United States Security Strategy for the Americas

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

The end of the Cold War and the spread of democratic governments around the world have opened the door to a new era of security challenges and opportunities. I have asked the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to develop a series of regional security reports, consistent with President Clinton's strategy of "Engagement and Enlargement," to explain our efforts to meet these challenges and seize these opportunities.

This security strategy report for the Americas is part of this series. President Clinton has declared that "our nation has a major stake in the prosperity and freedom of the entire Hemisphere." As democracy takes hold, and the promise of rising standards of living for all our people becomes a reality, the United States "will become more secure." To make this vision real, our vital security interests must be protected through diplomacy, peacetime engagement, rapid response capabilities, and close defense cooperation with our friends and allies in the region.

The bedrock foundation for our approach to the Americas is a shared commitment to democracy, the rule of law, conflict resolution, defense transparency and mutual cooperation. The Defense Ministerial of the Americas, the first-ever gathering of the hemisphere's civilian and military leaders which I hosted this July, demonstrates the unprecedented consensus on these fundamentals while opening new avenues for expanded cooperation.

The security challenges in the region are many and diverse. They range from strengthening democratic governments and stable civil-military relations to confronting transnational threats like drug trafficking and terrorism. As demonstrated by our recent deployments in Haiti and the military observer mission in Peru and Ecuador, all require integrated plans for protecting democratic stability and promoting conflict resolution. Our military-to-military contacts will remain the currency of our engagements.

I welcome your attention to this report.

William J. Perry

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Introduction

In the last several years, the Americas[1] have emerged from a decade of political conflicts and economic setbacks to become one of the most democratic and economically vibrant regions in the world.

A Meeting of Minds and Vision of the Future

In early December of 1994, the leaders of every country in the Western Hemisphere except Cuba gathered in Miami for the "Summit of the Americas." Just eight months later, in July of 1995, the defense and security leaders of these same 34 nations convened in Williamsburg for the first-ever Defense Ministerial of the Americas. These meetings themselves were impressive testimony to the progress of democracy in the region, bringing together 34 countries with democratically-elected leaders.

At the last hemispheric summit in 1967 and in the two decades that followed, such a representation of elected heads of government could not have been assembled. Remarkable as a political symbol of democratic gains, the Summit of the Americas was also notable for the leaders' commitment to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas, a $12 trillion mega-market of some 800 million consumers. By all measures, the Miami Summit, a U.S. initiative, was a milestone event reflecting a region-wide commitment to democracy, open markets, and a cooperative approach to common problems.

The Defense Ministerial was also a milestone. Civilian and military leaders of the region gathered for the first time for wide-ranging dialogue on questions of security. This was no emergency meeting in reaction to a crisis event, but an effort to rethink issues of defense and security in light of two new geopolitical realities: the resurgence of democracy in the region and the end of the Cold War. Reflecting individual country and subregional perspectives, defense leaders exchanged views on the role of militaries in the 21st century, transparency and confidence-building measures in the region, and defense cooperation, including regional contributions to international peacekeeping missions.

New Realities, New Thinking

The new thinking and new realities reflected in the Miami Summit and Williamsburg Ministerial undoubtedly benefit our national security strategy of engagement and enlargement as it applies to the region. U.S. interests in the region have always been substantial and our security has always been closely tied to that of our immediate neighbors. As the U.S. draws ever closer to them, the potential domestic impact of instability in the region rises correspondingly. Threats to stability in the region have not disappeared, although they have changed in ways that often make them harder to understand and confront.

[1] The term "the Americas" includes the United States, Mexico, and Canada, along with countries in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean; it symbolizes that the United States is geographically, historically, and politically part of the region. Note, however, that Canada was covered in the DoD strategy report for Europe, and, in this report, "the region" principally refers to Latin America and the Caribbean.

The difference today—which makes the outlook for a policy of engagement and enlargement so positive—is the convergence of views on fundamentals: a shared commitment to democracy, to sustainable development rooted in open-market principles and practice, and to a cooperative approach to enhancing security. This consensus on fundamentals lays the foundation to meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century.

Not since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 has any country in the hemisphere posed a strategic threat to the United States and its people. The real danger to our national interests comes from the spillover effects of instability outside our borders. Political instability in Haiti following the September 1991 coup, for example, shows how the problems of a neighbor state can translate directly into humanitarian, migration, and human rights problems for the United States. The Mexican peso crisis in December 1994 also shows how quickly financial and economic crises across the border can jeopardize the material well-being of U.S. citizens and necessitate the kind of executive action the President took to help restore stability to financial markets.

In the past, U.S. engagement in the region was episodic and unilateral with U.S. military assets applied to deal with traditional threats to security. After World War II, U.S. policy in the region tended to view local events geostrategically against the backdrop of bipolar Cold War conflict. The direct application of U.S. military power to situations in the hemisphere often strained relations with other countries in the region.

Today, a concept of "cooperative security" is emerging, with greater emphasis on integrated approaches to shared problems. The dangers the U.S. faces today are more diverse. The line between domestic and foreign policies has blurred. Transnational phenomena like narco-trafficking and terrorism have long-term consequences for domestic and regional security. It is understood that not all security risks are military in nature and require well-coordinated approaches. But military institutions continue to play a key role in working toward solutions, and strategic planning can never discount the need for combat-ready forces.

As old problems linger and new security threats take shape, the U.S. and its friends in the region see greatly expanded opportunities for achieving lasting security. A long-standing commitment to the pacific settlement of disputes, embodied in the Organization of American States, finds fresh resonance in present-day notions of "preventive diplomacy" and confidence-building measures as well as in ongoing efforts by the United States and others to help resolve tensions like the border conflict between Ecuador and Peru.

Even as our ties with our democratic counterparts in the region expand and deepen, our military presence in the hemisphere remains modest. Numbers, however, do not tell the whole story. In Latin America and the Caribbean, as in other regions of the world, U.S. leadership is greatly valued. Professional regard for the U.S. military as an institution could not be higher. No less than our diplomatic and commercial interactions with regional counterparts, our military-to-military engagements play a key role in advancing our national security strategy.

A Strategy of Engagement

The strategic challenge for the United States in its neighborhood is to leverage our defense assets in support of national security goals that embrace the promotion of democracy and open markets as well as the core function of protecting American lives and well-being. A democratic and prosperous hemisphere is a safe and secure environment for ourselves and our neighbors.

Our strategy of engagement puts a high premium on military-to-military avenues to expand and deepen contacts with defense organizations in the region. These include: combined exercises, training programs, security assistance, professional military and civilian education, humanitarian relief projects, participation in international peacekeeping missions, joint planning and information sharing, and arms transfer policies. None of these vehicles is unique to the region, but in this hemisphere they are key to cementing close relations.

These relatively low-cost, low-profile programs with their proven utility in fostering defense and security ties can pay high dividends in the future. Multinational exercises under U.S. aegis, for example, can build mutual confidence among immediate neighbors and diminish the chances of border conflicts. Cooperation in border and coastal monitoring can effectively contribute to checking trafficking in arms, drugs, and other contraband. As more Latin countries look beyond the hemisphere to contribute to international peacekeeping operations, the value of training and exercises oriented to multinational cooperation is translated into wider burden-sharing globally.

As with peacekeeping, the hemisphere plays a significant role in nuclear nonproliferation and international arms control. DoD's regional strategy necessarily includes promoting U.S. nonproliferation and arms limitation goals among our friends in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Obviously, much of the implementation of a national security strategy based on enhancing our security, promoting prosperity at home, and fostering democracy falls to other Cabinet departments. Nonetheless, DoD plays a significant role in strengthening our security and furthering democratic consolidation in the region. This is especially true given the important role of the military in many Latin countries and the history of military regimes often displacing democratically elected governments.

DoD's leadership role is symbolized by the Defense Ministerial of the Americas, which marks a new chapter in the political-military history of the region. The six "Principles of Williamsburg" announced by Secretary Perry at the Ministerial **(see box)** stand as an unparalleled commitment by the region's civilian and military leaders to the preservation of democracy as the basis for our mutual security.

