. and Colombian objectives in that crisis situation. She also examines the concomitant issue of “spillover” from the Colombian crisis into the rest of the Latin American region. The results and recommendations of this analysis go well beyond prescribing a simple military solution to the complex political-economic-social-moral-security issues of this 50-year-old war. In these terms, it becomes clear that the military in general and the U.S. Army in particular must change in order to operate more effectively in the full spectrum of current and future conflict.

This monograph was written as the second in the new Strategic Studies Institute(SSI)/North-South Center Special Series that deals with the hemispheric security environment. SSI is pleased to publish this study as a source of first-hand information and a topic of focused debate concerning global security and stability issues.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

LUZ ESTALLA NAGLE is Assistant Professor of Law at Stetson University College of Law in St. Petersburg, Florida, where she teaches international criminal law, Latin American business law, and international comparative business law. Professor Nagle served as a judge in Medellin, Colombia, in the mid-1980s until assassination attempts by drug traffickers forced her to leave Colombia for the United States. Her writings and presentations on national security law and mutual legal assistance, drug interdiction, guerrilla insurgency, international white collar crime, and judicial mechanisms probe the realities of foreign policy and the rule of law in the Americas from a critical perspective. They reflect her training and experience in both the Anglo-American and continental law systems. Professor Nagle holds an LL.D. from the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, a J.D. from the College of William and Mary, an LL.M. from the University of California at Los Angeles's Law School, and an M.A. in Latin America studies from the University of California at Los Angeles.

PREFACE

Professor Luz E. Nagle has never been a believer in *Plan Colombia* as the solution to her native country's array of problems. Now she has again published on the subject, in an article which is eloquently critical about the plan's results during the administration of President Andrés Pastrana, yet which holds out hope for a better turn of events in the new administration of President Alvaro Uribe. It is a study written with passion and commitment. But also, as befits a law professor, it is scholarly in its degree of documentation and factual content.

In Nagle's view, practically everything was wrong with *Plan Colombia* that could have been wrong, although she acknowledges that to do nothing would have been even worse. The plan was, in her view, doomed from the beginning—prepared without adequate consultation with the Colombian people, therefore lacking in consensus and support. It was inadequately funded by the Colombian government for the most part, but drew on large amounts of aid from the United States, \$1.7 billion, which was largely restricted to fighting narcotics trafficking when insurgency was the real problem. It failed to attract the expected funding from Europe and Japan and was largely ignored by Colombia's Latin American neighbors, who often seemed to be in a state of denial as to how the problems of Colombia affected them.

A particular strength of Nagle's well-documented article is a detailed explanation of the multiple failures of the Pastrana administration in every aspect of *Plan Colombia's* implementation. The ill-fated peace initiative of Pastrana simply consigned over to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas a piece of Colombia's territory the size of Switzerland with no positive results. The FARC were strengthened by having the territory, as was predicted by the Colombian army. Kidnappings and assassinations continued unabated. Eventually, this year the army had to be sent in to retake the zone. Rampant corruption at every level of the Colombian government, according to Nagle, became even worse during the

Pastrana years and signified, in her view, a lack of any credible leadership.

Does the new Uribe administration hold out any hope for better results? Nagle thinks it does. The Colombian army is becoming more professional, its morale is increasing, and it is today that institution which actually enjoys the highest popular support of any in the country. The mood of the people has hit bottom and now responds to Uribe's policies which demand sacrifice from the population and are producing support for tougher action against the guerrillas. The president is leading a full charge against corruption. The U.S. Congress, as well, has become more sophisticated in understanding the need to combat insurgency, linked as it is to the illegal drug trade and not separable from it. Similarly, in the context of the "war on terrorism," although that somewhat disparate term generally refers to the Middle East, the point is not lost that three Colombian groups, the FARC, Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN) and Auto Defensas Unificados de Colombia (AUC), have been classified as terrorist organizations by the U.S. Government.

Nagle also documents instances in which Colombia's neighbors are taking stronger measures on their frontiers to combat the effects of insurgencies and the flow of drugs from Colombia. The evidence of "spillover effect" into the five countries bordering on Colombia and well beyond is too abundant to ignore.

To Nagle, her native Colombia is "a nation worthy of being saved." In terms of hemispheric stability, essential to the entire U.S. strategy for the region, it is certainly deserving of U.S. attention, more than it has had in the recent past.

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SUMMARY

In this new monograph, Professor Luz Nagle examines the status of *Plan Colombia* within the context of Colombia's political and social turmoil. Intended as an ambitious program to achieve decisive results in a war against illegal drugs fought in a major source country, *Plan Colombia's* implementation has been wrought with corruption, delays, and problems in program implementation, tactical shortcomings and oversights, and lack of backing by the Colombian elites. *Plan Colombia* was also meant to define President Pastrana's legacy to his country. But his failure to bring the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other irregular combatants into serious peace negotiations, his inability to curtail institutional corruption in the civilian and military branches of government, and his lack of support from the Colombian people further conspired to prevent *Plan Colombia* from achieving the desired results.

It is now up to a new administration headed by President Alvaro Uribe to determine how best to do two things. First, the Uribe administration must come to terms with the corruption that has rendered the Colombian government ineffective for decades, and has precluded the success of *Plan Colombia* and past aid programs. At the same time, it must seek and utilize new U.S. aid, intelligence resources, and military equipment in the fight against the narcoterrorists/narcoguerrillas, and fulfill its commitment as a reliable ally in the international war on terror.

Nagle concludes that the war against international terrorism is being fought on Colombian soil, and makes a series of observations and recommendations about what it will take for Colombia to overcome its own internal crises of armed conflict and institutional corruption, fulfill its regional security and counternarcotics obligations, and fight the global war against terror.

PLAN COLOMBIA: REALITY OF THE COLOMBIAN CRISIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR HEMISPHERIC SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

It has been said that the road to Hell is paved with good intentions.¹ The same can be said for *Plan Colombia*. Nearly 20 years into the endeavor, implementation of *Plan Colombia* has been difficult, results have been underwhelming, and the chief architects of the Plan, the Pastrana administration and officials in the Clinton White House,² have left behind a dubious legacy, a nation in disarray, and many promises unfulfilled. Now, a new Colombian administration under the leadership of a no-nonsense “authoritarian” must come to terms with the wreckage of his predecessor and steer *Plan Colombia* resources, continuing aid from the United States,³ and the will of a beleaguered nation toward the resolution of crises that have persisted and festered for half a century.

This monograph is intended to provide the reader with a context into which *Plan Colombia* falls within Colombia’s political and social turmoil. The first part of the monograph is a critical analysis of *Plan Colombia*’s implementation and the performance of President Andres Pastrana in dealing with the nexus between *Plan Colombia* and guerrilla insurgency. We will examine how institutionalized corruption and a near total lack of leadership during the Pastrana administration eroded Colombia’s capacity to cope with its many political and social problems and rendered *Plan Colombia* impotent. We will also review the state of affairs in Colombia since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and consider what the new war on terrorism means for prosecuting the war against drugs and guerrillas on Colombian soil. Next we will discuss the status

of the military in Colombia's complex society and the changing perceptions of its emerging role in stabilizing the nation, and finally, we will outline the implications for hemispheric security.

In the second and final part of the monograph, we will cover generally where Colombia goes from here as the new president, Alvaro Uribe Velez, takes office at a most profound juncture in the history of Colombia. The discussion will focus on the nation's resolve to find a permanent solution to the armed guerrilla conflict, narcotics trafficking, related terrorism, and social upheaval, and what needs to be done to fulfill the overwhelming mandate of a people weary of war, political corruption and turmoil, and economic hardship.

PROMISES, PROMISES

Promoted as a magic bullet, *Plan Colombia* was touted as an ambitious panacea to stabilize the civil society of a beleaguered nation and gain the upper hand on unabated drug trafficking and narcoterrorism. When President Pastrana pitched his plan to the United States in 1999,⁴ the Clinton administration and lawmakers in Congress were attracted to *Plan Colombia* for many reasons. Some viewed it as a comprehensive agenda to fight an international drug trafficking epidemic that the Reagan administration had 2 decades ago elevated to the status of a most insidious threat to U.S. national security.⁵ Others embraced *Plan Colombia* out of a sincere sense of altruism, idealism, and a desire to help a long-suffering neighbor in the hemisphere. More pragmatic lawmakers viewed the plan in terms of *realpolitik*—a bold, albeit costly, effort to stabilize the geopolitics of our hemisphere and protect United States and international foreign investment and interests in Colombia, and stimulate the economic vitality of an international military/industrial complex. Whatever the motivation, the United States to date has provided more than \$1.7 billion toward the \$7.5 billion projected to make the plan succeed.⁶

Unfortunately, no sooner had the ink dried on *Plan Colombia* than a number of events conspired to disrupt its implementation. The European nations and Japan, which initially supported the plan and pledged more than \$300 million⁷ to the endeavor, pulled the plug on their support, blaming and criticizing the United States for supporting a plan that was in their view too skewed toward military aid. They argued that the position of the United States on military aid would only heighten tensions in Colombia rather than help stabilize the country through funding of the plan's humanitarian elements.⁸ The position of the European partners and Japan, however, is not on firm ground, for while they were criticizing the U.S. military role in Colombia, they were simultaneously hosting and toasting Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)⁹ guerrillas on European tours and treating them as esteemed celebrities,¹⁰ and seeming to ignore the nexus between drug trafficking and the FARC and other irregular combatants in the Colombian civil war.

The implementation of *Plan Colombia* also contributed directly and indirectly to the growing Colombian diaspora, a brain drain of the best and brightest to other countries, and accelerated the displacement of rural inhabitants as a result of aerial eradication campaigns gone awry and more collateral damage occurring from counterdrug/counterguerrilla operations. Moreover, the Colombian government was unable to articulate clearly how it would come up with the balance of funding, some \$5 billion, to keep the plan afloat—especially after guerrillas have in the last year hit major oil pipelines and processing facilities from which revenues would be drawn to pay for Colombia's share of the plan.¹¹ While congressional testimonies indicate that as of May 2002 the Colombian government had already spent more than \$3 billion on *Plan Colombia*,¹² significant concern remains regarding where Colombia will locate the remaining \$2 billion, especially after the departure of the Pastrana administration in August 2002.

Perhaps most unfortunate of all negative aspects of *Plan Colombia*, however, is that Colombian citizens had little say in the matter of the plan's creation and implementation. Most Colombians feel, justifiably, that the plan has been forced upon them by a Colombian president who did not first consider the collective will and wishes of the nation. This sentiment was well-expressed by a former Colombian peace commissioner who, in August 2001, wrote:

The plan was never consulted, discussed, or debated within Colombia before it was presented abroad. Neither the directly-affected local communities nor their elected officials were brought into the decision-making process. While the U.S. Congress has held countless hearings and open sessions on *Plan Colombia*, the Colombian Congress has yet to hold its first.¹³

The problematic timing of its implementation is another critical shortcoming of *Plan Colombia*. Although it was conceived late in both the Clinton and Pastrana administrations, each viewed the plan as a legacy project that would define the efforts each president made to fight the war on drugs and stabilize Colombia's downward spiral into anarchy and civil war. On the U.S. side, congressional support for Clinton's promotion of the plan was achieved only after tough political maneuvering and much public debate, coupled with key visits in 1999 and 2000 by Pastrana to the United States to lobby lawmakers. Throughout the plan's formulation process, many Republican lawmakers derided the Clinton administration's dismal track record in implementing prior counternarcotics and rule of law initiatives in Latin America. At a hearing on August 6, 1999, Congressman John Mica (R-FL) called the administration's approach to Colombian aid "schizophrenic" and criticized the administration's inability to provide materiel and training to the Colombian armed forces in a timely and efficient manner:

While very publicly calling for \$1 billion in emergency aid last week, this same Administration requested only \$40 million for

Colombia just six months ago and blocked assistance there two years ago. Indeed, in a bold display of hypocrisy, the Administration's FY-2000 budget request did not include a single dollar of the \$280 million authorized by Congress for Colombia under the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act, an emergency congressional appropriation initiated by Mr. Hastert.

Worse still, this Administration has resisted congressional efforts to ensure that needed drug-fighting equipment makes it to Colombia in a timely manner. The Administration has fought us on Blackhawk utility helicopters for the past 3 years and, to date, not a single Blackhawk helicopter has yet made it to Colombia. Notably, there is one sitting, right now, on a tarmac in Stamford, Connecticut as we speak.

