

**COLOMBIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS:
THE TENTACLES OF INSTABILITY**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	i
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. COLOMBIAN ARMED IRREGULARS IN BORDER COUNTRIES	2
B. GUNS AND DRUGS	3
C. COLOMBIAN REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS	4
D. DISTRUST AND A LACK OF COOPERATION	5
II. REGIONAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT....	7
A. ECUADOR.....	7
B. VENEZUELA	12
C. PANAMA	16
D. PERU.....	19
E. BRAZIL	21
III. CONCLUSION	26
APPENDICES	
A. MAP OF COLOMBIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS	30
B. COLOMBIAN REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS.....	31
C. GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	32
D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP	33
E. ICG REPORTS AND BRIEFING PAPERS.....	34
F. ICG BOARD MEMBERS	39



COLOMBIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS: THE TENTACLES OF INSTABILITY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While the Colombian armed conflict has deep roots in history, increasingly it is fuelled by the inflow of weapons, explosives and chemical precursors and financed by an outflow of drugs. The tentacles of instability criss-cross the 9000 kilometres of land and water that separate Colombia from and link it to its five neighbours, Ecuador, Peru, Brazil, Venezuela and Panama. Those borders are largely uncontrolled, and the Colombian government has stepped up its demands for fuller regional cooperation. The neighbours are greatly reluctant, partly because of internal crises and partly because of their view of the conflict. Yet, Colombia needs more help from them to make progress in ending that conflict, while peace in Colombia would give them a better chance to solve their own serious domestic problems.

The first months of 2003 witnessed a marked surge in violence. The FARC tried to assassinate President Álvaro Uribe, a paramilitary unit made a foray across the border into Panama, and both the FARC and ELN have made a determined effort to counter the upgrading of the Colombian military, assisted by the U.S., to protect the major oil pipeline that runs through the provinces bordering Venezuela. The killing of two crew members after a U.S. spotter plane crash-landed while under FARC gunfire, and the kidnapping by the insurgents of the three American survivors raised the level of U.S. military involvement, at least in rescue operations, as well as the intensity of the hemisphere's focus on the conflict.

President Uribe challenged his neighbours to formally declare FARC a terrorist organisation and give substantive intelligence, counter-drug and counter-insurgency support. Although he received encouraging resolutions from a Central American presidential summit, the OAS Permanent Council

and the United Nations Security Council, only Panama fully met the request on FARC, and overall there is insufficient new concrete cooperation.

Relations between Colombia and the Chávez government in Venezuela have been strained for some time by the latter's at least tacit tolerance of the insurgents, who move nearly freely on either side of the Venezuelan border, and the significant flow of drugs through that country. Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama each feel vulnerable to the impact of their neighbour's internal conflict, not least because their exposed border areas are poor and structurally underdeveloped. They blame Colombia for not doing enough to contain the conflict and subjecting them to incursions of irregular armed groups and drug and arms traffickers, as well as refugees. While Peru and Brazil are confident they can manage any direct spillover, largely because of forbidding geography, they worry about drug trafficking and the side effects of Colombian and U.S. counter-drug policy. Peru's apprehension relates to a sudden rise in coca cultivation that may be negating Colombia's recent eradication gains. Brazil knows that the rising crime and drug problem in its main cities has direct links to Colombia but the new government is still reviewing its policy and is clearly uncomfortable with Washington's Plan Colombia approach.

The reactions of Colombia's neighbours depend substantially on their own domestic political dynamics. All five have deep economic and social problems. Brazil and Ecuador inaugurated new presidents early in 2003 and are still edging into their policies toward Colombia. Venezuela's Chávez withstood a crippling two-month general strike but the survival of his government and the stability of the country are far from assured. Peru's President Alejandro Toledo has seen his approval

rating plummet, and his signature political reform project endangered. Colombia's conflict presents Panama with a serious security threat.

This report examines the armed conflict's impact on Colombia's neighbours. Nothing has altered Colombia's basic responsibility to manage the conflict. It needs to move toward a negotiated solution by pursuing a broad, integrated security strategy that combines strengthening the security forces while respecting human rights, extending the rule of law, and implementing credible political and economic reforms. But more effective regional security cooperation, an end to mutual recriminations, and establishment of a political consensus would do much to help the Uribe administration. Operationally, Colombia and its neighbours should give priority to enhanced joint border control and development, more effective intelligence sharing and judicial cooperation, confidence building between the military and police and more concerted action against drugs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Colombia:

1. Give high priority to establishing or strengthening state security and law enforcement, with full respect for human rights, new social and economic development and environmental protection programs in the border provinces, as part of a new comprehensive rural development strategy.
2. Pursue within the framework of the Andean community, but including Brazil and Panama, a joint security strategy to block illegal armed groups and drug traffickers from moving freely across the region's borders.
3. Deny sanctuary and refuge to illegal armed groups by developing real-time systems for exchange of operational information with neighbours and joint military and law enforcement planning.
4. Request the UN, OAS, and the international financial institutions to join the Andean community, along with Panama and Brazil, in pursuing plans and projects for both short and long term border protection, conservation and development, depending on the characteristics of each border.
5. Review intelligence, planning, communications and transport with its neighbours and international supporters, including the The United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNDCP) and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD), to produce a more effective border surveillance system, and conduct a new regional review of overall counternarcotics policy, seeking common approaches where possible and mutual understanding of differences on eradication, interdiction, law enforcement and alternative development.
6. Give priority to re-establishing local government and courts with adequate security in combination with local community infrastructure and economic development projects, especially in border municipalities from which authorities have fled.

To the United Nations:

7. Work with other international organizations, including the OAS, the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank and bilateral donors and join with the Andean Community and with Brazil and Panama in comprehensive short and long term planning for Colombia's borders, including:
 - (a) security, economic and municipal development; and
 - (b) conservation of rain forest, bilateral watershed management and protection of other environmentally vulnerable natural resource areas, where appropriate.
8. Insure continuing counsel and protection for refugees forced to flee across Colombia's borders and plan, together with the governments of the region, for their safe and rapid repatriation and resettlement in Colombia.
9. Explore innovative avenues for enhancing support from Andean neighbours for the ongoing efforts at humanitarian and ceasefire accords.

To the Members of the Andean Community, Brazil and Panama:

10. Ratify the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism and adopt implementing legislation particularly with respect to money laundering

and cooperation on border controls and among law enforcement authorities.

11. Expand armed forces and border police cooperation to enable real-time operational responses to Colombian requests to block illegal armed groups from obtaining sanctuary.
12. Develop with the OAS specialized entities bilateral and multilateral plans of action to increase capacity to prevent the flow of illegal drugs and arms across borders.
13. With UN and OAS assistance and the support of the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, design short-term programs to strengthen the economy, municipalities, and resource conservation, as well as comprehensive longer-term rural development strategies.
14. Treat the FARC, AUC and ELN as terrorist organizations until such time as they enter into humanitarian and ceasefire accords and halt their criminal actions.