Developing constructive civil-military relations is an important goal related to democratic consolidation in the region. DoD supports the commitment of its civilian and military counterparts in realizing this goal. For example, the International Military Education and Training program (IMET) offers civilians and military the opportunity to acquire skills in defense resource management, facilitating dialogue on an often difficult issue. More broadly, the whole panoply of contacts developed

The Williamsburg Principles

To uphold the promise of the Santiago Agreement that the preservation of democracy is the basis for ensuring our mutual security.

To acknowledge that military and security forces play a critical role in supporting and defending the legitimate interests of sovereign democratic states.

To affirm the commitments of our countries in Miami and Managua that our Armed Forces should be subordinate to democratically controlled authority, act within the bounds of national Constitutions, and respect human rights through training and practice.

To increase transparency in defense matters through exchanges of information, through reporting on defense expenditures, and by greater civilian-military dialogue.

To set as a goal for our hemisphere the resolution of outstanding disputes by negotiated settlement and widespread adoption of confidence building measures, all of this in a time-frame consistent with the pace of hemispheric economic integration, and to recognize that the development of our economic security profoundly affects our defense security and vice versa.

To promote greater defense cooperation in support of voluntary participation in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations, and to cooperate in a supportive role in the fight against narcoterrorism.

under DoD auspices serves to encourage a professional military ethos in which democratic norms are paramount. Initiatives like the Defense Ministerial also serve to bolster civilian-led defense establishments as a constructive element in civil-military affairs.

As we approach the threshold of the 21st century, our strategic objectives are to:

- support the commitment to democratic norms in the region, including civilian control in defense matters, constructive civil-military relations, and respect for human rights;
- foster the peaceful resolution of disputes, transparency of military arms and expenditures, and development of confidence- and security-building measures appropriate to the region;

- carry out responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaty and cooperate with the Government of Panama in addressing issues linked to the companion Neutrality Treaty;

- work with our friends in the region to confront drug trafficking, combat terrorism, and support sustainable development;

- expand and deepen defense cooperation with other countries of the region in support of common objectives, encouraging them to improve capabilities for joint actions, including international peacekeeping;

- prevent humanitarian crises from reaching catastrophic proportions; and,

- encourage efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and associated delivery systems as well as other arms control initiatives of common benefit.

In short, democracy, peace and prosperity in the region are the best guarantees of U.S. national security. DoD's regional strategy is to use the defense assets at its disposal to promote these goals.

President Clinton joins the leaders of the 33 democratically elected governments of the Western Hemisphere at the historic Summit of the Americas held in Miami in December 1994.

The United States' Enduring and Growing Interest in the Security of the Americas

The U.S. stake in Latin America and the Caribbean is substantial and growing. Our ties—historic, political, geographic, social, economic, and cultural—have always been significant. In recent years, however, sweeping changes spurred by democratic and market-driven reforms have propelled the region forward globally. Today, and for the foreseeable future, the region promises to be a zone of expanding opportunity.

It is in our national interest to have stable and secure neighbors. What happens in Mexico City or Santiago or Brasilia or San Salvador or Port-au-Prince affects the daily lives and welfare of our own citizens. The record shows that instability in the region has adverse consequences for us—often immediate and measurable. As our linkages expand, so too will our security interest in a secure, prosperous, and democratic hemisphere.

U.S. Economic Interests

The data on the U.S. economic stake in Latin America are striking, but consider the trends. Latin America and the Caribbean is the third largest regional market for U.S. exports, and the largest market in which the U.S. maintains a favorable balance of trade. From 1987 through 1993, U.S. exports to Latin America grew at an average annual rate of 21%. That is twice the growth rate of our exports to the European Union. Latin America's gross domestic product is approaching $1 trillion, and regional economies have been growing 3-4% annually. By comparison, economies in member states of the Organization of Economic and Cooperative Development recently have had an average annual growth rate of only 0.9%.

The value of direct U.S. investment in Latin America is substantial, reported at $89 billion in 1992, close to one fifth of total US investment worldwide that year. Finance capital and portfolio investment is increasing rapidly in many countries of the region, constituting an ever-bigger share of total investment. The region as a whole has been able to raise an average of $12 billion in bond and stock offerings in the international markets during 1991 and 1992, compared with an annual average of less than $1 billion throughout most of the 1980s. Financial markets in cities like Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo, and Mexico City have grown with the inflow of funds for the purchase of stocks and bonds. Much of this investment comes from the United States. The volume and value of these investments responds daily—often from one hour to the next—to a wide range of political and economic events. Indeed, a precipitous turn of events in one country could have what some have called "the tequila effect" in several others.

Some telling examples of our concrete economic interests in the region, based on recent export data from the National Trade Data Bank, include:[2]

- U.S. exports to the Caribbean Basin countries exceeded those to China by several billion dollars.

[2] Data originates from the International Trade Administration and covers the year 1993. Revised in June 1994, it is the most current official data available as of June, 1995.

- The United States sold as much to Chile as to India.

- Brazil bought as much from the United States as all of Eastern Europe and the former republics of the Soviet Union, including Russia.

Not only is the region a growing market for our exports, it is the source of resources vital to our security and well being. Mexico, Venezuela, and Trinidad export significant amounts of petroleum to the United States. In fact, the largest single-country source of imported oil to the United States is Mexico, which supplies us with more barrels of oil than Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela is right behind Saudi Arabia. Chile is the world's leading producer of copper and Brazil is the second largest producer of iron ore. Brazil, Jamaica, Suriname and Guyana together produce the second largest amount of bauxite in the world.

The growing economic importance of the region to the United States is most concretely expressed in two recent developments: the signing in 1993 of the North American Free Trade Agreement among the U.S., Mexico and Canada, and the agreement reached at the Summit of the Americas to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005.

Geographic and Social Ties

Thirty-three countries and various dependencies with a combined population of 470 million people comprise Latin America and the Caribbean. Notwithstanding the physical scale of the region, talk of proximity is well justified and strategically significant.

- The United States shares a 2,000 mile border with its immediate neighbor, Mexico. In 1994, nearly 331 million people crossed the border from Mexico to the United States.

President Clinton, Prime Minister Chretien of Canada, President Frei of Chile and President Zedillo of Mexico at announcement inviting Chile to join the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

- More than 22 million Hispanics legally reside in the continental United States, according to the 1990 census, making this the largest non-English-speaking immigrant group in the country. The United States now has the fifth-largest number of Spanish-speaking residents in the world.

- The largest U.S. expatriate population, one-half million people, resides in Mexico. Tens of thousands of U.S. citizens also reside in large commercial centers like Caracas and Sao Paulo.

- Caribbean Basin sea lanes are the conduit for most of our oil imports, not only from the region but also from the Persian Gulf and Africa. The Panama Canal remains an important passage for the Pacific states of South America —countries that include some of our fastest-growing trading partners.

Globalization via telecommunications and vastly expanded travel links have only enhanced the importance of the region's proximity and accelerated demographic trends captured in the data above. The breadth of the region's physical size creates enormous problems for monitoring and interdicting the flow of illegal drugs, arms, migrants and contraband in the region. Our geographic and social interests in the Americas warrant a continued concern for the stability and well-being of our neighbors, near and far.

Vice President Al Gore speaks to the delegates at the Defense Ministerial in July 1995; seated behind him is Presidential Counselor Thomas "Mack" McLarty.

Historic and Political Interests

The United States has a strategic interest in the consolidation of democracy in the region. Democracy is the core value of our political culture and a defining element of our national identity. The protection of democracy was a key reason for our participation in two World Wars. Promoting democracy is one of three primary objectives of the President's National Security Strategy. In our own hemisphere, we aim to promote democracy by helping our neighbors consolidate the democratic gains they have made.

The reaffirmation of democracy as a cardinal national security objective comes at a time when democracy has become the rule throughout the hemisphere. It was not always so. Fifteen years ago, authoritarian regimes were the norm and democratically elected governments, the exception. From 1979, when Ecuador made its transition to democracy, until the 1994 Summit of the Americas, the world watched as one country in the region after another elected their own leaders.

In 1990, Haiti elected Jean Bertrand Aristide as President. Haiti's remarkable political transformation was not without setbacks. Although this "silent revolution" was accomplished peacefully, it required great effort on the part of the United States, its friends and allies, and the Haitian people.