Likewise, this Administration fought us on upgraded Huey-II helicopters for the Colombian National Police. Again, to date, only two of twelve upgraded Huey-II helicopters have made it to Colombia, despite the fact that, right now, there are four Huey-II helicopters, outfitted and ready to go, sitting on a tarmac in Ozark, Alabama.¹⁴

Some Democrats, too, expressed skepticism during the formative stages of funding for *Plan Colombia*. In his statements before the House Appropriations Committee on March 9, 2000, Congressman David Obey (D-WI) said:

In my view, all of the American money, all of the American helicopters, all of the American military advice in the world cannot achieve the successful outcome on this problem if you do not have the sustained will and determination on the part of the Colombian people and their elite, their economic and social elite, to deal with the core problems in that society that must be dealt with if we're going to get a leg up on this problem. I think the key lesson we learned in Vietnam is that this country can never do for another country what that country can do for itself if that country does not have the will to do everything necessary to deal with its problems.¹⁵

Democratic lawmakers also had serious reservations about the lack of attention the plan paid to rule of law and civil society components, such as drug education, health

reform, judicial reform initiatives, and substantive efforts to improve the human rights records of the Colombian armed forces. That concern led to a number of adjustments to the plan, including adoption of restrictions established by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) during the drafting of the Foreign Appropriations Act of 1997.¹⁶ Under the so-called Leahy Amendment, Colombia would be required to vet carefully all Colombian military and law enforcement officials for complicity in alleged human rights abuses before assigning them to operational units funded under *Plan Colombia*.¹⁷

Despite such widespread skepticism toward the plan as formulated, the Clinton administration persisted in selling to Congress promises that realistically could not be kept, especially as rumblings surfaced prior to implementation that the United States would soon be abandoned by its international partners in the enterprise. Republican lawmakers began raising formal concerns about the plan in March 2001. In testimony before a House investigative panel, Rep. Ben Gilman, former chairman of the House International Relations Committee, said, “It [*Plan Colombia*] is not a pretty picture. Our policy lacks any clarity. As we learned in Vietnam, that means real trouble.”¹⁸

Now, more than a year into *Plan Colombia*, the U.S. Congress has been asked by a new Colombian president to increase spending yet again, even as charges of Colombian corruption surrounding the management of plan programs come to light. Senator Leahy summed up Congressional sentiment during a recent visit to Capitol Hill by then Colombian president-elect Uribe: “The results of *Plan Colombia* have been disappointing. . . . After spending more than \$1.5 billion, in many respects the situation is worse today than before *Plan Colombia* began.”¹⁹ The Senator’s opinion should not come as a great surprise to those familiar with Colombia’s record in handling, or rather mishandling, foreign aid in the war against drugs, narco-terrorism,

political violence, and, by association, the war against the half-century-long insurgency.²⁰

No one can deny, however, that *Plan Colombia* has yielded some positive results and changes in Colombia. Mutual legal assistance efforts under *Plan Colombia* and prior commitments resulted in the extradition of 23 drug kingpins during 2001.²¹ Officials claim 818 coca base labs and 221 HCL labs were destroyed,²² and significant damage done to coca and poppy crops through the aerial spraying of more than 84,000 hectares.²³ The Colombian military has made laudable strides in professionalizing the officer corps and in greatly improving the training, command and control, personal conduct, and salaries of personnel, as well as orchestrating a successful public relations campaign to improve the image of the military and national police. That said, however, the Colombian military continues struggling to provision and train personnel to meet logistical and tactical obligations.

But for few quantifiable successes, *Plan Colombia* has been victimized by its largesse, and emasculated by the unrealistic promises of funding made by the Colombian government that never materialized. To make matters worse, allegations have recently arisen that corrupt members of national police counterdrugs units have siphoned off millions of dollars of *Plan Colombia* funding. The scandal has led to the firing or reassignment of top officials, and has had a debilitating effect on the morale and credibility of elite counternarcotics forces that were touted as the crown jewel of *Plan Colombia*. As has been demonstrated repeatedly in the past, as soon as one fire is put out, another fire flares up.

Plan Colombia has also been flawed from inception for one very important reason that has remained largely ignored: its backers never acknowledged the obvious linkage between combating drug trafficking and fighting the guerrilla insurgency. Moreover, the framers of the plan in the administration had to walk a fine line between

provisions in U.S. foreign policy that allow for the support of counternarcotics initiatives in Colombia and regulations that prohibit direct U.S. involvement in Colombia's internal conflicts. But the conundrum for the United States is that the Colombian domestic crisis is also a U.S. national security threat, which coincidentally since September 11, 2001, has taken on an entirely new dimension with regard to the involvement of Colombian guerrilla groups in international terrorism.

The challenge, then, quickly is becoming one of how the United States can find a way to reconcile the linkage between fighting a war against drug trafficking and going after Colombian guerrillas under the auspices of the war against terror. Some analysts will admit that trying to delineate between the two is impossible under the current construction of *Plan Colombia*, or rather under the current obligations and rules of engagement that have tied up a considerable amount of U.S. foreign aid. For instance, *Plan Colombia* provided helicopters for moving drug interdiction forces around the country to conduct counternarcotics operations and provide cover for aerial fumigation missions, yet prohibited the use of the same helicopters directly in counterinsurgency operations. But the nexus between interdiction and eradication missions and operations against the guerrillas who are themselves drug producers and traffickers could not be separated. This catch-22 of sorts persisted until last June during meetings in Washington between President Bush and then President-elect Uribe, when the Bush administration requested to Congress that the helicopters and other support apparatus under *Plan Colombia* be made available for the Colombian military to use in counterinsurgency operations.²⁴

The success of *Plan Colombia* in part was also predicated on linkage to the Pastrana administration's hopes of negotiating a peace accord with the FARC guerrillas and pacifying other combatants. But Pastrana's efforts failed. Unabated kidnappings and assassinations by the guerrillas (including the brazen murder of the ex-minister of culture,

the kidnapping of the governor of Antioquia, and the kidnapping of presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt), and continued attacks on the nation's infrastructure forced the administration to face the reality that the FARC and other irregular combatants would never give up all they gained during the Pastrana presidency. Moreover, after more than 40 years of fighting, the guerrillas see no gain in submitting to the rule of law and abandoning their lucrative way of life. One Rand Corporation adviser best summed up the conundrum when he wrote:

Demobilizing or disarming would deprive their leadership of authority and expose them to retaliation. They recall that many of those who accepted previous amnesties and entered the political process as candidates were gunned down. In addition to ideological reasons, there are the tens of thousands who have suffered at their hands, lost relatives, paid ransoms [and] would have personal scores to settle. And peace would end a profitable enterprise.²⁵

When it finally became all too clear that the peace process was doomed, Pastrana made two serious errors. First, he allowed United Nations (U.N.) Peace Envoy James LeMoyne²⁶ to attempt negotiations at the 11th hour, just prior to Pastrana's deadline for the FARC to return to the peace table or give up the distention zone.²⁷ This angered many Colombians who saw LeMoyne's actions as postponing the inevitable, costing the lives of many Colombian military personnel and innocent civilians, and giving the guerrillas precious time to disappear into the jungle and mountains.²⁸ Second, Pastrana waited far too long to make good on his ultimatum to retake the distention zone from the FARC, forfeited any tactical element of surprise, and thereby squandered a window of opportunity for the Colombian armed forces to hit the guerrillas hard as soon as Pastrana's deadline ended at midnight on January 14, 2002. The great shame of Pastrana's indecisiveness and the interference of the U.N. Envoy is that the Colombian people overwhelmingly favored Pastrana's ultimatum and were ready to support the military's move to retake the zone

of distention and rout the FARC once and for all. Pastrana simply squandered the public resolve.

The State of the Nation.

In August 2002 the Pastrana administration left office, and its former officials departed for new jobs or homes abroad. *Plan Colombia* has been left adrift in a sea of uncertainty, political violence and narcotrafficking continue unabated, and the guerrillas and drug cartels thumb their noses at the incoming administration.

In spite of the situation on the ground in Colombia, the U.S. administration still shows a willingness to step up to the plate and work with President Uribe, and has already succeeded in obtaining from Congress an additional appropriation of \$538.2 million beginning in October.²⁹ The new package essentially will result in *Plan Colombia* morphing into yet another foreign policy strategy in which supporters will argue that dealing with the drug war means dealing with the Colombian insurgency, which *de facto*, means fighting the international war against terrorism on a Latin American front.

Colombia's immediate future began last January with the collapse of the peace negotiation with the FARC. Success at the peace table had been an oblique but critical component to the success of *Plan Colombia*. Unfortunately, President Pastrana badly miscalculated and compromised his own political position by being too accommodating to the FARC. One could argue, in fact, that the peace process was doomed early in Pastrana's administration when he granted the FARC status as a legitimate political entity and ceded to the rebels a zone of distention in Southern Colombia comprising nearly 40 percent of national territory—an area roughly the size of Switzerland. Giving the FARC the distention zone was a serious failure for the national security of the state, for the specific territory ceded to the FARC, the Llanos de Yari, was critically valuable to FARC's operations. The Colombian army had long

considered the Llanos to be a key strategic rear guard area for the guerrillas, affording them excellent communications between the most important cities in southern Colombia, good roads and favorable terrain for the rapid deployment of troops, good resources for sustenance, and an infrastructure capable of supporting the alternative society and narco-based economy the guerrillas were well into establishing.³⁰ Regardless of any other decisions he would make during his administration, Pastrana failed the moment he allowed the FARC to dictate national policy.

External forces also conspired to torpedo *Plan Colombia*, not the least of which was Europe's willingness to dance to the FARC's tune, giving FARC commanders diplomatic celebrity and sending official European delegations to the distention zone for talks on any number of topics such as economic assistance, global politics, and humanitarian aid.

The result of Pastrana's mistakes is that Colombia's civil society now finds itself at a unique crossroads in its history:

- The civil infrastructure has deteriorated precipitously;
- The social programs and health systems are overwhelmed by the forced displacement of rural inhabitants;
- Violence and crime have skyrocketed in the cities;
- Grievous brain drain threatens the future of Colombia as the best and brightest emigrate to other countries (resulting in the loss of an insulating buffer between the extreme left and extreme right wing elements);
- Corruption in the government remains problematic for reform; and,
- The Colombian military has so far been unable, despite respectable effort, to provide the personnel

and command and control to manage the materiel already made available under *Plan Colombia*.

Yet, Colombians have determined to turn the situation around if possible, beginning with a presidential election in May 2002 that clearly signaled a rejection of Pastrana's legacy. The new president, Alvaro Uribe, is the antithesis of his predecessor. Campaigning on a law and order platform, Uribe was swept into office with 53 percent of the vote and the mandate of a nation to deal decisively with the FARC, with corruption, with all forms of criminalism, and to enforce the rule of law throughout the country. He brings to office an energy and reputation for hard work that has become known in Bogotá's political circles as "el ritmo paisa" (paisa rhythm), referring to the strong work ethic and shrewd business acumen long attributed to the people of Antioquia province (known as Antioqueños) from which Uribe and many members of his administration come.³¹

The election of a hawk also signals a sea change even among the Colombian elite who, after decades of burying their heads in the sand, have grown tired of paying ransoms and extortion money to criminals and guerrillas. Polls taken at the end of 2001 showed overwhelming lack of support for the Colombian government, and in one poll last December, more than 78 percent of respondents felt that Colombia was heading down a bad road. Just 3 months later, when Pastrana finally called out the troops, polls showed nearly 98 percent of respondents supported the government's military actions in the field, but still held a majority view that the government was incompetent, corrupt, and incapable of governing the nation during this time of crisis.³² This negative view of the Colombian government was confirmed in August when a survey carried out by the Colombian Confederation of Chambers of Commerce in the cities of Bogotá, Cali, Medellín, Barranquilla, Cartagena, Bucaramanga, Popayan, Cucuta, and Pereira of 900 businessmen who enter into contracts with government bodies revealed that 70.3 percent of them believed that corruption in government had increased in the 2 years since

a prior survey had been taken.³³ One can understand then why a straightforward leader like Uribe was elected to replace someone a majority of Colombians now consider to be a traitor.³⁴

If the United States is to stand with the new president and continue the effort to help a country that has so much potential for the hemisphere, it is critical that lawmakers on Capitol Hill quickly gain a greater understanding of the new dynamic of a people who have finally said enough is enough and are becoming ever more ready and prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to bring peace to Colombia. U.S. lawmakers also need to appreciate that Colombia is a nation divided along class lines, united by a common cynicism toward the central government. The poor, particularly in the rural outlying regions of the nation, have long ago become indifferent toward the government, believing nothing the government says and holding out particular animosity for the *Bogotanos* whom they feel have little knowledge or interest in what is happening anywhere but in the capital city. Similarly, the middle and upper classes see the government as a failed administration unable to contend with a peace process that in the end was little more than a dog and pony show. All three classes of the society share the opinion that the leadership of the nation is paralyzed by decades of corruption and incompetence that have finally brought the nation to its knees—in the public sector, in the private sector, in the cities, in the countryside, and in the hearts and minds of the people.