To the International Community:

15. Donor governments, including the U.S. through its Andean Counterdrug Initiative, the EU, international organisations and international financial institutions, should:
 - (a) increase substantially and better coordinate aid to Colombian NGO and government alternative development, community economic and social development, and rule of law projects; and
 - (b) help Colombia and other Andean countries design longer-term rural development strategies directed at poverty reduction and provide resources to help implement those strategies.
16. The U.S. should, through its Andean Counter Drug Initiative and in conjunction with other countries providing security cooperation, give financing and technical assistance and share intelligence to improve border surveillance and police mechanisms and offer joint training to the armed forces and police deployed by Colombia's neighbours to the border.
17. The EU and its member states, the U.S., Canada, and the international financial institutions should increase support to Andean region border programs with the multi-purpose objectives of promoting security, denying

sanctuary to illegal armed groups, severing cross-border illegal drugs and arms trade routes and pursuing sustainable development.

18. Countries that manufacture precursor chemicals should explore additional measures to regulate end use, including by enhancing information sharing with Colombia and its Andean neighbours, Brazil and Panama, and, in coordination with appropriate UN and OAS entities, should provide additional training to national customs and border police.

Bogotá/Brussels, 8 April 2003



COLOMBIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS: THE TENTACLES OF INSTABILITY

I. INTRODUCTION

Colombia, immersed in a long internal armed conflict fuelled by an immense illegal drug industry, wants more political, law enforcement and military support from its neighbours. Historically, its borders have been porous, poorly patrolled, and politically neglected. The government's increased military pressure on the guerrillas has produced a violent backlash in cities, including those in the newly created Rehabilitation and Consolidation Zones (RCZs), without establishing firmer control of the borders.¹ Now, not only do its neighbours fear the spreading instability inherent in the unabated violence of the conflict, but they also face internal conditions that threaten their own stability. To differing degrees, all of Colombia's five neighbours have imminent political and economic crises.

- Since the end of 2001, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela has been confronted by opponents of his erratic style with mass demonstrations and strikes, even a coup d'état that led to his temporary ouster. It will take years for the country to recover from the economic damage. His political fate remains uncertain as the opposition is determined to find a mechanism for an early end to his administration.
- On 24 October 2002, Lucio Gutiérrez, a retired colonel who participated in the 2000 revolt that brought down the democratically elected president, Jamil Mahuad, was elected president of Ecuador. In six years Ecuador has had two

civilian-military coups (February 1997 and January 2000), two interim governments and a new constitution (1998). Gutiérrez faces strong opposition in parliament as well as from powerful economic sectors and has to cope with an extremely difficult economic and social situation.

- Alejandro Toledo's government in Peru, while democratically elected in June 2001, has had difficulty in stabilising the country after the spectacular demise of the corrupt and autocratic Fujimori regime in 2000. After a year, his approval rating had dropped to 14 per cent and, although recovering somewhat, is still under 30 per cent. His administration is entangled in a large project of territorial and political decentralisation at the same time as it faces a worrisome revival of coca cultivation that appears to be a direct result of the eradication campaign in Colombia.
- On 6 October 2002, Brazil, Colombia's largest if most distant neighbour, elected Luíz Inácio "Lula" da Silva president. The former metal worker and leader of the socialist Workers' Party (PT) is the first declared leftist head of state since Brazil's return to democracy in 1985. Contrary to expectations, international markets have reacted positively, and he has shown himself deft at claiming a greater regional role for Brazil. Nevertheless, observers worry about Brazil's precarious financial and macroeconomic situation if he tilts toward redistributive policies to help the poor – and the risk of unrest if he does not.
- Since abolition of the army, withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Canal Zone and serious economic crises, Panama is increasingly faced with internal insecurity and external vulnerability. Incursions by irregular armed groups from Colombia and large-scale arms

¹ The RCZs, three of which have been created so far, form a core part of the Uribe administration's "democratic security policy". Among their main features are enhanced military presence and the empowerment of military officers, who act as governors and mayors, to control the carrying of weapons and the movement of people and vehicles.

and drugs trafficking across the eastern border have become a primary security concern for the Moscoso administration.

These regional dynamics, particularly evident in Venezuela, are an additional challenge for the Uribe administration as it copes with civil conflict, drugs, unemployment and poverty. Since its inauguration on 7 August 2002, it has moved fast to carry out a “democratic security policy” adding men, money and new security mechanisms – but without fully satisfying continuing human rights concerns;² tax, labour and pension reforms; intensified aerial spraying of illicit crops; and preparations for a “referendum against corruption and political chicanery”.³ It has also called on the international community, in particular Colombia’s neighbours, to do more in the struggle against the irregular armed groups and drugs. Minister of Defence Martha Lucía Ramírez has continuously stressed the need for more Andean cooperation in border control and intelligence sharing. The 7 February 2003 bomb attack on the exclusive El Nopal club in Bogotá, a thwarted presidential assassination, the recent crash of two U.S. financed spotter planes and the resultant kidnapping of three Americans by the FARC have heightened concerns.⁴

President Uribe proposed a high level meeting of the member states of the Community of Andean Nations (CAN), Brazil and Panama to discuss regional security issues prior to the May hemispheric security summit in Mexico that was held on 12 March 2003 in Bogotá with the U.S. and EU as observers. A resolution reaffirmed support for OAS and UN resolutions condemning terrorism and drug trafficking and pledged cooperation with Colombia in general terms. Little concrete action was disclosed, and success depends on the specific follow-up.⁵ President Uribe also wrote directly to the neighbouring presidents asking for more help against the irregular armed groups and drugs.⁶

A. COLOMBIAN ARMED IRREGULARS IN BORDER COUNTRIES

Colombia’s frontiers have been little more than lines on a map due to geography, a lack of political will and limited governmental capacity. The country’s border guards, their equipment and infrastructure are totally inadequate to police over 6,000 kilometres of land borders with five states ranging through rainforests, mountains and deserts, more than 3,000 kilometres of Caribbean Sea and Pacific Ocean

² The advance edited version of the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the 59th session of the Commission on Human Rights, (E/CN.4/2003/13) relates, with regard to Colombia, “a significant increase in reports of violations attributed directly to members of the Security Forces, as compared to 2001. Several of these acts were committed pursuant to the new Government’s security policy and in particular to enforce the norms adopted under the state of public unrest declared in August. Some were carried out with the participation or authorisation of members of the Office of the Attorney-General”.

³ For a discussion of Uribe administration policies, see ICG Latin America briefing, *Colombia: Will Uribe’s Honeymoon Last?*, 19 December 2002.

⁴ On 7 February, a car bomb was detonated in the inside parking lot of the El Nopal social club in Bogotá, killing 36 people, including six children, and injuring more than 150. Although no group has claimed responsibility, the government said the blast was the work of the FARC. El Nopal was a multi-story complex of bars, restaurants and recreational facilities. Political and business leaders frequented the club; several embassies are close by. Prior to taking office, Minister of the Interior Fernando Londoño had served as El Nopal’s president. On 14 February a second explosion rocked the southern Colombian city of Neiva when local authorities searched a house for explosives. Seventeen people were killed, more than 30 were hurt and numerous houses were destroyed.