The vision of a democratic hemisphere is as old as our countries' struggles for national independence in the 18th and 19th centuries. And it is enshrined in the Charter of the Organization of American States, the oldest international organization of its kind. Our region is the only one where an explicit agreement exists to cooperate in the defense of democracy acting through the OAS. Known as the Santiago Resolution, OAS member states have agreed to meet immediately "in the event of any occurrences giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratically elected government" in any member state. This commitment was renewed by the hemisphere's civilian and military leaders in Williamsburg, where they agreed that the preservation of democracy is the basis for ensuring our mutual security. As Secretary Perry noted on that occasion, no crisis facing any member state justifies a breach of the system of representative democracy.

The Americas have made good on this commitment on three occasions, energetically responding to the coup in Haiti in September 1991, a couple months after the resolution was adopted; the auto-coup in Peru in 1992; and the auto-coup in Guatemala in 1993.

Promoting democracy is not a crusade but a pragmatic commitment. As a process for resolving societal conflicts, democracy provides a lawful vehicle for needed reforms and peaceful changes of governments. Democratic states are less inclined to wage war against one another. And countries which share democratic values find it easier to cooperate. That is why promotion of democracy is an integral mission of our armed forces deployed throughout the region.



Secretary of Defense William J. Perry with the Heads of Delegation at the first-ever Defense Ministerial of the Americas, held in Williamsburg, Virginia in July 1995.

The Challenges and Opportunities Facing the United States in the Americas

Favorable trends in the region point to rising opportunities for the United States. Nonetheless, old problems linger and new challenges arise which put U.S. national interests and strategic objectives at risk. As we draw closer to our neighbors, we find not only increased opportunities for cooperation, but greater exposure to the adverse consequences of setbacks and disturbances outside our own borders.

The Challenge of Strengthening Democracy

All of us in the region are looking to consolidate the democratic gains of the last 15 years. Hemispheric leaders at the Miami Summit focused on the "modernization of the state": creating transparent and accountable institutions, accessible and independent judiciaries; attacking corruption; and attending to the needs of "vulnerable groups" (indigenous people, the disabled, minorities, and others). The resulting list of tasks in the Summit Plan of Action points to the challenges we and our neighbors face.

Direct threats to democratic governance have continued. In September 1991, not a year after he was elected President of Haiti, Jean Bertrand Aristide was overthrown in a military coup. In 1992, Peru's President Fujimori staged an "auto-golpe" or self-coup, effectively shutting down the legislature and courts. In 1993, President Serrano of Guatemala attempted the same thing. Twice in 1992, reactionary elements of the military attempted coups in Venezuela, one of the longest-standing constitutional democracies of the region. And in Cuba, where democracy does not yet exist, the United States faces the challenge of how best to contribute to the goal of the peaceful establishment of democratic governance for the people of Cuba.

Strengthening democracy is a task that cannot be pursued in isolation. Economic dislocation proves fertile ground for coup plotters, as Venezuela's case suggests. Confronting terrorism and insurgency puts enormous stress on constitutional governments, as the case of Peru shows. Haiti set out on the path to democracy in 1990 with undeveloped institutions and traditions—including a military with virtually no acculturation to democratic values—as well as chronic, massive poverty.

Secretary Perry and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili examine weapons found at abandoned police quarters in Les Cayes, Haiti.

Opportunities for facing up to the challenges to democracy are at hand. The Americas are equipped to deal with coup attempts by working through the OAS and the Santiago Resolution. Militaries, which in the past supplanted elected governments, have shown greater commitment to democratic norms and willingness to rethink and revise professional roles. In Guatemala, the military stood behind the constitutional democratic process, thereby helping effect a favorable outcome to the 1993 crisis. And civilian leaders are increasingly recognizing the pressing need for greater civilian expertise in defense and military affairs.

Failure to work with our friends in the region to protect and strengthen democratic government would weaken our strategic interests across a wide spectrum. Trade and investment would be put in jeopardy, with both real losses and opportunity costs to U.S. businesses and workers. Cooperation in areas like counternarcotics would be sidetracked. Humanitarian crises in the wake of political turmoil would severely tax our ability to provide relief and find solutions. The region's support for global peace and security initiatives would fall off.

Dealing with Residual Strife and Long-standing Disputes

Internal Conflicts

The end of the Cold War and resurgence of democracy in the Americas have not put an end to conflict in the region. Although their impact has diminished, insurgent and guerrilla forces continue to operate in some countries. These include:

- *Colombia*, with two main guerrilla groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN);
- *Guatemala*, with three major armed guerrilla groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), and the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP);
- *Peru*, with Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and the diminishing Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA); and
- *Mexico*, where on January 1, 1994, a new rebel group, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), seized several towns in the southern state of Chiapas, Mexico.

The listing of these groups does not argue for any specific U.S. policy response other than active support for peaceful resolution. Where civilian-led peace negotiations are underway, the United States should encourage all sides to the conflict to respect the process, including interim accords and cease fires. Positive developments include the resolution of El Salvador's decade-long conflict through the 1992 peace accords, the beginning of national reconciliation that went hand-in-hand with elections in Nicaragua in 1989, and ongoing negotiations in Guatemala, Mexico, and Colombia. All of these point toward continuing U.S. and international support for national reconciliation.

Border Disputes

While the Americas are relatively free of international conflict, tensions based on historical animosities remain unresolved and can reignite if not addressed. Contested international borders and maritime boundaries could lead to inter-state conflicts, as the eruption of hostilities between Ecuador and Peru in 1995 shows. The immediate

Selected Major Boundary Issues in Latin America



and constructive response to that conflict by the "Guarantor Nations," which include the United States, demonstrates the value of cooperative engagement involving the United States, multilateral mechanisms, and Latin American nations.

An overview of border disputes in the region indicates a number of potential flash points. At the same time, a historical and growing regional commitment to conflict prevention provides the U.S. opportunities for diminishing potential hostilities.

Boundary disputes include those between Guatemala and Belize; El Salvador and Honduras; Venezuela and Colombia; Venezuela and Guyana; Guyana and Suriname; Ecuador and Peru; Bolivia and Chile (access to the sea by Bolivia); Colombia and Nicaragua; and Argentina and Chile.

Even though most of these disputes have not flared up recently, the U.S. must continue to support efforts to resolve them. Some recent efforts to resolve disputes are:

- Guatemala and Belize have shown signs of rapprochement, including open communication between border patrols to avert misunderstandings;
- El Salvador and Honduras are implementing the International Court of Justice's decision on their boundary dispute;
- Colombia and Venezuela have initiated greater cross-border cooperation, for example joint patrols and search operations;
- Chile and Argentina have made unprecedented progress in eliminating friction over their borders with the aid of Papal mediation.

This record of progress reflects a commitment to pacific resolution of international conflicts through a variety of mechanisms. Prospects for further progress have been improved by the widespread interest in confidence- and security-building measures, a major theme of the Defense Ministerial in Williamsburg and the subject of an OAS Conference in November, 1995 in Santiago, Chile.

Confronting Transnational Threats

Drug Trafficking

In a message to Congress conveying the *National Drug Control Strategy*, the President called international drug trafficking "a criminal activity that threatens democratic institutions, fuels terrorism and human rights abuses, and undermines economic development." "Drug use," he added, "puts our entire Nation at risk."

The *Drug Strategy* specifies the effects of drug trafficking on our own society:

> "International drug trafficking affects the United States, bringing crime to the streets, violence to communities, and drug abuse to towns and cities. These assaults on health and safety will continue to affect the security and undermine the welfare of the people of the United States."

The *Drug Strategy* sums up the need for a strong international counternarcotics effort: "If drug production and trafficking are left unchallenged at their source, they will overwhelm the Nation's ability to respond to the drug threat at home."

Data on cocaine symbolize the magnitude of narco-trafficking in the region. Virtually all of the world's production of coca leaf, the

raw material for cocaine, comes from Peru, Colombia, and Bolivia. Coca leaf production in these three countries yields roughly 1,000 metric tons of cocaine annually, significant amounts of which are seized and destroyed. Still, this volume represents more than three times the 300 metric tons of cocaine the United States consumes every year.