The Elements of Crisis: Unchecked Corruption.

A better future must begin with drastic reforms in the political will of the government. Such reforms must be driven by the resolve to end corruption, in both the national legislative branch and at the regional level, and to prosecute officials decisively and to the fullest extent of the law.³⁵ The problem, however, is that corruption is so entrenched in the government³⁶ that terms of art have evolved over the course

of many generations to describe how corruption has been an accepted and even admired form of exerting power, influence, and control among the traditional ruling factions. Traditionally, one's reputation and success in politics has been measured by one's success in adhering to the principle that no one general law applies to all and at all times. Each individual is regulated by whatever law one can secure from one's leaders. In this way, "a politician expects to demonstrate his ability to shield his supporters from the rigorous application of the laws,"³⁷ and thus a protracted patron/client relationship is consummated. The politician who does this best is esteemed as *un verraco*.³⁸

While foreigners perceive that corruption in Colombia relates primarily to the drug trade and related illegal enterprises, Colombians worry more about the impact of institutionalized corruption on the delivery of services and direct government benefits. It is well documented that Colombians are more tolerant of drug traffickers who have built hospitals, childcare facilities, and housing projects for the poor than they are of government officials who do nothing to provide safe water, secure roadways, and ensure a dependable mail.³⁹

Time and again, Colombian politicians have come to the United States and other nations for aid, pleading ignorance of past sins, and promising to behave better in the future. Time and again, the United States has weighed the priorities of geopolitics and its own national security requirements against the risks that significant portions of aid will be siphoned off into private pockets and has moved ahead, despite overwhelming evidence that aid money disappears in copious amounts. Lawmakers in the United States would do well to reconsider the advice given by George Washington who, in his farewell address in 1796, said,

It is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that by such

acceptance it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard.⁴⁰

While President Pastrana promised an administration of integrity in calculated contrast to the scandal-ridden prior administration of Ernesto Samper, actual government corruption increased during Pastrana's time in office. It was no surprise to most Colombians that prominent banking and financial institutions were linked to scandals involving corruption. Such entities include Caja Agraria, Banco del Estado, BCH, Dragacol, Foncolpuertos, and Fondo de Previsión del Congreso (Congressional pension fund).⁴¹ Many of the scandals involved individuals who had been placed in crucial managerial positions as payback for political favors owed them, despite evidence of murky pasts and questionable conduct. Even as scandals consumed the institutions, the individuals continued to enjoy the full backing and confidence of the politicians who had promoted them.⁴²

A number of reports have also been produced by the press about the purchase and theft of large inventories by government entities. Not long ago, for example, the Colombian Congress purchased carpets and toilet paper during the final hours of budget appropriations in such volume that political critics noted wryly that the Congress would be using the inventory well into the next century. Favoritism in the awarding of government contracts also continued at epidemic proportions. In one month alone during 2001, the Office of the Attorney General detected over 2,000 illegal contracts. In one state, illegal contracts were awarded for more than 59 million pesos immediately following the issuance of a memo by the Attorney General to adhere to the Law of Government Contracts.⁴³ No doubt the agencies responsible for checking and overseeing the proper functioning of certain entities were either negligent,

incompetent, corrupt, or all three. There is a saying at play here at which many politicians wink: “Hecha la ley, hecha la trampa” (when a law is made, a swindle is made).

It is inevitable then, that scandal would inflict *Plan Colombia*. In May, reports surfaced that more than \$2 million of *Plan Colombia* funds were discovered missing and believed taken by more than 20 corrupt officers of the elite counterdrug forces (other sources place the number of police involved in the scandal at greater than 60).⁴⁴ At least 12 officers were fired for using the money for “personal ends,” such as buying gas for their automobiles, and the scandal soon led to the resignation of the agency’s head, General Gustavo Socha.⁴⁵ President Pastrana, however, vehemently insisted that “not a single peso” of the plan had been misplaced, but at this writing, no proof has been produced that that funds were not diverted.⁴⁶ Another scandal surfaced in early June regarding the origin of money used to finance the construction of a commercial building and other construction projects by the president’s former head of personal security, Colonel Royne Chavez.⁴⁷ Colonel Royne’s confused excuses about the funding and function of the multistory structure only raised more questions when he was unable to identify exactly who his partners were in the project, and why a penthouse complete with sauna and whirlpool bath would be built atop a building ostensibly to be used as a public parking garage.⁴⁸

In April another military commander, Colonel Édgar Bejarano, the former private secretary of General Luis Ernest Gilibert, director of the national police, was discovered to have close ties with FARC Front 42 in the state⁴⁹ of Cundinamarca.⁵⁰ Bejarano was also investigated by the U.S. embassy for having sidetracked *Plan Colombia* funds by writing at least 52 memorandums in which he claimed that, under orders of General Gilibert, moneys reserved for anti-narcotics operations would be diverted to other administrative uses.⁵¹ Bejarano was also found to be the owner of a company supplying meats to the 1300 cadets at the national police academy, despite the fact that his

company was not on the approved list of food service contractors. The revelation of Bejarano's involvement with guerrilla forces came just after he was promoted to assume command of the national police forces in the state of Quindío. Investigative reporters with *Cambio* magazine intercepted cellular phone calls between Bejarano and FARC guerrillas that indicated that he had 1) met frequently with a man named Santos Montañez, reputed to be FARC's chief of kidnapping in Cundinamarca, 2) had given the FARC munitions, 3) had provided intelligence on police operations in the region, and 4) had used his influence to move forces away from areas of operation so that the FARC could operate freely. The evidence against him led to his forced retirement after the U.S. Embassy petitioned the Pastrana administration for the colonel's removal. General Gilibert insists that he was unaware of any of his private secretary's depredations, despite the fact that the two men have been close friends and colleagues for more than 30 years. Gilibert's denial of knowing about the corruption of his subordinates exposes not his ignorance, but rather the Code of Silence entrenched among the officer corps.

In the meantime, Colonel Bejarano's sister, Fabiola Bejarano Chávez, herself a captain in the national police, was exposed for her association with a private company that provides security and espionage services to multinational corporations in Colombia. She was accused of negligence in her functions as a police officer by violating the prohibition against public officials engaging in private employment. In addition to her duties as a police captain, Bejarano had been assigned to work for Pastrana's peace commission. In relation to that work, she claimed that, because the police building had no room for her to work, she was compelled to move her office to the building in which the company providing the security and espionage services is based.⁵² When reporters called the company to get information on the story, Captain Bejarano herself answered the phone.

Each week *Cambio*, *Semana*, and the nation's major newspapers report new cases of corruption in both the

military and the civilian government. The revelations provide a steady diet of intrigue and malfeasance against the people of Colombia by the officials and leaders sworn to protect the nation from precisely the individuals they themselves have become. Rather than being outraged, many Colombians are resolved to the simple fact that corruption is part and parcel of everyday life in their land. A number of other acts of corruption came to light during the last year of the Pastrana administration, but they largely escaped being reported in the U.S. press. Among them:⁵³

- September 2001—General Laureano Villamizar, commander of the national police in Cali, is forced to retire after revelations surfaced regarding his direct involvement with narcotraffickers while he was a Lieutenant Colonel.
- September 2001—Walter Cortés Cortés, a known narcotrafficker and money launderer shows up as a guest, along with President Pastrana, at the wedding of the same Colonel Royne who later comes under scrutiny for his building project.
- November 2001—The prosecutor general’s office opens an investigation into irregularities in the exclusive contract for the purchase of airline tickets by the national police from a travel agency owned by the wife of Colonel Marino Escobar, the director of management for the police. The travel agency’s office just happens to be located in the headquarters of the National Police.
- January 2002—The Fiscalía and National Police investigators reveal that a band of Bogotá-based kidnapers known as “Los Calvos” is comprised of active duty police, retirees, and common delinquents. The band kidnaps people and then sells them to the guerrillas and is thought to be responsible for 25 of the 40 kidnappings reported in Bogotá during 2001.

- May 2002—U.S. Embassy antinarcotics official, William Duncan, says that his people have detected that officials of the Colombian Antinarcotics Police are mixed up in the misappropriation of funds from an embassy account.

More difficult to explain or accept, however, is a report from a confidential source with close ties to the highest levels of government who told me in August that less than a few hours prior to ordering the military into the distention zone following collapse of the peace talks in January, Pastrana ordered Black Hawk helicopters—ones given to Colombia under *Plan Colombia*—to airlift the FARC leadership out of the distention zone and out of harm’s way. My source indicated that some in the Colombian military command were outraged and went so far as to label Pastrana’s actions treasonous. One has to consider if his inexplicable actions could not be construed as complicity in supporting groups the United States had earlier labeled international terrorists.

In June the Pastrana administration was unable to respond to a leaked U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) summary that questioned why the Colombian government had been unable to provide 250 pilots for flight training in 14 Black Hawk and 30 Super Huey helicopters given under *Plan Colombia*, and why the Colombia air force had made “very little use” of U.S.-provided A-37 aircraft for drug interdiction operations.⁵⁴ The GAO also noted in the summary that, while nearly 150,000 hectares of coca crops have been sprayed, an equally large area under drug cultivation remains in 23 of the 32 Colombian departments.⁵⁵ Moreover, the GAO criticized Pastrana for moving too slowly to beef up the military and not earmarking more of the national budget to military spending.⁵⁶

While much of the focus is on public corruption and exposing transgressions against the public trust, such as illegal government contracts, embezzlement, and the

diversion of money from targeted projects, there is little discussion of corruption in the private sector—a problem as insidious and destructive as the institutionalized manifestations. Colombians tend to perceive private collapses as separate, unrelated events without looking too deeply into the underlying causes of the crises. Yet, if Colombians tend to misunderstand the dimensions of these crises, they are only overlooking a significant piece of the bigger problem, for many of the private collapses are the direct result of institutional corruption. This is a linkage Colombians must consider in the process of confronting corruption and moving toward greater transparency and accountability in the government.

The Elements of Crisis: A Lack of Leadership.

If evidence of corruption is proof of the lack of honest and competent leadership within and emanating from the central government, then Colombians note cynically that the money corrupt actors have stolen from the country could have already been used to build a first-world nation, with a well-educated citizenry, a high standard of living, an efficient economy, and a well-managed and cost-effective infrastructure.

Since the founding of the Republic, Colombians have believed in their manifest destiny, and that the many blessings bestowed upon them as a people defined their character, work ethic, and relationships toward the rest of the hemisphere. Even while the groundswell of political violence was building into the 1960s, the romantic notion of Colombian intellectuals, like Umaña Luna, in his 1962 book on political violence, maintained that regardless of the threats to the society, a great nation persisted, and Colombians were “a people of immense possibilities, of values that should not continue to be underestimated . . . a people that despite everything, still believes, loves, and hopes.”⁵⁷ But 36 years later in 1998, in reaction to the assassination of his son, a human rights activist, Luna

stated a very different sentiment. “This is a country of cowards, of shamelessness, of vagabonds, of thieves and assassins. I don’t give a damn about the country. It pains me to be a Colombian and to live in the midst of a bunch of assassins.”⁵⁸

While Luna’s outcry is the anguished reaction to the death of a loved one, others in Colombia note that his angry words are an accurate reflection of the societal point of view. In his compelling analysis of the Colombian crisis, Anthony Maingot noted the sentiments of one editorialist, who wrote that Colombians have moved “beyond just being scandalized and shocked by the situation”⁵⁹ and are now overwhelmed by “a sense of powerlessness and detachment.”⁶⁰

The perception of the lack of leadership originates in the presidential office and spreads like a virus throughout the nation. Convinced, by example after example, that there is no leadership at the national level, the state and local governments feel abandoned by the centralized authority, which remains aloof and insulated from the country’s ills in Bogotá. A former mayor from a small town in Tolima department, now awaiting an asylum hearing in Florida, told me of an instance where the guerrillas were attacking his town. He called his cousin, a Congressman in Bogotá, begging for help, for military intervention, for anything to lift the siege. His cousin’s response was in effect, “Call me back when the shooting stops, and we’ll send the army to remove the bodies.” Without faith in the capacity of the central authority to lead during a crisis, how can the Colombian government appeal to the hearts and minds of its citizens for support and affirmation? How can the Colombian government maintain credibility as it approaches other countries for assistance?

Given such a record of indecision and impotence, every new Colombian government has a Herculean task to convince citizens that it is capable of leading and of overcoming the crisis. Every 4 years a new administration attempts to distance itself from the transgressions of the

prior government, and each administration fails in the effort. Perhaps nowhere has the lack of decisive leadership shown more obviously than in Pastrana's failed negotiations with the insurgents, and Colombians are clearly fed up.⁶¹ One Colombian interviewed in the press commented recently, "Talks get postponed . . . and what are they negotiating, anyway? The kidnappings continue, the attacks continue."