Investigators said the detonation was caused by remote control and its intended objective was President Uribe, scheduled to visit the city one day later. On 13 February, three Americans were kidnapped and one was killed along with a Colombian by the FARC after their plane crash-landed in a jungle area in the department of Caquetá. In March, a second plane crashed in Caquetá. The three Americans on board were killed. The kidnapped persons have been identified by officials in Washington as contractors paid for by the Defense Department. Some 2,000 Colombian troops have searched a swath of southern Colombia, along with American rescue experts equipped with high-tech radio gear and guided by reconnaissance aircraft. So far, there is no trace of the three Americans who are believed to have been taken by their captors to a location far from the site of the crash. U.S. President Bush announced the sending of an additional 150 American military to Colombia to participate in the search and rescue operation. For this rescue mission, the additional troops do not count against the ceiling set by Congress (400). A broad political spectrum in Colombia has warned about an increased U.S. military presence. According to the constitution, the president must seek approval of the Senate or the State Council prior to the arrival of foreign troops.

⁵ “Declaración de Cancilleres y Ministros de Defensa Andinos”, Bogotá, 12 March 2003. CNE. <http://www.presidencia.gov.co/documentos/framdoc.htm>

⁶ See <http://www.presidencia.gov.co/cne/2003/febrero/febrero.htm>

coastline and an extensive network of waterways.⁷ Historically, that mixture of factors, combined with petty corruption, has made it easy for irregular armed groups, drug traffickers, arms dealers and smugglers of all kinds to move in and out of Colombia almost at will. Irregular armed groups use the territory of neighbouring states as sanctuary and as a base for criminal trafficking of drugs and arms. They also engage in combat with their adversaries and harass, abduct and, at times, kill civilians outside of Colombia. For example, in January 2003 paramilitaries attacked two villages in Panama, killing three Panamanians and abducting three U.S. journalists. In April 2002, three FARC camps used as safe havens and as bases for cross border attacks were discovered in Venezuela,⁸ the one country where a clear ideological factor has partly explained an apparent willingness often to ignore the insurgents.⁹ The FARC kidnap and extort Venezuelan farmers, and Colombian and Venezuelan paramilitary forces have begun to operate jointly in that country. The FARC is also intermittently present in Ecuador and Panama. Recent press reports indicate that authorities are even investigating FARC safe houses in Brazil.¹⁰

B. GUNS AND DRUGS

Drug trafficking and gun running go hand in hand in Colombia. As the guerrillas and paramilitaries increase their stakes in narcotics, their capacity to buy weapons and ammunition on the international black market expands. These criminal activities share the same transport infrastructure and strategic corridors.¹¹ A transaction network of weapons for drugs and vice-versa has developed in which prices are calculated not in cash but in kilos of cocaine or heroin.¹² Bordering countries are also involved in the

smuggling of weapons into Colombia, not least because the complicity of corrupt local authorities is often a necessary condition in this business. As with drugs, weapons enter at various points along the border, often in small quantities not easily detected. However, since 1999 at least 20,000 AK-47 assault rifles have reportedly been smuggled to guerrilla and paramilitary groups.¹³ Although the AK-47 is the most commonly smuggled weapon, police have also seized grenades, rifle grenade launchers and sub-machine guns that could only have been provided by foreign suppliers. The sources include the remnants of Cold War stocks in the former Soviet Bloc and Central America, but there is growing evidence that much, particularly ammunition, comes from neighbouring countries.¹⁴

The production and trafficking of drugs is a transnational criminal activity that involves most of the region's countries in at least one stage of production, distribution or money laundering. All Colombia's borders are used, not only to smuggle out purified cocaine, heroine and marijuana, but also to smuggle in cocaine base, a substantial amount of which actually originates in other parts of Colombia, and chemical precursors required for production.¹⁵ It is impossible to make an accurate estimate of the amounts but trends and primary routes can be identified based on seizures and intelligence. According to the National Directorate of Illicit Drugs (DNE), which coordinates Colombia's national drug policy, the preferred method for carrying cocaine from the country is by sea, either aboard cargo ships, hidden in fishing vessels or on speedboats, which are difficult to detect and can be refuelled en route. U.S. government sources confirm the maritime preference, even if some 65 per cent of cocaine actually enters

⁷ In comparison, the U.S.-Mexican border, which is considered very difficult to police, is 3,600 kilometres long.

⁸ "Linea caliente", in *Cambio*, 8-15 April 2002, pp. 28-29.

⁹ This might be changing since President Chávez's priority has become to survive a determined campaign to remove him from office before the end of his term. ICG interview, Washington, 14 February 2003.

¹⁰ <http://www.washtimes.com/world/20030304-7618764.htm>.

¹¹ See "Hemispheric Report – Evaluation of Progress in Drug Control 2001-2002, 30 January 2003, OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission, www.cicad.oas.org.

¹² For the illegal armed groups, this means that they are often forced to buy overpriced weapons with drugs that triple in value once on the U.S. or European markets. While an AK-47 assault rifle may cost U.S.\$100 in Nicaragua, by the time

it arrives in Colombia it is worth over U.S.\$1,000. *El Espectador*, "Alimento para diez mil fusiles", 10 February 2002.

¹³ *El Tiempo*, "Cuatro arsenales en 2 años", 8 May 2002, p.1/9.

¹⁴ A survey conducted by the Colombian authorities on the origin of weapons seized between 2000 and 2001 concluded that a large portion were either lost or stolen in Ecuador and Venezuela. Dirección Nacional de Estupeficientes, "La lucha de Colombia contra las drogas ilícitas: acciones y resultados 2001", Bogotá (March 2002), p. 91.

¹⁵ Cocaine base, also referred to as cocaine paste, is an extract of the leaves of the coca bush. Purification of cocaine base yields refined cocaine also known as Cocaine HCL. See http://www.undcp.org/odccp/report_1998-10-01_1_page007.html.

the U.S. overland from Mexico.¹⁶ Venezuela and Brazil also are transshipment points for significant quantities of finished product that ultimately winds up in Europe.¹⁷

Most chemicals needed to produce refined cocaine or heroine, such as gasoline, are used in legitimate industrial activities, making it difficult to identify the amounts and sources of what the illicit drug industry uses. Chemicals not available domestically are imported with legitimate licenses and then diverted. Exporting countries have a legal responsibility to ensure the end-use. The UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, to which Colombia and its neighbours are parties, lists sensitive chemicals the trade in which the parties have agreed to control. Similar commitments were made regionally in the Andean Cooperation Plan in the Fight against Illicit Drugs and Related Crimes. But legal loopholes and regulatory shortcomings remain.¹⁸ Smaller amounts of chemical precursors are also smuggled into Colombia from Brazil, Venezuela and Ecuador.¹⁹