If left unchecked, Western Hemisphere sources also could easily meet U.S. demand for heroin in the future. While Southeast Asia remains the largest producer and supplier to the U.S. illicit drug market, Colombia presents a major new heroin supply threat to the United States.

Narco-trafficking affects virtually every country in the hemisphere. It is estimated that more than half of the cocaine entering the United States passes through Mexico along our common 2,000 mile border. The Caribbean Basin is another key transit area for illegal drug movements to the United States, with about one-third of cocaine flows passing through. Even ports like Buenos Aires are used to ship drugs to the United States, as traffickers often take circuitous routes to avoid interdiction efforts.

Bahamian Minister of Security C.A. Smith addresses Caribbean concerns at closing ceremony of Defense Ministerial.

DoD's principal role is to support law enforcement agencies in detecting and monitoring the flow of illegal drugs. At Williamsburg, the defense leaders of the hemisphere agreed to cooperate in a supportive role in the fight against narcoterrorism, for example, through greater information sharing and arms interdiction.

Terrorism

Leaders at the Miami Summit in December 1994 called terrorism a "systematic and deliberate violation of the rights of individuals and an assault on democracy itself," characterizing it as a "serious threat to the security of the Americas."

Of the 321 international terrorist incidents worldwide in 1994, 58 were in Latin America, a 40 percent decrease from the year before and lower than the Middle East (115) and Western Europe (88). More importantly, however, anti-U.S. attacks numbered 44, putting the region far ahead of all others in this category (the Middle East, ranking second, had only eight such attacks).

Argentina suffered the worst terrorist attack perpetrated in Latin America in 1994 when a bomb blew up the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires killing nearly 100 persons and injuring more than 200.

Citing such terrorist attacks, Miami Summit leaders adopted an action plan against terrorism and called for a special OAS conference on its prevention. Along with confidence-building measures and counternarcotics, counterterrorism received prominent attention in the security-related elements of the Summit Plan of Action.

As in the case of counterdrug efforts, DoD plays a support role to law enforcement in the fight against terrorism, for example, through terrorism prevention programs in the region.

Opportunities for Advancing Global Peace and Security

Arms Control

The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have been active in both regional and international arms control initiatives.

Weapons proliferation, though not a major problem in Latin America, is monitored carefully. Of particular concern is the potential that the Peru-Ecuador conflict could spark an arms race. Defense spending is low and has declined from 3.3% to 1.6% of GNP from 1987 to 1992. Of all regions in the world, Latin American and Caribbean nations spend the least on military budgets and have the fewest uniformed personnel per capita. Certain states in the region have the technological capability to produce or acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction and the means for their delivery.

Commendable efforts by Argentina and Brazil to subscribe to nuclear control regimes have reduced the overall threat and deterred a potential arms race between them. Similar progress has been made to contain the spread of missile technology. At Mexico's initiative, all 33 states of the region have signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, agreeing not to acquire, manufacture, test, use or station a nuclear explosive device. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have declared in the Mendoza Accord their joint commitment to halt development, production or purchase of biological and chemical weapons. In 1992, an OAS General Assembly resolution co-authored by the United States and Brazil endorsed a broad range of arms control measures, affirming support for the UN Register of Conventional Arms, transparency in arms transfers, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. The states of the region are prominent among those which have signed the Convention and participated with others in the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Broad support for arms control does not preclude differences with and among our neighbors. We shall continue close and ongoing consultation to achieve our nonproliferation goals. Issues include the linkage between strategic arms limitation efforts and nonproliferation, appropriate measures for limiting and monitoring the transfer of dual-use technologies, and the transfer of conventional arms. The challenges and opportunities for arms control in the region are reflected in the Central American Security Commission (CASC) which at once manifests its member states' will to resolve arms and security issues and the difficulties of implementing broader goals.

Confidence- and security-building measures play an important role in advancing our arms limitation goals. Measures like those supported at the Defense Ministerial have the potential not only to diminish the chances of conflict but also to create an environment which makes possible a reduction in levels of armament.

International Peacekeeping

The region has demanded little from United Nations peacekeeping resources and has contributed much. The level of internal conflict declined substantially with the resolution of the war in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Of the 15

UN Peacekeeping Missions in operation in 1994, just two were in the region: the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), which had largely completed its mission with great success.

As of June 1995, twenty American countries were supporting 15 of the 16 United Nations peace operations throughout the world with a total of 9,411 military and police personnel (**see box**). Some recent examples:

Country	Peacekeeping Personnel*
Antigua and Barbuda	15
Argentina	1,441
Bahamas	36
Barbados	34
Belize	3
Brazil	84
Canada	3,017
Chile	6
El Salvador	2
Guatemala	124
Guyana	51
Honduras	134
Jamaica	101
St. Kitts and Nevis	7
St. Lucia	7
Suriname	46
Trinidad and Tobago	55
USA	3,318
Uruguay	927
Venezuela	3
Total	**9,411**

*UN data as of July, 1995

- Almost 900 Argentine troops were participating in the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia;
- A 300-strong contingent of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is serving in the UN Mission in Haiti;
- Chileans and Uruguayans participate in the UN Observer Group in India and Pakistan;
- El Salvador, itself the beneficiary of a successful UN Mission, contributed personnel for the Referendum in the Western Sahara;
- Brazil was participating in the UN Mission in the former Yugoslavia. President Cardoso has announced plans to send 1,100 military personnel to assist the UN Mission in Angola.
- Over 850 Uruguayans have supported peacekeeping efforts in Angola.

Multilateral peace operations are an important component of our national security and serve important U.S. national interests in promoting stability. The United States welcomes the opportunity to build upon the interest in the region in international peacekeeping. As shown by their involvement in El Salvador and Haiti, long-held resistance to participation in UN peacekeeping operations within the hemisphere is breaking down.

Discussions at the Williamsburg Defense Ministerial in July 1995 led to a consensus to cooperate on voluntary UN-sanctioned peacekeeping missions. At the same time, policy and resource constraints bear on decisions to join in such operations. To maximize resources, Argentina and Canada offered to open their peacekeeping training centers to



Delegates to the Defense Ministerial examine an F-15 Eagle at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.

additional students from other countries. Also at Williamsburg, the United States joined those countries interested in participating in peacekeeping in calling for continued reform of UN peacekeeping operations.

We encourage other countries of the region to conduct their own review of peacekeeping missions to ensure that maximum benefit is derived by participation. As in Williamsburg, the Defense Department will continue to share information and experiences with regard to such missions. We will continue to encourage our partners in the region to support global efforts at peace, press for further reform of UN peacekeeping operations, and increase burden sharing, interoperability with other forces, and military professional development.

Defense Engagement in the Americas: Strategy, Forces, and Programs

A Strategy for the Long Term

As we move into the 21st century, U.S. defense engagement will be increasingly interactive and diversified. The measure of engagement will not be the forces we count in bases around the hemisphere, but the wide array of contacts we use to cooperate with other countries in shared goals, such as those identified at Williamsburg. Our strategy will be successful to the degree that its low-profile, long-range programs reduce the odds of conflict and need to deploy forces in emergency situations or combat.

In engaging other countries of the region, our strategy employs instruments proven useful the world over, including joint exercises and operations, U.S. training and professional development programs (especially International Military Education and Training (IMET)), military assistance, bilateral consultations and counterpart visits, and military-to-military interactions.

In a region where we put high priority on strategies to promote democracy and confront unconventional transnational challenges (like narco-trafficking), interagency programs which expand cooperation, build institutions, and develop capabilities and flexibility are vital. The key is to leverage DoD assets to support the commitment and capability of counterpart institutions in meeting common goals.

The thrust of our strategy of engagement can be seen in these recent examples of DoD and U.S. military activity with the region.

- At Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, in September 1994, 1700 soldiers from Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador participated in a combined exercise sponsored by US Southern Command built around a narcoguerrilla scenario. General officers from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile observed, as did nongovernmental human rights organizations.

- On March 15, 1995 approximately 90 U.S. military personnel joined counterparts from Brazil, Chile, and Argentina in support of Operation SAFE BORDER, the Guarantor Observer Mission in the disputed border region between Peru and Ecuador.