Colombians wanted to see results from the Pastrana administration, to see a payoff for their patience while the government proceeded with the peace process. But the payoff never happened. The war that was inevitable is now underway, and Colombians are left to contemplate the lives lost during the negotiation period, deaths that may have been prevented had the Pastrana government chosen a more decisive and forceful policy—beginning first and foremost with recognizing from the outset that the guerrillas and other combatants were nothing but organized criminals, murderers, drug traffickers, kidnappers, extortionists, and power hungry demagogues deserving of no political legitimacy. An attitude of decisiveness was paramount to any success in dealing with the rebels, and clearly the Pastrana administration did not possess such a trait.

The resistance to accountability and transparency also remains a critical missing component in the government's ability to lead the nation. John Adams once wrote, "Liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people, who have a right . . . and a desire to know . . . the characters and conduct of their rulers."⁶² There can be little progress in making the Colombian people feel that there is a trustworthy and competent leadership capable of upholding the interests of the people and the rule of law as long as the government at all levels remains closed to scrutiny and not liable for its actions. Government officials must be forced to submit to independent audits of their tax returns and financial statements; they must be required to submit to full disclosure in the same manner as is done with those seeking

public office and government appointments in the United States.

Not only has the country lost millions of dollars to corruption; the nation has also suffered the loss of its ability to sanction corruption among those sworn to uphold the rule of law. Until 1999, about 1,500 police officers were sanctioned annually for various acts of corruption. That annual average dropped to about 450 officers after 1999. This drop in numbers is not the result of less corruption, but indicates instead that the leadership during the Pastrana administration grew impotent and incapable of policing itself, the military, and the police forces under its command.

The lack of leadership has also resulted in the irretrievable loss of police officers and troopers whose lives might have been spared had the officer corps and civilian officials exerted greater care and stewardship over law enforcement personnel. The indictment against a failed leadership command structure is in the numbers: In the last 10 years, more than 2,000 police officers have been killed fighting guerrillas. Many of those losses were unnecessary and due directly to corruption and/or incompetence. More than a few police commanders and army officers have the blood of their own troopers and soldiers on their hands.

The lack of leadership also negatively affected the relationship between the United States and Colombia under *Plan Colombia*. The growing perception of the Colombian people is that the Pastrana government shot itself in the foot, that ongoing institutional corruption and unabated drug trafficking led to a “clouding [of] relations between the two countries,” and that the dynamic between the two nations is no longer one of “power among equals, but rather of Colombia’s subordination.”⁶³ Many feel that President Uribe must now carve a new path with the United States and promote a new sense that the Colombian government has a clear mission, has confidence in itself, and places the interests of the Colombian people ahead of the interests of its northern neighbor.

Status of the Armed Forces.

If there is a ray of hope for the immediate future of Colombia, it resides in the covenant between the Colombian armed forces and the Colombian citizens whose constitutional rights the military has sworn to protect. According to some, the civilian perception of the armed forces today is vastly different from even 2 years ago. Even with the exposure of scandals by individuals high in the command echelons of the military and the National Police, recent polls rank the armed forces as the most respected institution in the country. This is due in part to tremendous efforts on the part of the armed forces to improve its image, to modernize its forces, and to professionalize its officer corps. Human rights groups must grudgingly acknowledge that the armed forces is trying to reform, to teach personnel to work within the constraints of human rights, and to respect the rule of law. There is much still to be done, but these efforts must be recognized and applauded for the sake of fairness and objectivity. The military has a difficult job to do, for it is fighting an insidious opponent who has neither scruples nor morality, and will do anything it takes to preserve the evil empire of narco-trafficking, extortion, and terror it has cultivated over the last 4 decades. The human rights groups that criticize the Colombian armed forces but remain mostly silent about atrocities carried out by the guerrillas need to exercise greater objectivity, for their rhetoric and interpretation of the facts are prolonging the conflict and unnecessarily causing additional loss of life and property.

Most Colombians grew cynical of the peace efforts by the Pastrana administration and viewed the involvement of foreign human rights organizations and foreign peace negotiators as counterproductive to resolving the decades-long conflict with the FARC. In November 2001, for instance, U.N. representative Hina Jilani went to Colombia to promote a peace settlement. She proceeded, however, to make a number of critical statements, particularly toward

the Fiscalía General, which she accused of having no effective investigation into human rights violations committed by the army through its complicity with paramilitary forces. One editorialist writing in *Cambio* at the time noted that human rights violations were no secret in Colombia, and that many in Colombia thought her statements were damaging. He further criticized Jilani for refusing to accept that anyone besides the State could be a violator of human rights.⁶⁴

Pastrana's tough-talking rhetoric, too, while trying to reach a peace agreement with the FARC was in contradiction to his actions. For example, he extended the deadline for the FARC to relinquish control of the distention zone no less than nine times leading up to January 2002 when the peace process collapsed. When Pastrana finally gave the FARC an ultimatum, polls nationwide indicated the people were ready to support the ultimatum and were prepared for war. Then in another about face, Pastrana allowed the U.N. envoy and representatives from ten nations⁶⁵ to hold more talks after the first 48-hour deadline had passed for the FARC to clear out of the distention zone as of Friday, January 11.⁶⁶ The Colombian people, especially those in the countryside who blame external interference for prolonging the guerrilla war, were shocked by and resentful of Pastrana's reticence. Few Colombians believed the peace talks had much hope of succeeding after negotiations had dragged on for more than 2 years without either side beginning to address a single point in the original peace agenda. All the while the peace talks were wearing on, military attacks by the FARC continued, and the Colombian people demanded a military response and wondered why the government should bother with the effort. Rafael Pardo, a former defense minister, was quoted at one point as saying, "I've never seen people so fed up with the peace process."⁶⁷ The Pastrana government and the foreign entities in the peace process either ignored or never understood the will of the Colombian people. When the talks finally ended and Pastrana called the military into the

distention zone, polls showed that more than 97 percent of Colombians responding supported the end of negotiations.⁶⁸ Colombians were ready for THEIR military to take the field and do THEIR job. Some Colombians I spoke to in the farming areas surrounding Rionegro in Antioquia state were quite disgusted with peace talks and with the presence of the foreign peace negotiators, saying, “They don’t live here.” Moreover, most Colombians never believed there was any peace to negotiate, that the guerrillas never wanted peace—only concessions, and that enough was enough with bending over backwards to appease them. When the FARC proposed in February 2002 to return to negotiations with the government, a poll showed that more than 90 percent of respondents were against such a proposal.⁶⁹ Clearly, Colombians had had enough.

The ultimate failure of the peace talks has, however, opened a tremendous opportunity for the military to establish itself as a bright light in the government structure after enduring years of both justified and unjustified criticism. The crisis has forced the military establishment to confirm its capability to take on well-armed, well-trained, and highly motivated combatants. Years of criticism toward the army had reduced morale and readiness. Yet, the military was expected by the same critics to take center stage in the civil war and drug war. While Colombians have not forgotten that the military is guilty of many sins, Colombians are willing to support a better trained and much better equipped military to rescue their nation from chaos.

However, one significant problem with the military that has yet to be resolved remains: the simple fact that the poor do the fighting and dying in the countryside, while the able-bodied young men and women of the urban middle and upper classes remain insulated, aloof, and protected from military service.⁷⁰ No one in Colombia can deny that this is true.

During a trip to Colombia less than 1 year ago, I was speaking with a noncommissioned officer who told me, with great sadness in his voice, about how he felt that he was fighting and sacrificing to protect the land so that the elite could go to their farms safely. He looked at my young daughter and said, "I have a 3-year-old brother I haven't been able to see or to play with." The emotion in his remarks articulated an inferiority complex among the ranks, an uneven burden that personnel conscripted from the peasant class carry with them into service. Despite efforts to professionalize the military and recruit from all sectors of the society, the perception of the lack of fairness persists and is not healthy for the army, for the country, or for the goals the executive leadership formulate for bringing peace and normalcy to the nation.⁷¹ It is also no secret that parents of the upper classes continue to resort to tried and true methods for shielding their children from military service. Colombians, however, can no longer have it both ways. If they want the military to solve their problems, all classes of the society must support the military and contribute equally to the effort.

Many Colombians have perceived that either the civilian government was hesitant to commit the armed forces to the battlefield, or that the military leadership itself was incapable of taking any offensive action other than rattling sabers. That perception began to change, however, when Pastrana finally ordered air strikes against FARC positions in the distention zone. The public reacted by displaying great national pride, the highest it has been in decades, and cheered the images on television of Colombian pilots taking off and returning from air strikes against guerrilla targets. Feeling as if a dam had finally burst, some Colombians were going as far as to call for foreign troops to come help in the fighting, and called for the removal of limitations set by the United States and direct foreign involvement in the conflict. In fact, a poll taken in February immediately following the military move into the distention zone indicated that more than 92 percent of Colombians responding believed the

United States should take an active role in the war against the guerrillas.⁷² Even with broad popular support, some organized groups in Colombia continue to resist foreign involvement in Colombian matters, such as the labor union General Confederation of Democratic Workers (Confederación General de Trabajadores Democráticos, or CGTD), which announced on September 10, 2002, that it was absolutely opposed to military aid from the United States.⁷³

Any hesitation the civilian government may have had about committing the military to the field was publicly and dramatically removed in August when President Uribe summoned his military commanders for what is known in the military parlance as a “come to Jesus” meeting,⁷⁴ and told them in no uncertain terms that it was time to get out from behind their desks and into the field with their troops—where they belonged.⁷⁵ In addition, the distractions of costly education and training junkets to the United States and elsewhere would henceforth be curtailed.⁷⁶ He has also admonished military commanders to either do their jobs or resign.⁷⁷ Commander of the Armed Forces General Jorge Enrique Mora underscored Uribe’s goals and stated that the new mission of the armed forces would be to “prevent, rather than react to the attacks” by guerrillas against the Colombian people and the regional and local government infrastructure.⁷⁸ Likewise, President Uribe’s highly regarded defense minister, Martha Lucia Ramirez, reinforced another key aspect of the new administration’s security agenda—that improved effectiveness of the military requires “transparency, respect for the constitution, the nation’s laws and human rights.”⁷⁹

Despite past scandals in the upper ranks of command, many dedicated officials remain who have tried to reform the military and the National Police, such as General Rosa Jose Serano, former head of the National Police, who during his tenure discharged more than 12,000 personnel for corruption, human rights violations, and drug trafficking.⁸⁰ Serano is proof that honest and tough leaders capable of meeting national objectives can be cultivated and

empowered in the officer corps. Serano's leadership may have inspired a new movement among the officer corps of the National Police to fight corruption from within. A group of anonymous officers known as Dignity are working to overcome the code of silence among the military and police leadership by exposing corruption and educating fellow officers and their troopers in their responsibilities to be honest and faithful stewards of the rule of law.⁸¹ Their movement is gaining notoriety and support, is spreading into the military branches, and is bringing hope to a nation that demands transparency and accountability.

One persistent problem with the National Police and the armed forces has been that increases in resources remain confined largely to the main cities and have trickled down into the rural areas too slowly or not at all. But the situation has begun to change under *Plan Colombia*. At the end of last year, for instance, the National Police began moving back into 192 population centers nationwide to regain control of areas that had come under guerrilla control, with the intention of providing better security in the rural areas. A key element is for newly formed *carabineros* units (mounted police) to increase patrols and protection of rural farmers and to establish new rural police stations and mobile squads capable of rapid response. The plan got off to a good start and includes the training of 10,000 mounted police over the next few years.⁸² The plan also includes efforts to improve relations with the civilian population by conducting civic-police activities that foster better relations between citizens and law enforcement.⁸³

One troubling concern about the reform efforts underway in the armed forces, however, is whether the civilian population realizes positive improvements are taking place and that the traditional *status quo* is yielding to a new order among the armed forces. Two years ago, before the military embarked on a public relations campaign to improve its image, there was resistance to making the army and the national police stronger. Improving the military capability was seen by many as

opening the door for further U.S. interference in Colombia's internal affairs. There has long been a love-hate relationship by the Colombian civilians toward the armed forces and national police. After all, the military's human rights record and its combat effectiveness over the last 4 decades have been far from admirable. Blame for the military's record cannot be laid solely at its doorstep, however. Prior civilian governments never established a clearly defined role for the armed forces in the national security agenda. The lack of a clear agenda allowed for breakdowns in the chain of command and undermined the military's credibility and effectiveness. Corruption grew throughout the armed services, regional and local commanders used the forces under their commands for personal gain or to settle personal vendettas, and the lines defining the rule of law became blurred in many areas of the country. Understandably then, Colombians are skeptical in the face of government efforts to improve the military's image, adhering instead to the adage that actions still speak louder than words. The military, therefore, finds itself in the position that regardless of slick public relations campaigns, it must produce results even as it remains under a microscope of scrutiny by the Colombian people and watchdogs abroad. Unless and until a clear role in the national security agenda is defined for the armed forces and embraced by its institutional components, the goal of winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population will remain elusive. If the August summit between the Uribe administration and the military leadership to define that role is any indication, many are hopeful that a positive new relationship between the citizens of Colombia and its military forces will emerge.