C. COLOMBIAN REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS

The number of Colombians crossing the borders to seek protection has increased dramatically over the past two years, though not to the degree some neighbouring countries had feared.²⁰ While actual numbers are still marginal compared to internal displacement, the issue has to be addressed in its own right. To be sure, both situations follow similar patterns, but Colombians abroad face qualitatively different challenges. As with internal displacement, the main reasons cited by refugees for crossing the border are related to threats from the armed groups,

accusations of being “collaborators” of one group or another, massacres, forced recruitment and selective assassinations.²¹ A growing group of peasants who cross into Ecuador from the department of Putumayo state that they had to leave because of increased military pressure from the irregular armed groups, who are fighting for control of the coca plantations.²²

Only a fraction of Colombians crossing the border fit the strict legal definition of “refugees” as it is usually understood in the relevant UN convention. It would be more accurate to describe them as Colombians who seek refuge, temporary or permanent, from the direct impacts of the armed conflict, regardless of their eligibility for refugee status.²³ Assistance to all seeking protection is essential and should not depend on the official recognition of refugee status. In many cases Colombians who are fully entitled to refugee status do not want to be identified as such, since the risks of being identified as a refugee (particularly retaliation against family members who have remained or against them when they return home) usually outweigh the benefits available to them. International NGOs, such as Project Counselling Service (PCS), that monitor the borders estimate that, over the past two years, up to 100,000 Colombians have at some point sought a neighbouring country’s

¹⁶ ICG interview, Washington, 14 February 2003.

¹⁷ ICG interview, Washington, 27 February 2003.

¹⁸ United States Department of State/Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report”, March 2002, p. X-4.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. XI-15.

²⁰ For example, the number of people applying for refugee or asylum status in Ecuador, 99 per cent of whom are Colombian, increased nearly seven-fold between 2000 (1,752 people) and 2002 (10,958 people). Nonetheless, when Plan Colombia was announced, many neighboring countries expected an influx of several tens of thousands of Colombians. For further detail, see at Appendix B below, the chart prepared by the International Organisation of Migration from UNHCR data.

²¹ See for example, Codhes “Caracterización del desplazamiento y del refugio en la frontera colombo-ecuatoriana”, at www.codhes.org.co. For more information on internal displacement in Colombia see ICG Latin America Report N°1, *Colombia’s Elusive Quest for Peace*, 26 March 2002.

²² ICG interview, Bogotá, 19 November 2002. See also Codhes, “Caracterización del desplazamiento y del refugio en la frontera colombo-ecuatoriana”, at www.codhes.org.co

²³ For example, individuals who have not been threatened directly but are reacting to a general sense of insecurity, or peasants who leave their lands because of the effects of the aerial spraying of illicit crops and the military pressures of the armed groups that accompany this process. ICG interview, Bogotá, 19 November 2002. The International Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (in force 22 April 1954), covers any individual outside his own country because of a “well-founded fear of persecution for race, nationality, religion, social status, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” and does not specify who has produced that fear. In the Americas, the tradition of asylum is strong and refugee protections were incorporated into the American Convention on Human Rights (in force 18 July 1978), Article 22, paragraphs 8 and 9 of which bar deportation of individual aliens or groups, if their “right to life or personal freedom is in danger of being violated because of ...race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opinions.”

protection.²⁴ The official figures confirm that only a few have asked for or received refugee status. PCS estimates that almost 30,000 Colombians could have applied in Ecuador but only 1,671 did in the first nine months of 2002.²⁵

D. DISTRUST AND A LACK OF COOPERATION

Instead of addressing the important issue of more and better regional security cooperation, recurrent recriminations have been the order of the day. During the last four years, the Chávez administration's alleged support for the FARC has prompted Colombia to issue several sharp protests. The Venezuelan president's affinity with the FARC has also been heavily criticised by his domestic opponents, including parts of the armed forces. The governments of other bordering countries, such as Ecuador and Peru, have blamed Colombia for not doing enough to contain its armed conflict and prevent irregular armed groups and refugees from crossing the border. In August 2002, Ecuador imposed travel restrictions on Colombians and stepped up security along its northern border. Panama has been considering visa requirements for Colombians, arguing that its increase in domestic violence is related to its neighbour's armed conflict and drug industry.²⁶ While Brazil perceives the Amazon rain forest as a natural buffer, it is aware that the increasing drug and crime problem in its cities is directly related to Colombia's conflict. It has developed and partially installed the Amazon Surveillance and Protection System (SIVAM/SIPAM), which should eventually gather much data on movements, border violations, illegal air strips and drug crops in the vast forest regions along its western and northern borders, and recently offered its benefits to Colombia.²⁷

However, efforts to elaborate and implement a regional security policy geared at fostering

confidence, technical cooperation and the exchange of intelligence information between security forces as well as judicial systems have been limited. The Colombia-Venezuela dispute about the maritime border in the Gulf of Venezuela is still not formally resolved. Especially prior to 11 September 2001, Plan Colombia and U.S. counter-drug policy have been perceived by some, particularly Brazil, as "hegemonic" intervention and an obstacle to regional political and economic stability.

The latest reports from the U.S. State Department, Colombia, and the UN, show a net reduction in hectares under coca cultivation for the first time in more than a decade, following massive aerial spraying, particularly in southern Colombia since Uribe took office. In Putumayo and Caquetá, U.S./Colombian data indicate hectares under coca cultivation dropped from 80,000 to 40,000 between 2001 and 2002, mostly over the past six months. However, new cultivation in Vichada and Guaviare provinces somewhat reduced the overall impact. UN data released on 18 March 2003 shows an overall net reduction of some 30 per cent and an end of 2002 figure for land hectares under cultivation near 105,000 hectares.²⁸ Colombia's success concerns Peru and Bolivia, where coca cultivation has shown the first upswing in several years. Ecuador also is worried about the ecological, social and security impacts of U.S.-Colombian counter-drug policy in its northern provinces, where all groups filter back and forth across the border and major drug shipments pass through.

The expansion of Plan Colombia to embrace an Andean focus, in response to regional criticism and concerns about spillover, was reflected in the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), launched in 2001. It also was reflected in Congressional approval of the Bush administration's request for extension of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), reducing some trade barriers to the region's exports into the U.S. The Andean program directs funds not only to Colombia,

²⁴ ICG interview, Bogotá, 19 November 2002. See also *El Colombiano*, "Lucha Antiterrorista opaca el drama de los refugiados", 15 September 2002.

²⁵ *El Colombiano*, "Lucha Antiterrorista opaca el drama de los refugiados", 15 September 2002.

²⁶ This was a topic of discussion between Presidents Moscoso and Uribe during their December meeting in Bogotá. In order to show solidarity with Colombia, Panama does not require Colombians to obtain a visa. It does, however, require proof of a valid credit card and US\$1,000 in cash. ICG interview, Bogotá, 25 February 2003.

²⁷ ICG interview, Washington, 14 February 2003.