- In November 1994, Secretary of Defense Perry met with Argentine Defense Minister Camillion in the first Secretarial-level Bilateral Working Group with a nation of the region. About that same time, a legislative staff person from Argentina was studying defense resource management at DoD facilities in California as a way of supporting a greater defense budget-oversight role by her legislature.

- In Honduras and Costa Rica, personnel received mine awareness and clearance instruction provided by an Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) team led by Brazil and joined by trainers from Colombia, Honduras, and United States. DoD contributed funds and help with training, communications, and medical evacuation support to this OAS/IADB project.

- Dental equipment, part of Excess Defense Articles stored by the Defense Logistics Agency in Pennsylvania was shipped in 1995 to a non-profit organization in Mexico which provides medical and dental assistance to the working poor in rural communities.

What the Numbers Say

Compared to other regions of the world, the numerical presence of U.S. military in Latin America and the Caribbean is limited. As of December 31, 1994, at the peak of operations in Haiti and Cuba/Guantanamo, a total of 22,114 U.S. military personnel were stationed or deployed in the region. The largest concentrations of military were in Panama (9,695), Haiti (5,359), and Cuba-Guantanamo (5,721). There are more DoD civilians in Japan than there are U.S. military in all of the Western Hemisphere region.

These numbers have already decreased substantially and will continue to decline: By the year 2000 we are obligated under the Panama Canal Treaty to close our bases in Panama; U.S. military in Haiti will decline in number as the UN Mission, of which they are part, finishes its work.



Crew members load humanitarian supplies on a C-17 at Pope Air Force Base to be transported to Panama.

Recent U.S. military operations in the region point to the changing character of our security concerns and ways of dealing with them. Of the 27 U.S. overseas military operations in the world since Desert Storm, eight were in the region. None involved open, armed hostilities. Three were directly related to the restoration and support of democracy in Haiti, and were carried out in line with international efforts toward that end. Three others were responses to migration emergencies spurred by events in Haiti and Cuba, and two of these were related to providing safe-haven facilities for migrants. To be sure, U.S. military forces deployed to the region in recent years have consistently proven they possess the versatility, skill and compassion required to perform demanding unconventional missions, as well as more traditional military tasks.

Region-specific Assets to Build On

Besides generic programs like IMET, our strategy is able to draw upon area-specific institutions and programs for engaging with our counterparts in the region.

- **Organization of American States (OAS)** Founded in 1890 as the Pan-American Union, the OAS is an international organization of all the countries of the region. (Cuba is a member, but its present government is excluded from participation as being incompatible with OAS Charter principles.) While not a security organization, its commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts and its increasingly prominent role in the support of democracy make it a significant factor in considerations of regional security. DoD works with the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to advance our regional objectives of transparency, confidence building and arms control

through the OAS Permanent Committee on Hemispheric Security.

- **U.S. Army School of the Americas** Under U.S. law, this school at Fort Benning, Georgia, offering instruction in Spanish, is authorized to provide sound, doctrinal military training to military personnel from Latin America and the Caribbean. Since its founding at Fort Amador in 1946 the School has educated almost 58,000 students.

- **Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA)** Founded in 1943 in Panama and now located at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, IAAFA provides professional, technical and management training in Spanish to approximately 500 Latin American military and government personnel a year. Through the years, IAAFA has supported U.S. policy in the region by graduating 29,716 students from 26 countries.

- **Naval Small Craft and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS)** Located in Panama, NAVSCIATTS provides courses and mobile training teams to improve the readiness of naval and coast guard forces of Latin America and the Caribbean. Its thirteen courses cover employment, maintenance and logistic support of small craft for coastal and riverine missions.

- **Inter-American Defense Board (IADB)** Created in 1942 to plan for the collective defense of the hemisphere, the Board is the longest standing multilateral military organization in the world. The militaries of 23 countries now participate in the Board, which opened its membership to all OAS member states in 1993. Funded by the OAS, the Board provides technical-military advisory services requested by the political organs of the OAS.

- **Inter-American Defense College** The IADB founded the College at Fort McNair in 1962 as an international senior service school. Some 50-60 field-grade officers and civilians attend the College for a year, taking courses on the political, social, economic, and military factors that bear on security in the region.

Advancing Our Strategic Objectives

The specific goals of the U.S. security strategy for the Americas are supported by an array of programs, institutions, and initiatives in which DoD has the lead or takes part. Those include:

Supporting the commitment to democratic norms in the region, including civilian control in defense matters, constructive civil-military relations, and respect for human rights

The regional strategy aims to employ DoD assets to strengthen democracy in the region so as to minimize the risks to democratic stability and the need for extraordinary, emergency action.

As the case of Haiti shows, support for democracy can draw heavily on our diplomatic and defense resources. DoD's role in a crisis of democratic governance can vary from suspending military assistance to enforcing sanctions to leading a multinational military operation. For example, in Operation SUPPORT DEMOCRACY, from October 1993 to September 1994, the United States used maritime interdiction of arms and oil off the coast of Haiti to pressure the military government of Haiti to step down. When these actions failed, U.S. military forces, joined by thousands of soldiers from the region and around the world, landed in Haiti and created a secure and stable environment for the return of

Secretary Perry welcomes Haitian President Jean Bertrand Arisitide to the Pentagon in September, 1994.

President Arisitide and the conduct of national elections.

Cuba is the only country in the Americas still ruled by a dictator. Our goal is the peaceful establishment of democratic governance for the people of Cuba. U.S. policy will continue to be guided by the Cuban Democracy Act, which tightens the embargo while increasing people-to-people contacts with the Cuban people.

Professional military and civilian education and training is critical to pursuing the goal of democratic consolidation in the region. The importance of IMET continues to grow. In FY94, 1,702 military personnel from 31 countries in the region received IMET training—more than any other region, and almost half the world total.

We will continue to take full advantage of legislation in 1991 which expanded the scope and purposes of the IMET program. Expanded IMET (E-IMET) objectives include fostering greater respect for democracy and the rule of law, including the principle of civilian control of the military. Improved civil-military relations is a program objective in IMET proposals for 18 of 22 countries in the region slated for IMET funds.

In response to the pressing need for greater civilian expertise in defense affairs, many regular IMET courses now qualify as E-IMET if taken by civilians. Civilian defense ministry officials and legislative staff who are versed in defense and military matters can facilitate civil-military dialogue and more effectively exercise civilian control of the military.

Other E-IMET courses support democratic consolidation as well. Courses on military justice help militaries in their efforts to improve their systems for ensuring accountability to the rule of law and internationally codified human rights standards. Courses to

develop defense resource management skills help civilian and military personnel reconcile defense needs with social and economic demands, and assist civilians to exercise informed oversight of defense budgets.

The School of the Americas has made a significant contribution to growing military professionalism in Latin America, a key factor for democratic stability. The School recognizes the need to update and modernize its curriculum and programs and has begun instituting reforms, including many to advance the goals of democracy and human rights.

All of its courses now contain a core module on human rights, including practical training exercises. Every instructor must be specially certified in human rights instruction. A new "train-the-trainers" block of instruction has been introduced to help Latin American instructors institute their own systems of human rights training when they return to their countries. The School is also developing new courses that will include civilians for the first time and increasing instruction in E-IMET-related topics.

The Department of Defense also recognizes the value of the Inter-American Defense College in advancing democracy and human rights goals. At Williamsburg DoD garnered support for an expanded role for the IADC to educate civilians in national security studies. As part of the Inter-American Defense Board's oversight of the College, the U.S. Delegation to the Board works to support improvements which reflect new developments, including the democratic changes and values of the region.

Ties developed through military-to-military contacts can support the democratic commitment of counterpart militaries and, for example, encourage them to play a positive role in emergencies. As long-range programs to strengthen democracy continue, the need to react to emergencies and crises should diminish.

Fostering the peaceful resolution of disputes, transparency in military expenditures and transfers, and development of confidence- and security-building measures appropriate to the region

U.S. participation in efforts to resolve the border dispute between Ecuador and Peru illustrates our commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region.



U.S. forces participating in the Military Observer Mission to Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP) prepare to monitor compliance with negotiated cease-fire.