The United States has a very important role to play in the future of Colombia's national security strategy, and the Uribe administration understands this and is working to increase U.S. involvement in military planning and preparedness. More than any other nation, the United States has the experience and capability to assist

Colombia's armed forces' institutions, having over the last 50 years trained "more than 100,000 foreign police and soldiers annually, both within the United States and in about 150 countries around the world."⁸⁴ Following the attacks of September 11, the Bush administration embarked on a new agenda to train foreign governments to confront the threats of global terrorism as manifested within the national borders of nations. President Bush made this clear in his speech of March 11, 2002, when he proclaimed:

In the current stage of the war, our coalition is opposing not a nation, but a network. Victory will come over time, as that network is patiently and steadily dismantled. This will require international cooperation on a number of fronts: diplomatic, financial and military. We will not send American troops to every battle, but America will actively prepare other nations for the battles ahead. This mission will end when the work is finished—when terror networks of global reach have been defeated. The havens and training camps of terror are a threat to our lives and to our way of life, and they will be destroyed.⁸⁵

Colombian terrorists, guerrilla groups, white collar criminals, and their alliances with other criminal organizations around the world threaten to destabilize the entire western hemisphere. The United States can ill afford to ignore the threat that looms at its own doorstep, a mere 3 hours by air from the U.S. mainland. September 11 changed the game for the U.S. involvement in Colombia, and the Colombian armed forces must now realize and come to terms with the fact that their mission in Colombia will now become inextricably linked with the fight against global terrorism. The Colombian military must get its own house in order and prepare itself for the international role it will soon be called upon to play.

Plan Colombia Since September 11.

The war against the guerrillas took on new meaning for Colombia in the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. In his address to the joint session of Congress and the American people on September 20, President Bush stated in no uncertain terms,

. . . we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.⁸⁶

One could make a reasonable argument that as of last September, the Pastrana administration fell into the category of a “hostile regime” for 1) providing safe haven by allowing the FARC to maintain an autonomous region, not unlike the Hezbollah’s control of the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, 2) inexplicably allowing FARC officials to travel abroad under quasi-diplomatic status while at the same time they were under indictment in Colombia for acts of terrorism, kidnapping, murder, extortion, and sundry other crimes against the Colombian people—including actions that could easily constitute crimes against humanity, 3) allowing IRA mercenaries, narco-terrorists, Hezbollah guerrillas and other radical Islamic fundamentalists into Colombia to provide the guerrillas with training on urban warfare, bombmaking, terrorism, and 4) doing nothing to curtail the known practice by the FARC of trafficking in Colombian passports and identities for Islamic terrorists.

September 11 placed the Pastrana government in a tricky situation, for here was a government supported by the United States to the tune of \$1.5 billion under *Plan Colombia*, in addition to having received additional millions in various types of military and nonmilitary aid. Yet, for nearly 4 years the Pastrana administration gave *de facto*

shelter and political status to a guerrilla group⁸⁷ that would soon be on the State Department's list of terrorist organizations. In addition, he did little to curtail the murderous and terrorist activities of the Auto Defensas Unificadas de Colombia (AUC), which would join the FARC on that list. Moreover, the troubling links between the AUC and Colombian military in the commission of human rights atrocities further reduced Pastrana's credibility relative to the new international war against terrorism.

One can also argue that Pastrana's policies placed the Bush administration in a difficult position because, having inherited *Plan Colombia* from the Clinton administration, Bush was committed to support the Pastrana government even while Pastrana allowed the FARC to solidify its power base, terrorize innocent civilians, conduct military operations against the government, and expand its drug production and trafficking operations. Four events following the September 11 attacks, however, conspired to save U.S. policy in Colombia and neutralize the question of a double standard between the United States and Colombia with regard to the war against terror. First, the peace talks with the FARC broke down, and Pastrana finally moved to retake the zone of distention. Second, the United States passed comprehensive counterterrorism legislation. Third, the Organization of American States (OAS) adopted the Convention Against Terrorism, with Colombia being a prominent signatory. Fourth, the European Union (EU) reversed its position on the FARC by declaring it a terrorist organization along with the AUC and all Colombian paramilitary groups.

Whereas Pastrana's policies were unclear and contradictory, the incoming President Alvaro Uribe leaves little doubt as to his position on the guerrillas and irregular combatants: submit voluntarily or otherwise to the rule of law. In this regard, the focus of *Plan Colombia* for the Uribe administration will be on fighting the guerrillas, because he recognizes the inescapable linkage between drugs as the driving engine that keeps the guerrillas in the field. To this

end, his first order of business will be to convince the United States of that linkage, and that attacking the guerrillas means fulfilling Bush's mandate of fighting the war against terrorism as well as fighting the war against drugs.

Implications For Hemispheric Security.

If *Plan Colombia* was intended as a framework for addressing Colombia's internal problems with drug trafficking and social chaos, the potential impact on the security of Colombia's immediate neighbors and other nations in the hemisphere was certainly not overlooked. Fallout from *Plan Colombia* was anticipated by the United States and Colombia's border states, and planning quickly moved forward for initiatives to mitigate the impact of *Plan Colombia* in the region.

In testimony before the U.S. House International Relations Committee in June 2001, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs James Mack noted that *Plan Colombia* was "the first step in responding to the crisis underway in Colombia," and that the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), proposed by the Bush administration in 2001 was intended as "the next stage of a long-term effort to address the threat of narcotics and the underlying causes of the narcotics industry and violence in Colombia, while assisting Colombia's neighbors to ward off those same dangers in their own countries."⁸⁸ Part of the \$882 million earmarked for the ARI included \$731 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), intended to provide assistance for "social and economic development as well as for counternarcotics and security efforts—the narcotics scourge throughout the Andean region."⁸⁹ Both initiatives were meant to respond to the significant challenge to fragile democratic institutions in the region while protecting U.S. interests, and the Congress eventually approved \$625 million for the ACI, which went into effect in January 2002.⁹⁰ Recognizing that drug trafficking "does not respect

national borders and that both feeds and feeds upon the other social and economic difficulties with which the Andean region is struggling,” the ACI was described as “a regional versus Colombia-centric policy and a comprehensive and integrated package that brings together democracy and development as well as drug initiatives.”⁹¹ The full ARI program was divided 50/50 between counternarcotics and alternative development/institution-building programs, while the ACI component was a 60/40 split between counternarcotics and development/democracy.⁹² Under consideration during the State Department’s formulation of the ARI and ACI proposals was the concern by Colombia’s neighbors of spill-over from Colombia’s porous borders resulting from

pressure applied by the Government of Colombia (GOC) in southern Colombia [which would] result in the flight of refugees, guerrillas, paramilitaries, and/or narcotics traffickers across porous borders into other countries. We will work with the countries of the region to strengthen their capacity to cope with potential outflows.⁹³

The stated goals of both initiatives were to promote and support democracy and democratic institutions, foster sustainable economic development and trade liberalization, and significantly reduce the supply of illegal drugs to the United States at the source.⁹⁴

The State Department noted the following about the situation in the region:

Since we believe *Plan Colombia* will result in major disruption of the cocaine industry, ACI’s regional approach becomes even more of an imperative. Traffickers will undoubtedly try to relocate as their operations in southern Colombia are disrupted. We believe they will first try to migrate to other areas inside Colombia, then try to return to traditional growing areas in Peru and Bolivia. But if those options are forestalled, they may well seek to move more cultivation, processing and/or trafficking routes into other countries such as Ecuador, Brazil, or Venezuela.⁹⁵

From the outset, Colombia's neighbors expressed grave concern over the effect of the plan on their own national security, and declined, tacitly or otherwise, to support it. Border states quickly ramped up security along their frontiers to discourage refugees and combatants from leaving Colombia.

After declaring *Plan Colombia* its biggest security risk, Brazil instituted Operation Cobra, a 3-year plan involving the deployment of 6,000 troops along its 1,000-mile-long Amazon border, with another 6,000 held in reserve.⁹⁶ The deployment, particularly in an area called the Dog's Head which borders the Colombian department of Vichada, is intended to combat the incursion of FARC combatants across the frontier and to attempt to interdict and suppress drug trafficking by the FARC and other drug producers in the region.

In Venezuela, authorities stepped up drug interdiction efforts along its Colombian frontier and in last year's Operation ORINOCO seized several tons of cocaine entering the country. The role of Venezuela, however, has been uncertain and very troubling to Colombia and the United States. President Hugo Chavez has given aid, weapons, and cover to FARC units using Venezuelan territory for staging operations back into Colombia. He has also hosted FARC commanders and even invited a public spokesman for the FARC to address Venezuela's National Assembly.⁹⁷

Peru has much to lose due to the side effects of *Plan Colombia*. With the aid of the United States, the Peruvian government had made tremendous strides toward diminishing drug production and trafficking, especially among the indigenous communities along the Colombian border. But in recent months the FARC has been suspected of moving across the frontier into Peru and linking up with regrouped elements of the notorious Sendero Luminoso rebels.⁹⁸ The United States has tripled counternarcotics aid to Peru in response to the threat that a FARC presence in

Peru could destabilize the social and agricultural reforms that have been undertaken during the last decade.

After a successful fumigation campaign anchored U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Bolivia, the Bolivian government turned its efforts to combating drug production and threats of rebel insurgency through its Dignity Plan, which emphasizes “a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy.”⁹⁹

The spillover of *Plan Colombia* is of particular concern to Ecuador and Panama. In the last year, Ecuador has established a Northern Border Initiative to promote better security and development in the region bordering Colombia.¹⁰⁰ But indigenous groups and Ecuadorian environmentalists have cried foul against the collateral effects of *Plan Colombia*'s fumigation campaign along the Ecuadorian border. In September 2001, more than 10,000 Ecuadorians, mostly Indians, filed a complaint under the Alien Tort Claims Act against DynCorp, the Virginia-based contractor responsible for aerial spraying, seeking millions of dollars in compensation and an immediate halt to spraying. The complaint also alleges violations under the Torture Victim Protection Act.¹⁰¹

In Panama, the FARC, other irregular forces, and drug traffickers have long used the dense jungle region of Darien province for cover and for conducting transshipments of drugs from Colombia and smuggling of weapons through pipelines back into the Colombia. Because Panama has no standing military force and few military resources, the government has been nearly helpless, if not unwilling, to curtail the use of its most isolated territory by Colombian guerrillas and traffickers. But efforts are underway to close Panama's borders to foreign incursion and criminalism, and, of this writing, new legislation is about to be introduced in the National Assembly to request the return of the U.S. Marines to Panama, to reopen Howard Air Force Base, and to build two new bases, one in the zone of Colón and the other in the zone of Darién along the Colombian frontier.¹⁰²

Many of the FARC's ties abroad also extend to South American nations not bordering Colombia. Suriname has long been a transshipment point of drugs from Colombia to Europe, and recent reports indicate that the FARC have taken control of a "lawless area of Paraguay."¹⁰³ The question now arises as to how far *Plan Colombia's* primary intent to combat drug trafficking in Colombia could extend into other countries in the region.