²⁸ http://www.unodc.org/pdf/colombia/report_2003-03-01_1.pdf. Earlier indications were that the net reduction figure was about 15 per cent and that Colombia retained 144,450 hectares under coca cultivation. See testimony of John P. Walters, Director of National Drug Control Strategy, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, "Overview of U.S. Policy Toward the Western Hemisphere," 27 February 2003. Peru is believed to have had a net increase of eight per cent and Bolivia, 20 per cent. Also see http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&u=/ap/20030228/ap_wo_en_po/na_gen_us_colombia_2.

but, in increased measure, to the other Andean countries, and Brazil and Panama as well.²⁹ The total funding approved by Congress for the counter drug aspects of ARI (renamed the Andean Counterdrug Initiative) for FY2003, is U.S.\$700 million.³⁰ Once again, other funds will come directly from the defence budget, with the largest single amount just under U.S.\$100 million to equip and train special Colombian units to protect the Caño Limón pipeline. Congress approved an administration request to erase the line between counter narcotics and counter terrorism, permitting all security-related aid to be directed at both guerrillas and paramilitaries whether or not linked directly to drug trafficking.³¹ The proposed budget for FY2004 essentially replicates the previous year's request.³²

²⁹ Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, "Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors," K. Larry Storrs and Nina M. Serafino; Report to the Congress, Order Code RL31383 12 June 2002. The Clinton administration had proposed to direct 67 per cent of Plan Colombia's U.S.\$1.3 billion funding to Colombia. Of that, 75 per cent was to establish three counter narcotics military battalions in southern Colombia, equipped with helicopters. They were intended to back up eradication efforts with armed pressure on guerrillas and paramilitary directly linked to drug trafficking operations. Those funds were complemented by support for alternative development, human rights and justice reform. The nearly U.S.\$1 billion ARI proposed by President Bush in 2001, though described as linked to "the three D's – democracy, development, and drugs" – also focused on counter narcotics and was heavily security oriented. The Bush administration described its purposes as designed to support democracy by providing technical and financial aid to judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, government and some NGO human rights groups and to the peace process; boost economic development through alternative economic development, environmental protection and renewal of ATPA; and significantly reduce the supply of illegal drugs to the U.S.

³⁰ Conference Report on H.J. Res. 2 the Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003, Title V. at <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/z?cp108:hr010>. The Bush administration had requested U.S.\$731 million.

³¹ Ibid. Congress maintained conditionality on human rights and insisted that the Colombian military cut ties with the paramilitaries. In addition, the Congress approved about U.S.\$100 million in child survival and development aid unrelated to the counter narcotics focus for the Andean countries. It also mandated that no less than U.S.\$250 million of the total funds be transferred directly to USAID to carry out the community, municipal and economic development and governance and alternative development programs.

³² President Bush's foreign assistance budget for FY2004, <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2004/>. For specific breakdown go to Account Tables, pp. 68-69. Once again there is a request for U.S.\$731 million for the Andean counter

Critics charge that the heavy security focus of the program and the support for counter-insurgency will result in greater violence and, almost unavoidably, suffering for the civilian population caught in the middle. They also assert that the program fails to address the growth of paramilitary forces, military-paramilitary ties and associated human rights abuses. Some of Colombia's neighbours have expressed reservations about the financial priority given to Colombia.³³ The government and the U.S. argue that Colombia's situation is more dire and that military aid is essential to combat illegal armed groups that threaten the state, its institutions and the people of Colombia. They also point to positive results from non-security aid.³⁴ But they likewise acknowledge the increasing pressures that have resulted along Colombia's borders.³⁵

narcotics part of ARI, which would finance the eradication, largely aerial spraying; interdiction, law enforcement, and alternative development, and another U.S.\$100 million requested for health and development funding unrelated to drugs and some U.S.\$110 million more in defence spending. The differences in the content of the counter drug activities in Colombia and its neighbours, which reflects the conflict in Colombia, is evident from the breakdown for the counter narcotics program proposed by the administration:

Country	Total	Eradication/ Interdiction	Alt.Devel./ Instit.Blding
Colombia	\$463 m.	\$313 m.	\$150 m.
Peru	\$116 m.	\$66 m.	\$50 m.
Bolivia	\$91 m.	\$49 m.	\$42 m.
Ecuador	\$35 m.	\$20 m.	\$15 m.
Brazil	\$12 m.		
Venezuela	\$5m.		
Panama	\$9 m.		

³³ Center for International Policy, "The 'War on Drugs' meets the 'War on Terror'", Ingrid Vaicius and Adam Isacson, February 2003.

³⁴ Op. cit. Hearing of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Testimony of Adolfo A. Franco, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, USAID and unpublished documents distributed at CSIS briefing on the Economic and Social aspects of aid to Colombia, 8 March 2003, citing among cumulative accomplishments of Plan Colombia aid over several years: 20,000 former coca-growing families of a total estimated at 120,000 to 150,000 benefited, 16,000 hectares of licit crops financed, 208 social infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, schools and potable water completed, 31 casas de justicia (justice houses) handling 1.5 million civil complaints, 600,000 internally displaced assisted, 2,543 journalists and others protected, 51 government and NGO human rights offices protected.

³⁵ Walters hearing testimony, op.cit.

Given this situation, Colombia's call for more regional security cooperation is justifiable. However, a new regional security policy should not be based on an assumption that Colombia's conflict and drug industry are the sole menace to Andean stability. The spillover scenario is real but is often identified as a one-sided flow from Colombia outward without addressing how actions in bordering countries affect Colombia or their own internal situations.³⁶

The presence of Colombia's irregular armed actors in the bordering countries is a fact. Nevertheless, none of these groups appear interested in, or capable of, extending its "revolutionary" or "counter-revolutionary" struggle across the region. Their presence mostly has logistical, economic and military-operational reasons.³⁷ They have managed for decades to prosper within the vast spaces of Colombia itself. But an almost inevitable consequence of improvement in Colombian security forces is that FARC and ELN units will more often seek short-term refuge across borders. Similar consequences are likely with the paramilitary AUC if counter narcotics operations begin to bite and if their demobilisation, which is currently being explored by a government commission, is delayed.³⁸ The political situations in Venezuela and Ecuador but also in Peru, Panama and, to a lesser extent, Brazil in turn make it difficult to build a successful strategy of regional security cooperation. In short, without greater stability in the neighbouring countries, the Uribe administration will find it hard to reduce substantially the negative impact of the Colombian conflict and obtain crucial regional support.

II. REGIONAL POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT

A. ECUADOR

There is a general perception in Ecuador of imminent and growing danger owing to the impact of its neighbour's armed conflict, not only in the border region with Colombia, which is tense, violent and riddled with crime and poverty, but also in other, more central regions of the country.³⁹

According to Ecuadorian military sources, there is evidence of activities by irregular armed groups from Colombia in regions far from the border, such as the Amazonian provinces Napo and Orellana, the provinces of Carchi (mountains) and Esmeraldas (coastal), and even in Imbabura and Pichincha, the province of the capital, Quito.⁴⁰ Academic and human rights organisations have confirmed cases of extortion and kidnappings in all the provinces bordering Colombia.⁴¹ These include kidnappings of technical personnel working on projects for foreign oil companies. Some perpetrators are delinquents who adopt a political cover, but there are also irregular armed groups that use these methods in order to acquire funds.