The United States, along with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, is a Guarantor state under the Rio Protocol, a 1942 agreement designed to help Ecuador and Peru deal with their long-standing border dispute. U.S. diplomatic efforts with other Guarantor states are supported by U.S. military participation in a Guarantor Observer Mission in the disputed border area. The Mission supports the February 1995 Itamaraty Declaration of Peace between Ecuador and Peru by observing and reporting on implementation of the treaty.

The United States actively supports OAS-sponsored efforts to encourage defense transparency and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the region. CSBMs were a major topic of discussion at the Defense Ministerial in Williamsburg, where the Ministers strongly endorsed the November 1995 OAS Meeting of Vice Foreign Ministers in Chile, which will focus exclusively on CSBMs. We and other countries of the hemisphere recognize the value of CSBMs in preventing disputes from developing into open hostilities. Ecuador and Peru, for example, have committed to direct talks on CSBMs as well as on the elements of a final settlement of their dispute. In Williamsburg, Brazil announced that Peru and Ecuador had agreed to a demilitarized zone, thus validating the type of work accomplished at the Ministerial and the successful efforts of the four Guarantor nations.

The Defense Ministerial itself was an important confidence-building measure. Not only were CSBMs a major theme, but the very fact of the meeting, as many delegates said, increased transparency and spurred further action toward greater confidence building. As an important next step, Secretary Perry announced the United States would take the initiative of giving countries prior notification of significant U.S.-sponsored multilateral military exercises in the region.

The design of the exercise programs of the U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Atlantic Command also advance our CSBM goals. Exercises are increasingly multinational, often involving the militaries of neighboring countries in a subregion. This builds cooperation and confidence among militaries and makes transparent to all participants the nature and specifics of the exercise program. Transparency is extended further by inviting numerous guests from nonparticipating militaries, international bodies, and nongovernmental organizations to observe the exercises.

Fuerzas Unidas CENTAM 95, for example, was the third multinational exercise sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command in 1994, and involved El Salvador (100 soldiers), Guatemala (37 soldiers), Honduras (73 soldiers), and the United States (170 soldiers). The subject of this exercise, conducted in Puerto Rico by the Army National Guard there, was preparing for participation in multinational peacekeeping operations. Observers included military from Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras and Venezuela as well as multinational observers from the United Nations, Inter-American Defense Board, and Inter-American Defense College.

In such a well-integrated exercise, several strategic objectives are served at once. The content of the exercise relates directly to promoting regional cooperation, especially contributions to international peacekeeping. By making the participation multinational and accommodating a wide variety of observers, the exercise increases transparency and builds trust among participants.

DoD works closely with other government agencies to plan and coordinate U.S. policy for the development of regional CSBMs, helping to identify, for example, various military-specific measures which can be taken to build confidence among countries in the region. DoD will continue to lead by example in this area by exploring opportunities for transparency and employing its assets and resources in ways which build trust in the region.

Carrying out responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaty and cooperating with the Government of Panama in addressing issues linked to the companion Neutrality Treaty

The terms of the Panama Canal Treaty obligate the U.S. to transfer custody of the canal and all U.S. military installations in Panama by December 1999. Through detailed planning, U.S. Southern Command has established a turnover program that retains core mission capabilities within theater as close to the 1999 withdrawal time frame as possible. The companion Neutrality Treaty is of unlimited duration and gives both the U.S. and Panama the unilateral right to defend the Canal and keep it open to ships of all nations.

Fort Amador in Panama is now jointly controlled. The 193d Infantry Brigade, which had been the major U.S. Army tactical force in the Latin American region, was deactivated in October 1994. Only one infantry battalion remains after deactivation of the Brigade. The design of this phased withdrawal allows for continued support for counternarcotics programs, military deployments for training from the United States into the region, emergency evacuation of U.S. citizens within the region, and humanitarian and disaster relief assistance. In 1998, U.S. Southern Command Headquarters will relocate to Miami, a vital transportation, commercial and academic crossroads of the United States, the Caribbean and Latin America.

Working with our friends in the region to confront drug trafficking, combat terrorism, and support sustainable development

Counterdrugs

In accordance with the President's *National Drug Control Strategy*, DoD provides counterdrug support to regional military and police with counterdrug responsibilities. DoD, in coordination with the State Department, works with foreign counterdrug forces which have special monitoring, communications, detection and personnel assets.

DoD support falls into two categories:

Source Nation Support

In line with the *Drug Control Strategy* focus on source countries, DoD emphasizes support to Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, the primary source nations for cocaine cultivation and processing. Within the broader goals of strengthening democratic institutions and encouraging national resolve and regional cooperation, our support seeks to develop air sovereignty and "end game" (apprehension, arrest, and seizure) capabilities. All DoD activities in source-nations are carried out in cooperation with host governments and in coordination with the State Department. All training of host nation forces includes a human rights element.

Detecting and Monitoring Transport of Illegal Drugs

As the lead U.S. agency for the detection and monitoring of illicit drug smuggling into the United States, DoD operates a variety of radar, ships, aircraft and data collection assets to identify and hand off maritime and air smuggling targets to law enforcement agencies. The Department has focused its efforts on "tip off"-cued operations, the use of new technologies to achieve more cost-effective coverage, and flexible capabilities that can respond to changing drug threats.

DoD through the Joint Interagency Task Force East of the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) in Key West employs assets throughout the transit zone together with host nations of the Caribbean Basin to:

- detect and monitor aerial and maritime narcotrafficking platforms;
- support drug law enforcement agencies interdiction efforts;
- aid in the training of host-nation forces to maximize end-game seizures and arrests; and,
- facilitate cooperation among Caribbean nations to counter illegal production, transport and sale of drugs.

The July 1995 United Forces Riverine exercise sponsored by U.S. Southern Command indicates how some of our training exercises contribute to counter-drug goals. The scenario of this field exercise involving coastal and riverine units of Honduras, El Salvador, and Belize, stipulated a narcoguerrilla threat with strong emphasis on contraband smuggling. The threat requires joint, combined surveillance from host nation forces that conduct operations involving interdiction and board-and-search techniques. Human rights goals are integrated into the exercise by practicing legal board-and-search procedures and compliance with rules of engagement.

Counterdrug help sometimes takes the form of DoD planning support for bilateral operations between neighbor states. This was the case with combined, cross-border operations carried out between Colombia and Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, and Peru and Brazil, among others in recent years. U.S. Southern Command provided logistical and operational support in combined Panamanian-Colombian coca eradication operations in Panama in May 1994.

Anti-terrorism

DoD plays a supporting role to the State Department and other federal agencies in combating international terrorism. Of the $15 million appropriated for Anti-terrorism Assistance in FY94, about 19% went to meet training and related needs in Latin America and the Caribbean.

As the President's National Security Strategy indicates, countering terrorism requires close day-to-day coordination among Executive Branch agencies. The Departments of State, Justice and Defense, the FBI and CIA continue to cooperate closely in an ongoing effort against international terrorists.

The State Department has identified eight indigenous terrorist organizations in the region. All are guerrilla organizations as well and have engaged counterpart militaries in the region. DoD encourages cooperative efforts to counter cross-border terrorist organizations and offers the affected countries of the region the technical expertise of its personnel to help cope with the threat and phenomenon of terrorism.

Sustainable Development

The National Security Strategy highlights promoting sustainable development abroad as one of our national priorities. At the Summit of the Americas, the 34 leaders agreed on a series of steps to take to promote sustainable development throughout the hemisphere.

DoD does not have a lead role in promoting the related goals of economic integra-

tion, free trade, poverty alleviation, and environmentally sensitive development. Nonetheless, we must ensure that our efforts in support of military modernization in other countries do not inadvertently cause depletion of national resources needed for economic development.

At the Defense Ministerial of the Americas, delegates frequently drew attention to the need to reconcile more conventional defense requirements with broader security goals like economic development. This integrated vision of security in the 21st century is summed up by one of the six Williamsburg principles: "The development of our economic security profoundly affects our defense security and vice versa."

One concrete way in which DoD training can contribute is its E-IMET courses on defense resource management. These courses directly address the issue of maximizing scarce defense resources and offer our civilian and military counterparts the technical skills to balance defense needs with competing demands.