In addition to any effects *Plan Colombia* is having on regional security, Colombia and its neighbors are also threatened by the ingress of foreign terrorist organizations from beyond the hemisphere. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is known to have provided training to FARC, and is believed to have been behind the deadly mortar attack against the Presidential Palace on the day of President Uribe's inauguration.¹⁰⁴ The Iranian-backed Hizbollah has also had ties with FARC going back at least into the early 1990s and is alleged to have been in business with FARC in the provision of false passports for Islamic terrorists using Colombia as a staging ground for illegal entry into the United States. Such was the case in 1998 when Mohamed Enid Abdel Aai, an Islamic terrorist linked to the 1997 massacre of 80 Western tourists in Luxor, Egypt, was arrested for using a forged passport obtained from Colombian sources while trying to reach a FARC base. He was subsequently deported to Ecuador.¹⁰⁵ General Jose Serrano, former head of Colombia's National Police, has also noted that more than 100 radical Islamic groups with ties to Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan have operated in Colombia and other South American countries over the last decade.¹⁰⁶

In 1999 a group of Iranian delegates, at the blessing of the Pastrana government, traveled to the FARC stronghold of San Vicente del Caguan to discuss the possibility of establishing a meat packing plant in the heart of FARC territory. Not only did it seem unusual that Iran, with very little presence of any in Latin America, would choose rebel held territory to establish such an enterprise, but the

location made little sense, given that the majority of cattle and meat production is more than 300 miles to the northwest on the other side of the Andes Mountains, and that the area around San Vicente del Caguan is mostly jungle, with no major roads and little infrastructure.¹⁰⁷ The Colombian military charged that the Iranians were not businessmen, but paid military advisers to the FARC, noting that the Iranians had resisted inspection of their baggage upon their arrival in Colombia. Nevertheless, the deal was sealed in October 1999, with Pastrana's peace commissioner, Victor Ricardo, signing the agreement as guarantor, although the project was later abandoned. The presence of Hizbollah in the tri-border region of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, also known as the Iguazu Triangle, has been well-known for more than a decade and is assumed to have been the staging area for the group's deadly attack against the Israeli embassy and Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994, respectively.¹⁰⁸ According to a number of reports, Islamic fundamentalists have been able to run drug trafficking and money laundering operations with impunity in the region. One investigation by Argentinian authorities has focused on the activities of suspected Hizbollah financier, Assad Ahmad Barakat, part owner in a large shopping mall, Galeria Page, in Ciudad del Este, the largest city in the tri-border region. It is believed that Barakat has "used the shopping mall as a front to recruit Hizballah volunteers and as a large source of financial support for terrorist activities" including the embassy and cultural center attacks.¹⁰⁹

Given the linkage between narcotrafficking and guerrilla insurgency in much of South America, and the ability of narco-guerrillas and drug cartels to utilize long-established pipelines for the shipment of drugs and weapons, it is evident that the United States cannot but play an ever increasing role in national security, counternarcotics, and regional development programs in the hemisphere. For this reason, it is imperative that the

FARC, as the primary accelerant for destabilization in the region must be removed quickly, decisively, and absolutely.

COLOMBIANS LOOK TO THE FUTURE

Colombians' perceptions for the future are difficult to judge. The overwhelming priority for the incoming government is to stabilize the internal chaos, reestablish the rule of law in the rural regions, and deny the guerrillas access to their infrastructure and resources by carrying out decisive counterinsurgency operations, narcotics interdiction, and anti-money laundering campaigns. Moreover, the Colombian government infrastructure needs drastic attention. The health system is virtually paralyzed, with elderly Colombians bereft of any health benefits or aid, entire sectors of the society are without the most basic of social and government services, and institutionalized corruption at every level of the government continues to impede reform and reorganization. The crises of incompetence and of lack of conscience where it matters most in the body politic continue to strangle the will and wishes of the Colombian people, and cynicism toward and lack of faith in the government persists as a most pressing problem.

In addition to the challenges of reaching tactical and strategic goals set out in the national agenda and as articulated in the terms of *Plan Colombia*, there has been talk in Colombia since at least 1998 of an "asylum syndrome" as evidenced by a poll that showed that nearly half of all Colombians from all social classes want to leave the country.¹¹⁰ An alarming and debilitating exodus is occurring in Colombia, both internally and externally, driven by the society's lack of faith in the ability of the government to uphold the rule of law. Those who have the means to do so flee to Miami, Boca Raton, Atlanta, Madrid, and elsewhere. Meanwhile, the poor campesinos, their agrarian lives in tatters, their lands seized by warring parties and feudal warlords backed by militia armies, living

amid the constant risk of being caught in the crossfire, have nowhere to run but to the already crowded cities where they fall prey to criminal gangs, social exploitation of various forms, and recruitment by the very groups that have caused their displacement. More than two million Colombians, a figure that amounts to one out of every 20, have left the country or fled their rural homes for the dubious safety of the cities. With their lives in doubt and the underpinnings of their livelihoods shaken, they are caught up in the maelstrom generated by the lack of protection, the lack of leadership, and the lack of security. Many Colombians who are to blame for the national crisis and the disintegration of the rule of law have themselves cashed in from their corruption and criminal conduct and have taken their illicit profits out of the country, settling comfortably abroad to wait out the crisis. Regardless of the motivation that has induced them to flee Colombia, anguish and anger are their traveling companions, albeit on different levels of reality. Ironically, however, instead of creating a shared feeling of loss among refugees and ex-patriots, the exodus has deepened the divisions in an already divided country.¹¹¹

Colombians have a complex and contradictory, some say schizophrenic, view of the future. They see little hope that corruption will end, that scandals will subside, that the guerrillas and drug traffickers will be brought to justice, and that the civil society will be restored and constitutional rights enforced. Even as the new government is formed, there are already denunciations that some of the new president's staff and many members of the Senate and Congress are tainted by corruption and scandal. Five senators elected in June have already been removed for vote fraud, and there has been such arguing and physical scuffling over office space in the Congress that new congressmen were sleeping in their offices in order keep their spaces from being taken over by their colleagues, leaving one to wonder if perhaps it is not only the military personnel that should be vetted under the terms of *Plan*

Colombia, but all the incoming members of the civilian government.

Yet for all the criticism leveled at the politicians, most Colombians still love desperately the Colombia of their minds' eye and have never and will never lose sight of the nobility of Bolivar's great experiment of nationhood. They still view their nation as being on the threshold of first world status, a nation of brilliance, resourcefulness, beauty and resilience. Sophisticated Colombians are still easily swept away and moved to tears by the simple and heartfelt patriotism and love of country expressed by the rural peasants during national holidays and regional events like the Festival of Flowers in Medellín and the Coffee Festival in Manizales. Through all the turmoil, scandal and violence, love of country has no class bounds.

All Colombians who embrace the rule of law want peace. But they have lacked the leadership to show them the way to achieve their goals of a truly united nation. Into this dynamic the United States will no doubt continue to pour money, aid, programs, advisers, and good intentions. But without a drastic change in the consciousness of the political leadership, little will change for the better, and U.S. aid will be reduced merely to protecting its own commercial and strategic interests in Colombia.

CONCLUSION

Colombia is like the horse being led to water that cannot be made to drink. The United States and other international partners can only do so much and can only go so far. All branches of the Colombian government must find the collective will and resolve to change the future. Once vilified by all sectors of the Colombian society and by nongovernment organizations at home and abroad, the Colombian armed forces have taken the first real steps into a new reality of nationhood in the new millennium. They have set a standard and raised the bar that the civilian government must now choose to respond to positively or risk total

collapse. The Colombian government must come to terms with its own corruption. To this end, the United States could provide the model by teaching the Colombian government how to conduct independent audit practices that carry the weight of law, and by legislating and enforcing laws that require full disclosure of the personal and financial conduct of all individuals going into government service or occupying command positions in the national police and armed forces.

While many Colombians perceive that poor leadership of the country is the cause for today's bloodshed, there are still legions of honest, patriotic, and upright Colombians capable of saving the country from ruin. Certainly, Dignity and other anonymous members working together to end corruption from within are cases in point. The problem is that corruption is so overwhelming and pervasive that the honest bureaucrats and officials are too often marginalized from having a positive impact on the system.

Nevertheless, the perception of all interested parties as they look to Colombia should be one of hope and faith that the situation can be turned around. It may take decades and even generations for the economy and the society to recover from the turmoil, but the effort must be undertaken, now, or it will soon be too late. The United States, too, has realized that, in the case of Colombia, it must make an exception to its standing policy of not interfering with the domestic policies and political conflicts of another sovereign nation. The Bush administration took a huge step forward by asking the Congress to provide money and materiel to Colombia to be used to fight the guerrillas. The declared war on terrorism and the passage of the antiterrorism legislation has made this change of foreign policy with Colombia possible, especially if one puts forward the argument that 1) giving aid to Colombia to fight the insurgency under the leadership of a tough, new Colombian president is in the direct interests of U.S. national security, and 2) it is simply the right thing to do—an opportunity for Colombia to rid itself for good of a half-century-long

guerrilla nuisance. When the House of Representatives approved the Bush proposal under the new \$30 billion counterterrorism bill, and when the Senate came through with its own approval for the Bush plan on June 7, a new chapter was begun in the history of relations between the United States and Latin America's oldest democracy.¹¹² Additional issues must be taken into account with regard to the spread of FARC's presence into other countries in the region. The implications are that if the FARC and its narco-trafficking network are not neutralized in Colombia now, the guerrillas will be able to establish firm footholds in neighboring countries to continue as a criminal and terrorist organization, making eradicating the FARC that much more difficult to achieve.

With regard to an increased military role of the United States in Colombia, there is a loophole the Bush administration could use to bypass aid limitations under *Plan Colombia* pertaining to the numbers of U.S. military personnel and contractors allowed to work on the ground in Colombia. The law governing *Plan Colombia*, P.L. 106-246, initially capped U.S. presence in Colombia to 500 military personnel and 300 contractors.¹¹³ In 2002 the figures were changed to 400 military and 400 contract personnel.¹¹⁴ The cap applied only to military and contract personnel working in direct support of *Plan Colombia* "to combat drug production and trafficking, foster peace, increase the rule of law, improve human rights, expand economic development, and institute justice reform in the countries covered by *Plan Colombia*."¹¹⁵ Written into the law, however, was a provision granting the President the power to waive the personnel limitation "for a single period of up to 90 days in the event that the Armed Forces of the United States are involved in hostilities or that imminent involvement by the Armed Forces of the United States in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances."¹¹⁶ Furthermore, according to a report by the Center for International Policy, "Since some activities now being proposed, such as pipeline protection [i.e., this week's stories], do not fit within the

definition of the original '*Plan Colombia*,' the troop cap technically does not apply to them."¹¹⁷ The Center for International Policy's report also notes that:

During the House Armed Services Committee's May 1 debate of the 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, Rep. Gene Taylor (D-Mississippi) proposed an amendment to implement a more comprehensive 500-person military cap. It was approved, but severely weakened by a provision allowing the Secretary of Defense to waive it.¹¹⁸

For his part, President Uribe enters office with a mandate from the Colombian people who have delivered to President Bush a promising Colombian leader who believes in a policy similar to his own vision. Both the Congress and the Bush administration expect results for the money it has invested in the new Colombian government, and Uribe seems capable of delivering the goods. When prompted in a recent interview to clarify his position on the FARC, the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), and the AUC, all of which are on the U.S. State Department list of terrorist organizations, Uribe responded, "It is necessary to protect all citizens against whoever is the aggressor. We are not going to close the doors to dialogue. If the guerrillas want to dialogue, they have to commit to abandoning terrorism, with a ceasing of hostilities. And the same goes for the illegal self-defense forces."¹¹⁹

The new president has also made an excellent decision to retain the services of Ambassador to the United States Luis Moreno, whose strong performance and high regard in Washington circles will help maintain continuity and mutual respect in the continuing dialog between the new Colombian government and the United States. Moreno will also be indispensable in advising the Uribe administration on how best to proceed with doing business with the United States. He will be instrumental in articulating Uribe's vision to U.S. lawmakers, including clarifying Uribe's plan to boost the Colombian military to 100,000 personnel (although many analysts both here and in Colombia wonder

how the new government will pay for the increase). But more importantly, Ambassador Moreno will be able to help the Uribe administration avoid repeating past mistakes in diplomacy by clearly interpreting for Bogotá the position of the United States as it deals with the Colombian crisis. Finally, the addition of the FARC and the AUC to the U.S. Department of State's list of terrorist organizations, with similar acknowledgements by the European Union, will further strengthen Uribe's mandate to deal decisively with the insurrection.

President Uribe has already won a victory by convincing the United States that *Plan Colombia* resources limited by U.S. law solely to fighting narcotics must be revised, and that materiel resources, like the helicopters provided under *Plan Colombia* for counternarcotics missions, should be diverted to stop "terrorism, to prevent massacres, to fight kidnapping, and to prevent the taking of towns by rebels."¹²⁰

In addition to realigning support for *Plan Colombia* to suit the changing demands of the Colombian crisis, the Uribe administration will also be active in promoting the two T's—trade and temporary protection status (TPS)—for Colombians who have chosen to remain in the United States illegally because they are afraid to return to their violence-rife homeland.¹²¹

On the positive side, the Colombian crisis has emerged as a prominent issue on the U.S. national agenda. Many North Americans, who prior to the inception of *Plan Colombia* knew very little about what was happening in Colombia, have taken a new interest in the plight of their southern neighbor. Likewise, some positive intangible results have been realized in Colombia as well. For the first time in decades, the Colombian military is again regarded well by a huge majority of the Colombian people. Polls conducted by Colombian news entities show favorable ratings in the high 90th percentile for the actions the Colombian armed forces are taking to deal with narco-traffickers and guerrillas.