The AUC is in Sucumbios Province, especially adjacent to the bridge that crosses the San Miguel River. Paramilitary squads traffic in chemical precursors and weapons and have installed small laboratories for coca processing. According to Ecuadorian military intelligence sources, these groups have also established a presence in General Farfán and Cáscales and in the provincial capital, Nueva Loja. The FARC's 48th front operates in the extreme eastern quarter of Sucumbios but has not launched any military operations.⁴² In October 2002, two alleged FARC members were detained in Lago

³⁶ For a discussion focussed on the spillover, see Richard Millett, "Colombia's Conflicts: The Spill-Over Effects of a Wider War", The North-South Agenda, paper N°57 (Miami, September 2002).

³⁷ ICG interview, Bogotá, 13 November 2002.

³⁸ A forthcoming ICG report will discuss the paramilitaries in detail.

³⁹ Adrián Bonilla, "Implicaciones de la política de seguridad estadounidense para la región andina: el caso Ecuador", paper presented at the Conference: U.S. Security Policy Towards the Andean Region, San Diego State University, November 2002.

⁴⁰ ICG interview, Quito, November 2002.

⁴¹ ICG interview, Quito, November 2002; Observatorio Internacional por la Paz, *Testimonios de Frontera, Efectos del Plan Colombia en la frontera Colombo-Ecuatoriana*, (Quito, May 2002).

⁴² Research currently being conducted by anthropologists and sociologists have confirmed the presence of FARC guerrillas in the Ecuadorian Amazon.

Agrio, along with other Colombians, supposedly paramilitaries, just as violence appeared ready to escalate. Both the 32nd FARC front and the Colombian army are further towards the forest, along the mountainous Colombian side of the border. The ELN has a limited presence in the Colombian regions of Tumaco and Mataje and occasionally penetrates rural Ecuador in the province of Esmeraldas. The AUC is also present in the coastal region of Ecuador, as are minor FARC groups. As an indication of growing concern, Ecuador announced in early March 2003 the transfer of four additional planes to an air force security patrol based in Lago Agrio and deployed a new police anti-terrorism unit, apparently because it saw evidence of likely border skirmishes between the AUC, FARC and Colombian military.⁴³

Colombian and Ecuadorian insurgent groups had ties during the 1980s. Most notably, the Ecuadorian “Alfaro Vive Carajo” (AVC) maintained links with the M-19. Currently, no Ecuadorian radical group supports armed actors in Colombia. However, there are unconfirmed reports that in 2000 the authorities discovered the existence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Ecuador (FARE). Allegedly, this group is 400-men strong and has been trained and equipped by the FARC. It is held responsible for a recent bomb attack in Guayaquil.⁴⁴ While the ministry of defence believes that the FARE does not pose a security threat, the police view it as a problem.⁴⁵

Since the late 1980s, Ecuador has not initiated any anti-narcotics policies of its own but rather embraced regional U.S. initiatives, such as the 1990 Andean Strategy and the 2001 Andean Initiative. The explanation is that the country has not been involved in cultivation and processing of illicit drugs but essentially is a transit point for chemical precursors and cocaine and a location for money laundering. In 1998, Ecuador and the U.S. signed an agreement for transformation of the Manta air base into a U.S. Forward Operating Location. Up to 475 U.S. troops may be based at Manta for intelligence work and tracking airplanes and illicit crop plantations in the southeastern region of the Colombian Amazon grass lands. The U.S. Navy also received the right to

operate in Ecuadorian waters, although Ecuador wants to expand its navy to takeover more of those operations.

Ecuador's border is particularly vulnerable to drug and arms trafficking and related offences because it is adjacent to the Colombian departments of Putumayo and Nariño, home to 37 per cent of the total coca cultivation in the country. Furthermore, Putumayo, and increasingly Nariño, has been at the centre of the aerial crop-spraying eradication strategy of Plan Colombia, and paramilitaries and the FARC are fiercely disputing control of coca crops.⁴⁶ Cocaine base is smuggled into Ecuador from Putumayo on the eastern side of the Andes and transported back to Colombia via Nariño, west of the Andes, for refinement. Refined cocaine and heroine are smuggled into Ecuador for international distribution from the country's Pacific ports, such as Guayaquil and Esmeraldas.⁴⁷ Colombian military authorities claim that almost 50 per cent of the ammunition that enters Colombia is from Ecuador.⁴⁸

Given their disinclination to confront well-armed guerrilla groups, Ecuador's police and military in the northern region have reached a dangerous *modus vivendi* with the illegal armed groups, both guerrillas and paramilitary. They are not challenged when they stay for short periods on “rest and recuperation” or are fleeing Colombian armed forces but permanent camps are not permitted. As recently as late 2002, an Ecuadorian helicopter spotted a FARC camp with several hundred fighters along the northern border. By the time ground troops were sent, the FARC forces had fled, and the camp was then dismantled. Similarly, Ecuadorian forces have not seriously tried to halt the transit of coca leaf from southern Colombia through Ecuador and back into Nariño for processing or the finished product for export. But they appear determined to avoid the spread of cultivation and the even more frequent effort to establish processing plants in Ecuador near the Putumayo and Caqueta fields.⁴⁹

⁴³ “Ecuador steps up security along border with Colombia”, EFE News Services, 4 March 2002, Quito

⁴⁴ STRATFOR, “New Rebel Group in Ecuador Claims Ties to FARC”, 16 September 2002, at http://www.stratfor.com/standard/analysis_view.php ID

⁴⁵ “No hay guerrilla en el Ecuador”, in *El Comercio*, 25 September 2002.

⁴⁶ Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes, “La lucha de Colombia contra las drogas ilícitas: acciones y resultados 2001”, Bogotá (March 2002), p.11

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. IV-30

⁴⁸ The ammunition is allegedly transported in small quantities from the region of Esmeraldas, Ecuador into Colombian territory. *El Espectador*, “Desvían a FARC explosivos militares”, 10 February 2002.

⁴⁹ ICG interviews, U.S. and OAS officials, 10-14 February 2003.

Since the end of the previous decade and, particularly, since 11 September 2001 and the resulting change in U.S. security policy, alarm about a possible spillover of the Colombian conflict has had a strong impact on public opinion and the political elite as well as civil society and academics. In 1999, the Plan Colombia Monitoring Group was constituted by a number of NGOs working on human rights, refugees and biological investigation in the Amazon rain forest. This group has mobilised public opinion against U.S. policy, especially the air base at Manta. A report presented in October 2002, resulting from the work of a verification mission made up of diverse social organisations, concluded that Ecuador's side of the border had been fumigated with glyphosate. It alleged that the local population's health had been affected, and the fauna and flora had suffered undetermined damage from aerial spraying.⁵⁰ While this has not yet been substantiated scientifically, it alarms parts of Ecuadorian society⁵¹ – not least because Sucumbios Province, adjacent to the Putumayo River, is one of the most under-developed in the country, with a population historically linked to the Colombian side of a mostly permeable border. This, in turn, has fed apprehension about a massive influx of Colombian refugees as a result of an intensification of aerial spraying and drug-related violence. U.S. officials report that some 10 per cent of the “coca-farming” Putumayo population has left following the recent burst of concentrated spraying, but it is by no means clear where they have gone or what they are now doing.⁵²

Ecuador's migration policy has become more flexible as a result of the agreements on border development elaborated by the Colombian-Ecuadorian Border Commission, other accords that date back to 1989 and regional economic and political integration.⁵³ There are many Colombians in Ecuador, particularly in Sucumbios.⁵⁴ Since the Colombian side of the border is rich in coca, it is also at the centre of a territorial dispute between the paramilitaries and the

FARC. The civilian population, caught in the middle, is under pressure to flee to Ecuador.