Expanding and deepening defense cooperation with other countries of the region in support of common objectives, encouraging them to improve capabilities for joint actions, including international peacekeeping

Strong, professional working ties with our counterparts in the region, at all levels, are a fundamental component of our regional security strategy of engagement. Whatever our policy objectives, we cannot hope to achieve success without the cooperation of our neighbors in the region.

The Defense Ministerial in Williamsburg provided a premier opportunity to strengthen and deepen ties at the highest levels. Secretary of Defense Perry met with Ministers of Defense and equivalents, Prime Ministers, and other cabinet-level ministers and delegation heads in a series of plenary, working group, and informal encounters over the three days of the Ministerial. A prime factor motivating Secretary Perry to take this initiative was precisely to afford him and his counterparts the opportunity to meet each other and develop personal, working relationships. The Defense Ministerial represents the start of a long-term process—what a delegate called "the Williamsburg process"—to forge closer working relationships between DoD and the Ministries of Defense throughout the region.

Joint exercises with militaries of the region, especially multinational exercises, are a very useful tool for developing capabilities for joint actions and deepening our cooperation.

The UNITAS naval exercise, the premier maritime event in the Western Hemisphere for the last 35 years, is the cornerstone of naval initiatives with Latin American and Caribbean navies. UNITAS 94, for example, comprised a series of nine joint-combined bilateral and multilateral field training exercises over half a year by naval,

U.S. and Chilean naval ships exercise together off the coast of Chile as part of the UNITAS exercises involving the U.S. and nine South American nations.

marine, air force and coast guard units from the United States and other maritime countries. In addition to participants from the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), units from NATO countries participated (Spain, France, and the Netherlands).

To further develop the growing interest of countries in the region in international peacekeeping, clearly manifested at the Defense Ministerial, U.S. military commanders have created joint and combined exercises specifically with peacekeeping scenarios in mind. The exercise scenario for United Forces CENTAM 95, for example, emphasizes civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, and maintaining the peace. Another peacekeeping exercise is scheduled for September 1995 in Argentina with participation from Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil.

Other vehicles which facilitate our cooperation and demonstrate our close ties include:

- *Counterpart Visit Programs*
  The Secretary of Defense, Service Secretaries, Chairman and Vice Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Service Chiefs conduct bilateral consultations with their respective counterparts through visits overseas and by hosting Latin American and Caribbean counterparts for visits to Washington. In 1995 alone, Secretary Perry has held bilateral meetings with Brazilian President Cardoso, Chilean MoD Perez Yoma, Mexican Secretary of National Defense General Cervantes, and Venezuelan MoD General Orozco.

Secretary Perry welcomes Argentine Minister of Defense Oscar Camilion to the first Bilateral Working Group session in February 1995.

- *Secretary of Defense Level Bilateral Working Groups*
  Secretarial-level Bilateral Working Groups, such as the one initiated in 1994 with Argentine MoD Camilion, facilitate bilateral defense relations between the U.S. and a small number of allied governments with which there is a broad, active relationship.

- *Military Service Staff Talks*
  These talks, like that between the U.S. and Brazilian Armies, typically last 4-5 days and occur annually. Staff talks are relatively structured in format and involve formal briefings on a variety of topics by both sides. Their major focus is on achieving tangible standardization and interoperability results in concepts, doctrine, and material.

- *Subject Matter Expert Exchanges*
  These are short visits usually by 3-4 experts who exchange information on a mutually agreed area. Service exchanges are relatively unstructured discussions to share the latest thinking on specific areas of doctrine, training, tactics, force structuring, military justice, and medical matters. Such exchanges are an excellent vehicle for meaningful sharing of information with no formal commitments at a relatively low cost. The U.S. Army held exchanges in FY94 with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The U.S. Air Force held exchanges in FY94 with Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Paraguay.

- *Personnel Exchange Program*
  This is a reciprocal exchange of personnel between U.S. and foreign military units designed to develop closer relationships. The U.S. Army has a total of 16 personnel exchanges in Latin America. Exchanges exist with Brazil, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. The Air Force conducts nine active personnel exchanges with Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

The Eastern Caribbean Regional Security System (RSS)

- The RSS was formed in 1982 and includes the seven small English-speaking Caribbean states: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines.
- These countries contribute to a coalition of forces originally established to combat local insurrections. Recently, the operational emphasis of the RSS has shifted to counterdrug operations, internal security and disaster relief. U.S. support includes training, material and transport.
- The RSS assists member and non-member nations. In 1994, RSS troops deployed twice to St. Kitts and Nevis to restore peace following election violence and a prison break out. RSS units provided disaster relief to Martinique following hurricane Hugo. They were also employed in Trinidad and Tobago after a coup attempt.
- The RSS has emerged as a focal point for mutual security issues and has expanded its influence throughout the Caribbean community. Non-RSS countries (Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Belize) contribute to RSS discussions on common training objectives, regional training centers and cooperative disaster relief.

- *U.S. Service Academy Exchange Programs*
  These are cadet/midshipmen exchanges by each of the three Service Academies. An instructor and several students visit a Latin American country for a week and cadets/midshipmen from that country visit the sponsoring U.S. Service Academy.

None of these program vehicles is new, but all have acquired added emphasis as we seek to engage our counterparts in the region cooperatively. The same is true of the various Service Conferences, including the Conference of American Armies (CAA), the System of Cooperation of American Air Forces (SICOFAA), the Inter-American Naval Conference, International Seapower Symposium, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) and its Inter-American Defense College (IADC), and the Joint Mexican-United States Defense Commission.

Preventing humanitarian crises from reaching catastrophic proportions

The role of the United States and DoD in migration emergencies prompted by events in Haiti and Cuba is well known. Operations SEA SIGNAL, ABLE VIGIL, and SAFE HAVEN responded to the upsurge of Haitians and Cubans attempting passage over often treacherous waters to the United States, transporting and housing many in facilities run by our Services. DoD and the Armed Forces stand ready to support U.S. policy and help to prevent humanitarian emergencies from reaching catastrophic proportions.

Less widely known are the various forms of humanitarian assistance DoD facilitates to the region. These include:

- *Humanitarian Civic Assistance*
  U.S. military units perform humanitarian projects while deployed overseas for training, readiness exercises, or operations. Both U.S. Southern Command and Atlantic Command carry out such projects through Engineer or Medical Readiness and Training exercises. Of the 45 country projects undertaken worldwide in FY94, nearly half occurred in Latin America (14 projects) and the Caribbean (7 projects). Projects typically included water-well drilling, construction of basic sanitation facilities, rudimentary construction and repair of school and medical facilities, and medical, dental and veterinary care to remote areas. It is important to note that these are collateral humanitarian benefits to host countries, derived from programs whose principal purpose is to train U.S. military personnel.

- *Transportation of Humanitarian Assistance*
  Under the Denton Amendment, DoD transports donated supplies from non-governmental and private volunteer organizations intended for humanitarian assistance purposes. This transportation is authorized without charge to the donor but on a space-available basis.

- *Excess Non-Lethal Defense Supplies*
  DoD makes non-lethal excess supplies available for humanitarian relief purposes and in support of the Humanitarian Civic Assistance program. Military or paramilitary end use of any such defense materials is prohibited. Countries receiving deliveries of DoD excess property in 1994 were Belize, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Peru.

Humanitarian and cooperative engagement objectives are both prominent in U.S. support for the OAS/IADB Demining Initiative in Central America.

Over the past several years, DoD has provided training support to humanitarian demining activities coordinated through the IADB. Under the program, U.S. demining training experts train cadres of military personnel from around the region assembled by the IADB staff. These trained personnel then become instructors for personnel from host-country militaries who then carry out the demining operations in their countries. To date, this training has supported OAS programs in Nicaragua, Honduras, and Costa Rica.

Disaster relief is a major concern throughout a region subject to frequent hurricanes, floods, and volcanic eruptions. The militaries in a number of countries of the region are charged to support or lead efforts to deal with such humanitarian emergencies. While governments evaluate what role their militaries should play in such circumstances, DoD offers constructive measures for facilitating disaster relief efforts often through multilateral channels which also serve the objective of cooperative security.

The Engineering and Medical Readiness Exercises mentioned above have evident application to disaster relief. Interoperability is enhanced whenever relief operations involve several armed services in a country or the militaries of two or more countries. In a multilateral forum like the IADB, the United States promotes cooperation in disaster relief planning and conferences that facilitate information-sharing on common approaches to disaster relief.