Overall, Colombia has great potential to emerge from its decades of infamy. The foundations for a new government infrastructure are beginning to emerge, a dynamic, no-nonsense leader has taken the reins of government with the support of a majority of Colombians, and the military is on the verge of parlaying a rebirth of national pride and newfound professionalism into an effective and respected security force capable not only of preserving internal peace but participating in international peacekeeping roles. In the bigger scheme of world affairs, what happens in Colombia over the next several years will help define how law-abiding nations and freedom-loving peoples will deal with the new threats of terrorism from disparate groups operating around the globe. As was noted in a recent Rand report:

The fight for the future makes daily headlines. Its battles are not between the armies of leading states, nor are its weapons the large, expensive tanks, planes, and fleets of regular armed forces. Rather the combatants come from bomb-making terrorist groups like Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, drug smuggling cartels like those in Colombia and Mexico, and militant anarchists like the Black Bloc that ran amok during the Battle of Seattle.¹²²

In a very real sense, fighting the battles of the future is happening now in Colombia, and how Colombia and its international partners are able to subdue guerrillas, political violence, and the lawlessness and terrorism associated with narcotrafficking will determine, to a large extent, the capabilities of nations to secure the rule of law for future generations.

In closing, the following anecdote best may impart a sense of what is really at stake in Colombia, and why the United States, regardless of problems in its foreign policy agenda, should do all it can to help its southern neighbor. There often occurs an emotional moment on every airline flight from the United States to Colombia when at the instant of touchdown the Colombian passengers cheer, clap, and shed tears of joy and patriotism over their arrival back

on Colombian soil. A North American passenger cannot help but be moved by the moment and realize so poignantly the extent to which the Colombian people love their land.

Plan Colombia may not be the proper policy the United States should have chosen to help Colombia. It may in fact prolong resolving many of the ills it is trying to fix. But whatever one thinks of *Plan Colombia*, it is clear that to have done nothing at all would be catastrophic for Colombia and tragically shameful for all nations that adhere to democratic principles and the rule of law. Beneath the corruption, lawlessness, and conflict, there is still a nation worthy of being saved.

ENDNOTES

1. Sixteenth century proverb often attributed to Samuel Johnson.
2. *Update: Counterdrugs package for Colombia & Andean Region*, Center for International Policy's Colombia Project, March 21, 2000, visited August 1, 2002, <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/032102.htm> (on file with the author).
3. At this writing, the United States has just released \$41.5 million dollars after the Colombian army was certified as complying with human rights criteria established by the United States Congress. See "Colombia Celebra Certificación de EEUU a Fuerzas Militares," *Radio Caracol*, September 10, 2002 (on file with the author).
4. When he presented the plan to the European Parliament on October 25, 1999, Pastrana said little about the military aid aspects of the plan and instead emphasized Europe's role in the humanitarian assistance components of the plan. See "Colombia: Press Highlights 17th October 1991," *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, October 20, 1999.
5. Many argue that the drug problem is America's problem because the United States has the largest consumer population. Therefore, the United States should shoulder the entire burden of *Plan Colombia* as long as the U.S. drug control policy is based on stopping the flow of drugs at its source. But according to sources as far flung as the White House, the U.N. Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, and numerous nongovernment organizations (NGOs), the European nations are no less ravenous consumers of illegal drugs. Moreover, the same European nations provide havens to sophisticated processing centers for the

money laundering networks attached to Colombian criminalism. As has been noted by more than one U.S. lawmaker, the Europeans, in particular, all but refused to acknowledge that the FARC and other insurgent combatants were anything other than legitimate political groups trying to advance political agendas in Colombia. Attitudes of the European partners began to change following the September 11 attacks, but the images on the Internet and from news coverage of FARC commanders being treated as political VIPs in the capitals of Spain, Switzerland, and Scandinavia left Colombians bitter and disgusted at the international community's lack of good judgment. Inexplicably, 9 months passed before the EU finally stated on June 12, 2002, that the FARC are, in fact, terrorists, and this author's opinion is that the shameful behavior of the European nations toward Colombia has only prolonged the conflict and caused additional loss of innocent lives.

6. According to a statement made by Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman at the Hearing of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, *Federal News Service*, April 10, 2002.

7. Japan pledged \$175 million; Spain, \$100 million; and the EU, about \$95 million.

8. The criticism is unfair, however, because while the international partners pledged funding primarily toward humanitarian projects, the United States had already provided more than \$880 million in nonmilitary assistance, with a good portion of it going to crop substitution and other rural assistance programs. See Jose Ramos, "US Gives 880 Million to Regional Social Programs as Part of *Plan Colombia*," *Agence France Presse*, August 31, 2001.

9. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) is the largest rebel force in Colombia and has been fighting the Colombian government for more than 38 years. The FARC maintains its own sophisticated web page at www.farc-ep.org.

10. "Guerrillas or Terrorists," *The Economist*, December 8, 2001.

11. Bombings and attacks by the ELN and FARC on the Cano Limon oil pipeline resulted in a loss of nearly \$500 million in revenue for Colombia in 2001, according to Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman testifying before the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, April 10, 2002. See "Hearing of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee," *Federal News Service*, April 10, 2002.

12. According to recent Senate testimony by Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman, Colombia has spent “\$426.5 million on social and institutional development and \$2.6 billion on *Plan Colombia*-related infrastructure projects and improving the military.” See “Hearing of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee,” *Federal News Service*, April 10, 2002.

13. Daniel García-Peña Jaramillo, “The U.S. Foments Colombia’s War,” *Crimes of War Magazine*, August 2001 (visited September 8, 2002), <http://www.crimesofwar.org/colombia-mag/foments01.html> (on file with the author). García-Peña is currently director of a Colombia-based peace group, Planeta Paz.

14. “Prepared testimony of Chairman John L. Mica before the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,” *Federal News Service*, August 6, 1999.

15. “U.S. Representative Bill Young (R-FL) holds makeup hearing on supplemental appropriations,” *FDCH Political Transcripts*, March 9, 2000.

16. P.L. 104-208.

17. The language of the Leahy amendment in the 2001 Foreign Appropriations Act reads: “None of the funds made available by this Act may be provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.” See P.L. 106-429 Sec. 563.

18. Michael Hedges, “Bush: U.S. Will Aid in Colombian Drug War but not Peace Talks,” *Houston Chronicle*, February 28, 2001, p. A20.

19. Christopher Marquis, “Colombia’s Next Leader Seeks Drug-War Aid,” *New York Times*, June 21, 2002.

20. Colombia, however, should not shoulder all the responsibility for the mismanagement of *Plan Colombia*, or for the fiascos of prior aid programs from the United States. The United States is also culpable for delays and logistical difficulties. One glaring example is the delay in delivering to the Colombian military the helicopters that formed a major underpinning to the operational component of the plan. As of June 2002,

only 8 of 11 helicopters had been delivered to the national police, and only 35 of 54 had been delivered to the Colombian military. That represents barely 66 percent on station of the helicopters committed to the Colombian government.

21. According to figures provided by Marc Grossman in testimony before the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, "Hearings of Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee," *Federal News Service*, April 10, 2002.

22. According to Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman testifying before the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, April 10, 2002. See "Hearing of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee," *Federal News Service*, April 10, 2002.

23. A hectare is a metric unit of measurement roughly equivalent to 2.471 acres. See *American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, 1981.

24. Scott Wilson, "Colombian Rebels Move to Retake Lost Territory," *Washington Post*, June 30, 2002, p. A18.

25. Brian Michael Jenkins, "A Confounding, Complex Tragedy," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, June 17, 2002, p. G1.

26. James LeMoyne was by no means a stranger to the Colombian guerrilla conflict before taking on the role of peace envoy. Initially a reporter with 20 years of experience covering conflicts and peace processes around the globe, his involvement in Colombia began in 1998 in Bogotá when he and two U.N. officials created Sala de Situación, a forum of sorts to talk about peace. Between February and April 1998, the members of Sala de Situación undertook an ambitious campaign to solicit ideas from the most influential people in Colombia. Three weeks before the first round to elect a presidential candidate, LeMoyne and his colleagues visited the three strongest candidates, Sanín, Serpa, and Pastrana. They talked about trying to find a negotiated solution to the conflict, but Pastrana appeared the most distracted during the talk. After listening to the presidential candidates, the members of Sala de Situación then invited to the U.N. Office of Development those officials they thought would be the main characters in an eventual peace process, including presidential candidates, high military officers, industrialists, and labor leaders. LeMoyne and his colleagues realized they were missing the perspective and opinions of the guerrillas, however. So later in 1998, they traveled to Mexico City to meet three times with Raúl Reyes, a high ranking FARC commander. Following

these meetings LeMoyné and company outlined the steps the future government had to take if the government was interested in finding a negotiated solution to the conflict. When the U.N. members of the Sala returned to Colombia, one of President Samper's advisers accused the U.N., along with the ex-Minister of Mines Leyva (reputed to be a FARC sympathizer), of interfering in Colombian politics, and advised them that the U.N. could not lend itself to FARC to influence the outcome of the elections. When Pastrana lost the first round of elections to Serpa, he contacted Leyva for help. Leyva sent him a version of the conclusions reached by LeMoyné's Sala, which, according to ex-minister of defense, Rafael Pardo, reflected closely the FARC conclusions. The conclusions presented by Sala became the basis for Pastrana's speech titled Peace Policy for Change. It was in this speech that Pastrana first alluded to a distention zone for the guerrillas, to be called Spaces for Peace. That speech was attended by three FARC delegates, who, following the speech, met with Pastrana's aids to arrange for Leyva to meet with FARC head, Manuel Marulanda. As we know, Pastrana went on to win the presidency, and LeMoyné's influence in the peace process continued to evolve.

27. Edgar Téllez, *et al*, *Diario íntimo de un fracaso: Historia no contada del proceso de paz con las FARC*, Bogotá: Planeta, 2002, p. 365.

28. Sibylla Brodzinsky and David Adams, "Retaking Rebel Zone Unlikely to End War," *St. Petersburg Times*, February 27, 2002, p. 1A.

29. Tim Johnson, "Colombian Leader Begins Visit to U.S.," *Miami Herald*, June 19, 2002.

30. Edgar Téllez, *et al*, *Diario íntimo de un fracaso: Historia no contada del proceso de paz con las FARC*, Bogotá: Planeta, 2002, p. 50.

31. There has existed for generations a not too subtle rivalry between the citizens of Bogotá, known as *Bogotanos*, and the citizens of the province (*departamento*) of Antioquia (*Antioqueños*). The capital of Antioquia is Medellín, Colombia's second largest city after Bogotá. *Bogotanos* consider themselves to be very cosmopolitan and sophisticated, while they view *Antioqueños*, not unkindly, as backward provincials. *Antioqueños* on the other hand, view themselves as no less sophisticated than *Bogotanos* and the source of Colombian prosperity, industry, and to some extent culture, fashion, science, and political philosophy (for example, the artist Fernando Botero is from Medellín, and Medellín is considered the formal birthplace of liberation theology, and is the site of the first heart transplant in Hispano-America). Bogotá for most of the year is cool, cloudy, and subdued, while Medellín is warm, colorful, and vibrant. For generations *Antioqueños* have enjoyed a

reputation and distinction for being hard workers, proud, independent minded, and shrewd businessmen. These attributes are due in part to Antioquia's (and Medellín's) historical and geographic isolation in the central cordillera of the Andes relative to Bogotá. Medellín is said to have been founded by Spanish Jews seeking a haven from the Inquisition. The Jewish merchants who settled in Medellín built up a large and profitable textile industry upon which other manufacturing industries later developed. Between textiles and other manufacturing, coffee, which grows well in the region, and improvements in Colombia's transportation corridors, Medellín became Colombia's most important center of commerce. Antioqueños (or *paisas* as they are also known) like to think that the nation could not survive without Medellín. Bogotanos bristle at this notion and, hence, a rivalry has persisted over the last 200 years or more. The arrival in Bogotá of Alvaro Uribe, a native Antioqueño, former mayor of Medellín, and former governor of Antioquia has been greeted by Bogotanos with cautious reserve. The "let's get going" attitude that Uribe and his fellow Antioqueños in his administration bring to the presidency is the epitome of the Antioqueño reputation for hard work, putting in long hours, and using business savvy to get things accomplished. Hence the term *ritmo paisa* (paisa rhythm) has pervaded the political climate of Colombia's capital.

32. The World Bank reported recently that Colombia loses more than 2 billion pesos to corruption annually, noting that that is enough money to build 700,000 low-cost housing subsidies. See "Colombia: Uribe Issues Presidential Directive to Fight Corruption," *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, August 21, 2002.

33. "Results of Survey In, Moves to Tackle Corruption in Nine Main Cities," *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, August 23, 2002.

34. Colombian Senator Jaime Dussan announced on August 7, 2002, that he intended to sue Pastrana for treason against the fatherland. See "Colombia: Senate Authorizes Pastrana to Leave Colombia," *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, August 7, 2002.