There is consensus that of all Colombia's neighbours, Ecuador is the best prepared to receive and assist individuals who cross the border seeking protection and is most aware of the dynamics that cause these displacements. There is a legal framework to process applications, and authorities keep relatively current records. However, few Colombians have attempted to gain refugee status for fear of reprisals from the irregular armed groups as well as ill-treatment and forced deportation by Ecuador's police and army. In the first nine months of 2002, 1,671 Colombians applied for refugee status, of whom 719 (43 per cent) succeeded.⁵⁵ The system is overloaded with applications, which has caused serious delays in the asylum process. And in a country where most live in poverty, opportunities are limited and resources to assist the refugee population are scarce.

Although in August 2002 it was reported that army strength in Sucumbios would be increased to 12,000 men, it continues to be difficult to secure 630 kilometres of border. Ecuador's border guards and military operating along the frontier lack sufficient equipment and logistical capacity. Their work is made more difficult by the absence of a Colombian counterpart along large stretches.⁵⁶ The 1989 bilateral accord on creation of a Border Integration Zone and the 2000 accord on police cooperation are examples of the efforts made to remedy this situation.⁵⁷ However, results have been elusive, in good part owing to lack of resources but also of political commitment.

Estimates are that at least U.S.\$82 million is needed to establish even minimal control along the border and lay the foundations for wider development of the region. In 2002 the U.S. provided \$25 million for alternative development/interdiction. For 2003 it will give \$31 million – much intended for the northern border.⁵⁸ The omnibus bill passed in February 2003 contained a slight increase in U.S. grant funds, and the Bush administration seeks a still larger

⁵⁰ According to the report, about 2,560 hectares of various crops and 11,828 animals have been affected by fumigation. Informe Misión de Verificación, op. cit., p. 4, table 1c.

⁵¹ ICG interview, Bogotá, 5 February 2003.

⁵² Walters hearing testimony, op. cit.

⁵³ Such as the bi-national accord on the creation of a Border Integration Zone, signed in 1989.

⁵⁴ There is no official data on the number of Colombians living in Ecuador. Some estimates are up to 300,000. See Freddy Rivera, *Informe sobre desplazados y refugiados colombianos en el Ecuador*, FLACSO-ACNUR (Quito, 2003).

⁵⁵ PCS Statistics show that 1,800 Colombians have received refugee status. *El Colombiano*, “Lucha Antiterrorista opaca el drama de los refugiados”, 15 September 2002.

⁵⁶ ICG interview, Bogotá, 5 February 2003.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ CRS Report for Congress, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY 2002 Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbours (Washington, 12 June 2002).

contribution in FY 2004,⁵⁹ some \$35 million for counter narcotics, of which about \$15 million would be for alternative development. It also proposes \$15 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and \$24 million for justice reform and economic and social development.⁶⁰

Despite the border security problems, the Colombian and Ecuadorian foreign ministers said in November 2002 that the Plan for Border Development, currently in the last stages of elaboration, will soon enter into effect. This reflects the understanding of both governments that border security and development go hand in hand. A comparable plan is being implemented by Ecuador and Peru as an important instrument with which to heal the wounds of their 1995 war.⁶¹ The lessons learned from that experience could be a helpful point of reference.

There is another reason for pursuing well-conceived development strategies. Not all the human flow is Colombians fleeing. Particularly from the north of the country, significant numbers of Ecuadorans move into Colombia to work on planting, harvesting and processing coca leaf in the Putumayo, Nariño and Caquetá regions.⁶² It would be beneficial for all concerned if the new Ecuadorian government would offer these poor peasants alternative ways to earn an income.

Retired Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez was elected president of Ecuador on 24 November 2002, defeating Álvaro Noboa, the country's richest businessman. In January 2000 Gutiérrez, then deputy director of the military academy, had led a coup that briefly toppled the government of President Jamil Mahuad,⁶³ for which he stood trial on a charge of

military rebellion and was suspended from service. There is wide-spread disenchantment in Ecuador with the kind of democracy that its increasingly discredited political system and parties have produced. Institutional reforms, such as the promulgation of a new constitution in 1998, have failed to enhance stability. Since 1997 the country has witnessed two coups and has had four presidents.

From 1998 to 2000, Ecuador experienced a financial and banking crisis of unprecedented proportions: only 23 of the 44 banks that were in existence in 1996 were still operating three years later. Operation "Bank Salvage" is estimated to have cost U.S.\$2.7 billion to U.S.\$4 billion, and the financial crisis is far from over.⁶⁴ Uncontrollable inflation prompted the Mahuad government to dollarise the economy in January 2000,⁶⁵ meaning that a continuous inflow of U.S. currency is required in the face of a 30 per cent decline in GDP (U.S.\$20 billion in 1998 to \$14 billion in 2000). Ecuador has managed this, just barely, because the price for its oil has remained high on world markets and because of remittances sent home by Ecuadorians working abroad (U.S.\$1.2-2 billion annually).⁶⁶ However, the fragility of the economy is indicated by the decline of its non-oil exports and ten consecutive years of a negative balance of payments.⁶⁷

The Gutiérrez election has been received with caution, primarily because of the new president's questionable democratic credentials. By any standard, he faces a monumental challenge: to reduce the large external debt, reactivate the economy, generate employment, fight poverty, improve relations with the U.S. – and devise an effective

⁵⁹ Conference Report on J.J. Res. 2, the 2003 Omnibus Appropriations bill, www.ciponline.org/colombia/03021301.htm; and President Bush's foreign assistance budget for FY2004, at <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2004/>.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ The Bi-national Border Development Plan is contained in the 1998 peace accord between Ecuador and Peru. It contemplates the following types of programs: bi-national program for social and economic infrastructure development, national programs for the building and improvement of economic and social infrastructure and environmental issues and programs for the promotion of private investment.

⁶² ICG interview, Washington 21 March 2003.

⁶³ Gutiérrez led the revolt of cadets and other military faculty against higher-ranking military officers and supported the takeover of parliament by the Confederation of Ecuadorian Indigenous Nationalities (in Spanish, CONAIE). See also Franklin Ramírez, "Las paradojas de la cuestión indígena en

el Ecuador", in *Nueva Sociedad*, N°176, November-December 2001, pp. 17-23.

⁶⁴ Edwards, Sandra, "Colombian Conflict Impacts Ecuador", Washington Office on Latin America (Washington, June 2002), p. 1.

⁶⁵ See Paul Beckerman, "La vía ecuatoriana hacia la dolarización", in *Nueva Sociedad*, N°172, March-April 2001, pp. 111-124.