Encouraging efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and associated delivery systems as well as other arms control initiatives of common benefit

Long-standing commitment to arms control by countries in the region paves the way for U.S. cooperation in nonproliferation and other arms control measures. In addition to supporting global agreements like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have undertaken arms control agreements and commitments of their own of regional scope, fully within the spirit of global instruments. Among these are:

- **Treaty of Tlatelolco (1968)**
  Also known as the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, its parties agree not to acquire, manufacture, test, use, or station a nuclear explosive device. It has been signed by all 33 states of the region, and is in force for 29.

- **Treaty of Ayacucho (1974)**
  Eight Latin American governments pledged to stop acquiring arms for offensive purposes.

- **Mendoza Declaration (1991)**
  Argentina, Brazil, and Chile committed to halt development, production, or purchase of biological and chemical weapons.

- **Cartagena Declaration (1991)**
  The Andean states declared support for transforming Latin America and the Caribbean into an area free of weapons of mass destruction.

Working through the OAS, the countries of the Americas have supported regional and global arms control efforts and have established an OAS Permanent Committee on Hemispheric Security, which will pursue these goals.

Efforts on confidence- and security-building measures work hand-in-hand with arms control objectives. Greater international confidence and trust reduces the impetus to acquire arms. Reducing levels of armament, in turn, helps to build confidence and trust.

The opportunity to build upon a record of accomplishment and commitment does not imply the lack of challenges. There is much to be done on the arms control agenda and difficult issues remain.

The debate on indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty revealed concerns by countries in the region about the asymmetry of nonproliferation regimes which impact differently on nuclear and nonnuclear-arms states. The strong record of the United States in pressing forward with strategic arms reductions did much to allay concerns. When it finally came time for decision, indefinite extension of NPT won strong support in the region.

Delegates to the Defense Ministerial of the Americas view an F-15 fly-by at Langley Air Force Base, July 24, 1995.

A major item on the nonproliferation agenda is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Created in 1987, it is a voluntary arrangement which seeks to limit the spread of missiles and related technology. MTCR works through common export policy guidelines applied through national legislation to a list of controlled items. Participating states number 25, including Argentina, Canada, and the United States. US policy favors the prudent expansion of MTCR membership to include additional countries that are significant suppliers of missile technology and subscribe to international nonproliferation standards, enforce effective export controls, and abandon offensive missile programs.

Dual-use technology, i.e., technology with both peaceful and military applications, is of major concern. The technology used in civilian space launch vehicles resembles that used in ballistic missiles, for example. Advancing the goals of the MTCR with the region requires not only a general commitment to those goals, but perspicacity and will to find ways to reconcile arms control objectives with shared goals of technological development and cooperation, free trade, and scientific advancement.

Looking Ahead to the 21st Century

Just ten years ago, a *tour d'horizon* of the hemisphere would have given at best a mixed picture. Fratricidal wars raged in Central America. Countries labored under a heavy international debt burden. Statist models of economic development were the norm. Many markets were effectively closed to U.S. exporters by high tariffs and nontariff import controls. Bipolar conflict formed much of our optic for viewing security issues. Authoritarian governments with attendant human rights problems continued to rule in many countries, though a trend toward democratic elections was underway. Cuba was a conduit for supply of arms from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Block states to antidemocratic revolutionary movements in the region. The OAS was virtually moribund, a locus of dead-end North-South debates.

Now, just five years short of a new century and a new millennium, there is much to underpin hopes for coming years. Democracy has become the norm in the region as market-based economic principles and practice have become the rule. A commitment to regional institutions and a cooperative approach to problems in the Americas is reflected in a revitalized OAS. Civil war in Central America has subsided. Only one authoritarian government remains and the end of the Cold War has left it weak and struggling for survival. Cooperation on transnational problems like the environment and drug trafficking has displaced the North-South recrimination such issues often provoked earlier. It has become possible for the region to make an increasingly important contribution to global peace and security, even as it addresses the challenges and opportunities of cooperative security for the Americas.

All of this is good news for the United States. Our security is ever more closely tied to that of our neighbors in the region even as conventional threats and conflicts appear to recede. The progress of our neighbors redounds to the benefit of our people while setbacks have adverse consequences for us. We are united as never before by a consensus on fundamental values and a growing communality of interests.

The resurgence of democracy in the Americas made possible the Summit of the Americas in December 1994. The "Spirit of Miami," site of the Summit, reflects a common commitment to expanded opportunities for our peoples fueled by the effort to achieve hemisphere-wide free trade by 2005.

The Americas have not eliminated conflict. Old security problems persist and new ones have arisen. Transnational phenomena pose new risks and nonstate actors have emerged on the scene as threats to security. New strategic realities require new strategic thinking.

The Defense Ministerial of the Americas in Williamsburg embodied a simple concept: to bring the defense leaders of the region together to discuss common concerns. With this basic objective, the ministers who gathered in Williamsburg addressed a complex and ambitious agenda of issues. Preparations were conducted in close consultation with all governments in the region, so that the agenda reflected the primary issues we all face. The content, range, and

tone of the discussions suggest that there are grounds for optimism regarding prospects for regional security into the next century. To be sure, there were differences. But while no one professed to have all the answers to the many problems we face in the hemisphere, there was a convergence of views on fundamentals and a willingness to approach issues cooperatively.

The six Principles of Williamsburg attest to the agreement on basics, as the commitment to the "Williamsburg process" evinces a spirit to work together on issues of mutual concern. These developments bode well for all. And it suggests that our *National Security Strategy*, with its thrust of engagement, promoting democracy and seeking prosperity through free trade and open markets fits well with the outlook of our neighbors in the region.

This regional strategy, which takes its direction from the *National Security Strategy*, finds resonance and reinforcement in the views expressed in Williamsburg. It necessarily begins with a view of our national interests in the region and gives emphasis to those instruments of policy closest at hand, our own. However, it is evident that our deepest interests are closely intertwined with those of our neighbors.

The United States has never had to concern itself with the threat of invasion from a country in the hemisphere. Except for the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, no country in the region has been part of a strategic nuclear threat to our territory and people. With the resurgence of democracy in the Americas and the end of the Cold War globally, the outlook for security in the region is much improved—certainly to the extent that bipolar conflict has ended and authoritarian regimes, with one exception, are gone from the regional scene.

The challenge in coming years will be to: resolve residual issues; strengthen democracy; address transnational phenomena which undermine stability in the region; build the habits and instruments of cooperation so as to prevent conflicts from arising; and make a regional contribution to global peace and security.

We know from recent operations—particularly missions other than war—that U.S. Armed Forces are able to work effectively with the militaries and security organizations of other countries in the region. If the fundamental, positive trends in the region continue to hold, however, the need to take emergency measures should diminish. The task of our regional strategy is precisely to use our defense and military assets in peacetime engagement to avoid and prevent crises.

Security in the 21st century will be less and less "compartmentalized." Security is a shared goal of the United States and its neighbors in the Americas. Among the agencies of our government, it is a shared responsibility, all the more so as security comes to extend more and more beyond defense.

Political and economic trends augur well for the future. By investing in ongoing engagement with our neighbors, we can prevent crises, enhance security, and maximize the utility of our military and defense assets.

What the *National Security Strategy* says of the world can be said with validity of the region: in a more integrated and inter-dependent region, we simply cannot be successful in advancing our interests—political, security, and economic—without active engagement in regional affairs.

At the Defense Ministerial of the Americas in July 1995, Vice President Gore linked the "Spirit of Miami" to what could be called the "Promise of Williamsburg." Delegates from the Bahamas, El Salvador, and Argentina spoke of the "Williamsburg Process" and the "Williamsburg Principles" as embodying a shared commitment to continued dialogue on the fundamentals of peace and security. What they said of the Ministerial applies to our regional strategy: it seeks to advance the hemispheric commitment in Miami and Williamsburg to democracy, economic progress and sustainable development, harnessing the full participation of all of the institutions of the countries of the region, not least of all the militaries, recognizing that security issues are part of the new dynamic of relations in the region.