35. A widespread perception among Colombians is that white collar criminals are protected by their political investiture.

36. In his book, *Cartagena en la olla podrida*, Bogotá: Alfa omega, 2001, author Oscar Collazo documents 80 cases of corruption and irregularities that occurred in the last administration in the city of Cartagena, and describes various illegal adjudications of contracts and negotiations that favored private individuals and compromised severely the public treasury.

37. *U.S. Army's Area Handbook for Colombia*, Washington, DC: American University, 1961.

38. *Ibid.* A *verracó* literally means a boar, but connotes a person who won't let anything stand in the way of getting what that person wants.

39. This dynamic was well-articulated by Cepeda Ulloa in his book on administrative corruption, wherein he established a framework to study institutional inefficiency, the scope of individual discretion in decisionmaking posts, the degree of monopolization over the values desired, the benefits that can be derived from those monopolies, the probability of being discovered, the weight of punishment meted out, and the level of condemnation of corrupt acts by society as a whole. See Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, *La Corrupción en Colombia*, 1997.

40. *Washington's Farewell Address*, Am Jur 2d Desk Book, 1998, Item No. 13, p. 93.

41. Rolando López, *La Ruina de la Banca Estatal*, Bogotá: Alfaomega, 2001, p. 60.

42. For a thorough discussion of this topic, see Rolando López, *La Ruina de la Banca Estatal*, Bogotá: Alfa omega, 2001, pp. 13-15. One of the more controversial instances of political appointments being given to corrupt individuals involved Pastrana's selection of Diego Pardo Koppel, the former mayor of Bogotá, to be Colombia's ambassador to Mexico. Koppel is known to have ties to Cali Cartel boss Gilberto Rodríguez Orjuela going back at least to 1979 to a peculiar dispute over a missing suitcase and a nonexistent defendant. The dispute ended up in federal court in New York City. The case was that an individual named José Fonseca boarded an Avianca flight from Bogotá to Lima, Peru. His suitcase went, instead, to JFK airport in New York City. Going unclaimed, customs authorities opened the bag and discovered \$250,000 in U.S. currency packed inside. The discovery touched off a court battle over a 6-year period: *Fonseca v. Regan*, 734 F.2d 944, 2nd Circ., 1984, between the claimant, Fonseca, the state of New York, and Colombia's Superintendent of Exchange Control. Koppel testified on behalf of Fonseca, who claimed possession of the bag and its contents because he held the baggage claim check. The problem is that Fonseca was a nonexistent "person" created by Orjuela through the filing of false papers and the use of addresses of record that were actually for businesses owned by Orjuela. It is highly unlikely that Koppel could not have known that Fonseca was a myth. Koppel's dealings with Orjuela were no secret to those familiar with his career. Yet none of his murky past was questioned during Koppel's confirmation proceedings for ambassadorial appointment to Mexico. See Rolando López, *La Ruina de*

la Banca Estatal, Bogotá: Alfa omega, 2001, pp. 41-48. In 1999, Koppel was accused in the press of having improper credit transactions in the Banco del Estado, and improper business dealings with the president of the bank, Henry Ávila. See Rolando López, *La Ruina de la Banca Estatal*, Bogotá: Alfa omega, 2001, pp. 48-52.

43. Law 80 of 1993.

44. Susannah A. Nesmith, Colombia's Former Top Counter Drug Officer Resigns Amid Investigation Into Missing U.S. Aid," *AP Newswire*, May 22, 2002.

45. *Ibid.*

46. "Colombia: Pastrana Denies Corruption in *Plan Colombia*," *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, June 23, 2002.

47. "Los Enredos de Royne," *Cambio*, June 17-24, 2002, p. 16.

48. *Ibid.*

49. What North American readers would think of as a state is actually called a "departamento" in Colombia.

50. See "El coronel amigo," *Cambio*, June 10, 2002, p. 16.

51. *Ibid.*

52. "Negocios familiares," *Cambio*, June 10, 2002, p. 21.

53. "Diez meses de escándalos," *Semana*, June 24, 2002, p. 21.

54. Tim Johnson, "Colombian Leader Begins Visit to U.S.," *Miami Herald*, June 19, 2002.

55. Maria Isabel Garcia, "Politics-Colombia: President-elect on Difficult Mission to U.S.," *Inter Press Service*, June 14, 2002.

56. *Ibid.*

57. Umaña Luna, Orlando Fals Borda, Germán Guzmán, *La Violencia en Colombia*, Vol. I, Bogotá: Ediciones 15 Tercer Mundo, 1962, p. 426.

58. Anthony P. Maingot, *Studying Corruption in Colombia*, Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense

University, no date given, internet site visited March 22, 2002, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/cris7.html> (on file with the author).

59. Citing Enrique Santos, in *El Tiempo*, April 26, 1998, p. 5.

60. *Ibid.*

61. For an excellent rendition and analysis of the key events of the peace process, see Téllez.

62. *A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law*, 1765. See *Bartlett's Familiar Quotations*, 16th edition, 1992, p. 337.

63. Quoting political analyst Luis Valencia, in Maria Isabela Garcia, "Politics-Colombia: President-elect on Difficult Mission to U.S.," *Inter Press Service*, June 14, 2002.

64. Roberto Pombo, "Una ONU poco seria," *Cambio*, November 5, 2001, p. 10.

65. Canada, Cuba, France, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland all sent envoys to meet with the FARC and Colombian governments to negotiate a peace agreement. All failed. See Andrew Selsky, "Envoys Get Rebels Back to Peace Talks," *Associated Press*, January 15, 2002. This was not the first time European envoys had traveled to Colombia to meet with the FARC leadership. In February 2001, envoys from European nations, Canada, and Japan—all countries opposed to U.S. military aid, flew to the distention zone to discuss social development projects with FARC leaders. See Juan Forero, "Some Hopeful Signs As Colombia Meets With Rebels and Envoys," *New York Times*, March 11, 2001, Section 1, p. 15.

66. Sibylla Brodzinsky, "Safe Now, Rebel Zone Residents Fear Future," *St. Petersburg Times*, January 17, 2002.

67. John Otis, "Rebel Held; The Future; Peace or War," *Houston Chronicle*, August 5, 2001, p. 11.

68. A poll taken by Radio Caracol on February 21, 2002, asked, "How do you rank the decision of President Pastrana to break off negotiations with the FARC?" 89% said the decision was excellent, 8.29 said it was good, 2.05% said it was bad, and 0.66% had no opinion either way.

69. Radio Caracol on February 22, 2002, asked, "What do you think of the proposal by the FARC to return to negotiation with the government?" 90.55% said it was a bad idea, 3.61% thought it was a good

idea, 3.15% were noncommitted to the idea, and only 2.69% thought it was an excellent idea.

70. Mike Williams, "Colombia Pursues More U.S. Aid," *Palm Beach Post*, March 10, 2002, p. 5A.

71. The great strength and success of the U.S. military is that it is an egalitarian force representative of the entire nation, all its citizens, and all classes of the society. I believe that the Colombian military is beginning to recognize this importance and is undertaking efforts to recruit a professional corps of both male and female officers from the higher classes of society.

72. Radio Caracol asked on February 27, 2002, "Do you believe that the United States has a duty to help Colombia in the fight against the guerrilla?" 92.53% said yes and 7.47% said number

73. Fabio Orlando Cifuentes, "Sindicatos rechazan ayuda de EEUU a los militares," *Radio Caracol*, September 10, 2002.

74. For a telling image of President Uribe meeting with his commanders, see the photo accompanying the article, "Colombia acepta el reto de la guerra," *El Tiempo*, August 18, 2002, p. 1.

75. David Adams, "New President's Election Inspires Hope in Colombia," *St. Petersburg Times*, August 21, 2002, p. 1A.

76. *Ibid.*

77. "Colombia's Uribe Blasts Army Commanders," *Reuters*, August 26, 2001.

78. "Colombia acepta el reto de la guerra." See also "President Asks Armed Forces For More Effective Response to Terror Groups," *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, August 16, 2002.

79. "Colombia acepta el reto de la guerra," p. 1. See also "President Asks Armed Forces For More Effective Response to Terror Groups."

80. According to Jose Vivanco, Executive Director, Americas Division of Human Rights Watch, testifying before the Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs Subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Hearing Before Peace Corps and Narcotics Affairs Subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee," *Federal News Service*, April 24, 2002.

81. "Novela policiaca," *Semana*, June 24, 2002, at 18.

82. "Colombian Police Presence in 192 Rural Areas to Be Restored," *BBC Worldwide Monitoring*, October 21, 2001.

83. *Ibid.*

84. *U.S. Foreign Military Training: A Shift in Focus*, Center for Defense Information Terrorism Project, April 8, 2002, citing Lora Lompe, "U.S. Foreign Military Training," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, Special Report, February 2002. Report available at http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/miltraining.cfm#_ftn1, last visited September 17, 2002.

85. Speech marking the 6-month anniversary of the September 11 attacks, available from the White House homepage at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020311-1.html>. visited September 1, 2002.

86. See website <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>, visited September 10, 2002 (on file with the author).

87. See Edgar Téllez, et al., *Diario íntimo de un fracaso: Historia no contada del proceso de paz con las FARC*, Bogotá: Planeta, 2002, p. 55.

88. "Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative," Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Washington, DC, June 28, 2001 website http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rm/2001/jun_aug/3847.htm, visited September 23, 2002 (on file with the author).

89. *Ibid.* Both the ARI and the ACI were intended to carry out section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195) with regard to international cooperation in narcotics control. Sec. 481 was added in 1972 to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by P.L. 92-352 and codified at 22 U.S.C. 2291.

90. P.L. 107-115. 115 Stat. 2130.

91. "Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative," Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, June 28, 2001.

92. *Ibid.*

93. *Ibid.*

94. *Ibid.*

95. *Ibid.*

96. *A Wider Conflict?* RAND.

97. Steven Dudley, "Adios Presidente? Will Chavez Go the Way of Allende?" *The Progressive*, April 1, 2002, p. 25.

98. Paul Keller, "Bomb Raises Spectre of Rebel Revival in Peru," *Financial Times*, April 26, 2002, p. 8.

99. "Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative," Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, June 28, 2001.

100. *Ibid.*

101. Danielle Knight, "Ecuadorians File U.S. Suit Over *Plan Colombia*," *Inter Press Service*, September 21, 2001. For a copy of the complaint, visit the *us.fumigation.org* webpage at <http://www.usfumigation.org/Lawsuits/Ecuador.htm>, last visited September 5, 2002. The case is currently pending before Judge Roberts in the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia.

102. "Yankees come home," *Semana*, August 30, 2002.

103. Tim Johnson, "Colombian Rebel Groups Seen As a Regional Danger," *Miami Herald*, September 18, 2002.

104. Jeremy McDermott, "Colombian Bombers Were Trained by IRA," *Daily Telegraph*, London, August 12, 2002, p. 1.

105. Martin Arostegui, "Search for Bin Laden Links Looks South," *Organización Auténtica*, <http://www.autentico.org/oa09505.html>, visited September 23, 2002 (on file with the author).

106. *Ibid.*

107. *Iranian Investment in Colombia Raises Suspicion*, The Americas Foundation, <http://www.theamericas.org/colombia.htm>, visited June 15, 2001 (on file with the author).

108. Jeffrey Fields, "Islamic Terrorist Threat in the Tri-border Region," report published by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) and the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (visited October 19, 2002), http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_16b.html (on file with the author).

109. *Ibid.* For a concise overview of criminal, narco-trafficking and terrorism activities in South America, see “Instability in the Andean Region,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, April 2002, at pp. 12-13.

110. *Semana*, Internet version, May 14, 1998.

111. Christian Miller, “Colombia’s Fugitives from Woe,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 31, 2001.

112. Tim Johnson, “Colombia leader begins visit to U.S.,” *Miami Herald*, June 19, 2002.

113. P.L. 106-246, sec. 3204(b)(1)(A) and P.L. 106-246, sec. 3204(b)(1)(B).

114. Colombia Project, 2003 Aid Request, report by the Center for International Policy, <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/03forops.htm>, visited September 18, 2002, on file with the author).

115. P.L. 106-246, sec. 3204(h).

116. P.L. 106-246, sec. 3204(c).

117. Colombia Project, 2003 Aid Request, report by the Center for International Policy.

118. *Ibid.*

119. Interview with Steve Salisbury in, “Uribe Seeks U.S. Support,” *Washington Times*, May 14, 2002, p. A14.

120. *Ibid.*

121. Jose Ramos, “US Gives 880 Million to Regional Social Programs As Part of *Plan Colombia*,” *Agence France Presse*, August 31, 2001.

122. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001.

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