



[\[National Security Council\]](#)

---

**NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for  
National Security**

**(April 14, 1950)**

*A Report to the President  
Pursuant to the President's Directive  
of January 31, 1950*

TOP SECRET

[Washington,] April 7, 1950

Contents

[Terms of Reference](#)

Analysis

[I. Background of the Present World Crisis](#)

[II. The Fundamental Purpose of the United States](#)

[III. The Fundamental Design of the Kremlin](#)

[IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of Ideas and  
Values Between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin Design](#)

1. [Nature of the Conflict](#)
2. [Objectives](#)
3. [Means](#)

[V. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities--Actual and  
Potential](#)

[VI. U.S. Intentions and Capabilities--Actual and  
Potential](#)

[VII. Present Risks](#)

[VIII. Atomic Armaments](#)

A. Military Evaluation of U.S. and U.S.S.R.  
Atomic Capabilities

B. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons

C. International Control of Atomic Energy

## IX. Possible Courses of Action

Introduction

The Role of Negotiation

A. The First Course--Continuation of Current  
Policies, with Current and Currently Projected  
Programs for Carrying Out These Projects

B. The Second Course--Isolation

C. The Third Course--War

D. The Remaining Course of Action--A Rapid  
Build-up of Political, Economic, and Military  
Strength in the Free World

Conclusions

Recommendations

---