⁶⁶ ICG interview, Bogotá, 12 February 2003; Mauricio León, *Informe sobre migración*, SIISE (Quito 2003). Another helpful factor is international investment in the construction of a new oil pipeline for heavy crude oil, due to be completed within two years and expected to generate some U.S.\$700 million annually. See Lowell Fleischer, "Challenges Lie Ahead for Ecuador Despite IMF Agreement", CSIS Hemisphere Focus, Vol. XI, Issue 4, 7 February 2003.

⁶⁷ Juan Taccone and Uzel Nogueira, eds., *Informe Andino* (Buenos Aires, 2002), p. 45, table 15.

policy on the Colombian conflict.⁶⁸ Comparisons with Venezuela's Chávez, however, are mainly speculation. During his campaign, Gutiérrez tried to allay the concerns of the business community by widening his largely left-wing base. In a speech in Washington on 11 February 2003, he responded to a question about the differences between himself and Chávez by emphasizing the need for inclusion, dialogue and participation of all groups in government and the political process. He also presented himself as "the closest friend of the United States" and expressed support for UN involvement in resolving Venezuela's problems.⁶⁹

The new president's supporters are in a decided minority in the 100-seat single chamber parliament. He will need to mobilise grass-roots organisations and trade unions and take care that the country's powerful indigenous movement, CONAIE, which played an important role in his victory and has two cabinet posts, including foreign minister, stays with him. That vital alliance is already under strain as a result of austerity measures the administration has implemented.⁷⁰ Gutiérrez is aware he must walk a tightrope between huge unmet needs, particularly among the indigenous community, and the severe limitations on his ability to spend or to borrow. He counts on the new pipeline to give him financial breathing space once it begins to move oil. Meanwhile, the 10 February 2003 agreement with the IMF on a U.S.\$200 million loan also may cause difficulties with his supporters, though he says the IMF has assured him that he can maintain an adequate social safety net.⁷¹

Shortly after taking office, the new president initiated a "National Dialogue" on corruption,

economic reactivation and competitiveness, poverty, international policy and citizen security.⁷² Nevertheless, the fragility of the political system and the difficult parliamentary arithmetic suggest that there is a risk of a crisis that could produce pressure for another change of government in the next eighteen months, when IMF targets must be met if further lending support is to be expected.⁷³

Internationally, the Gutiérrez administration will likely attempt to steer a middle-of-the-road course. Its main foreign policy goal is to establish good relations with the U.S. government. The victory of "Lula" da Silva in Brazil provides Gutiérrez a slightly larger margin for manoeuvre than he might have hoped for only a few months earlier. Ecuador is also expected to show a somewhat greater tilt in support of Uribe. The new government's formal position is that Colombia has to solve its internal armed conflict on its own. However, since taking office, Gutiérrez has altered his rhetoric considerably and now says that the region cannot ignore the war. While he has rejected suggestions of direct military aid, he was forward-leaning during his Washington visit, expressing strong support for Uribe with whom he identified, saying that he is fighting "terrorist" groups and drug traffickers, both of which have "negative repercussions" for Ecuador. He promised to intensify relations with Colombia on border security and infrastructure development, the fight against drug trafficking, preservation of the natural environment and humanitarian and social issues,⁷⁴ and reiterated support for UN efforts to help bring about a negotiated solution in Colombia.⁷⁵ He also used that trip to obtain a commitment for slightly increased aid from the U.S. for both economic and social programs and his military.⁷⁶

⁶⁸ Miguel Díaz, "Former Coup Leaders Make Gains", in CSIS, Hemisphere Focus, Vol. X, Issue 20, 25 November 2002; Fleischer, "Challenges Lie Ahead for Ecuador", op. cit.

⁶⁹ Jokingly, Gutiérrez further added that Chávez was a little fatter than himself but both of them were "Colonel-Presidents". Speech delivered by President Lucio Gutiérrez at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 10 February 2003. <http://www.csis.org/americas/sa/030210Gutierrez.pdf>.

⁷⁰ While CONAIE accepted the austerity measures and stated that it would continue backing the president, Gutiérrez had to win this support by promising to increase social security spending for the most vulnerable sectors of Ecuadorian society. "Ecuador: El "debut" de Lucio Gutiérrez", in *Informativo Andino*, N°193, year 16, January 2003.

⁷¹ President Gutiérrez speech, op cit.

⁷² "Ecuador: El "debut" de Gutiérrez", op. cit.

⁷³ In effect, Gutiérrez already had to take a blow when Guillermo Landázuri of the opposition Democratic Left was first elected vice-president of parliament and then assumed its presidency. ICG interview, 14 February 2003.

⁷⁴ ICG interview, Bogotá, 5 February 2003. Public statement by President Gutierrez in Washington, CSIS forum, 10 February 2003.

⁷⁵ President Gutiérrez speech, op.cit.

⁷⁶ The Bush administration promised a combination totalling some U.S.\$57 million from the foreign aid budget submitted for FY2004 to the Congress, not counting what may be made available directly from Department of Defence sources. <http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2004/> (Account tables, pages 61, 64, 68, 74.).

B. VENEZUELA

Colombia and Venezuela share a long common history, more than 2,000 kilometres of mostly unpopulated and remote border and intense human and economic interchange. Each is the largest trading partner of the other. Differences over a number of pending border issues, including delimitation of marine and submarine areas, have occasionally been used for political purposes in both.⁷⁷ The FARC, ELN and paramilitaries are active along this frontier, where significant coca and opium poppy crops are grown, and strategic petroleum resources are found. As the U.S. trains Colombian troops to protect the major Caño Limón-Coveñas oil pipeline and challenge guerrilla control of the Arauca region, the levels of violence and displacement in the Colombian departments opposite Venezuela are rising.

Although the Venezuelan National Guard claims to control the border, there is evidence several illegal armed groups operate there – both Colombian and the United-Self Defense Forces of Venezuela.⁷⁸ In March 2002, General Martín Carreño blamed FARC camps in Venezuela after Colombian troops were attacked from across the border. A few weeks later, Colombian farmers discovered a FARC camp in the Venezuelan province of Zulia, adjacent to the Colombian department of Norte de Santander. While President Hugo Chávez denied there were Colombian guerrilla camps inside Venezuela,

witnesses said that a few days later Venezuelan air force helicopters destroyed a camp large enough to accommodate 150 fighters.⁷⁹

Venezuela is an important transit point for drugs originating from Colombia and other Andean countries, by some estimates the second most important point of embarkation for cocaine from South America headed for the U.S. and Europe.⁸⁰ Drugs are smuggled from Colombia into Venezuela not only by sea but also along the Orinoco River and by land, for example across the department of Norte de Santander into the state of Táchira.⁸¹ In a recent report, the DNE also noted that aircraft flying contraband to the Caribbean that no longer refuel in northern Colombia because of increased air patrols now use Venezuelan territory for that purpose.⁸² However, the resumption of joint U.S.-Venezuelan interdiction in Venezuelan airspace in September 2002, which President Chávez had stopped for a time, makes this route more problematic.⁸³

In January 2001, 15,000 rounds of ammunition for AK-47 assault rifles were seized after Colombia shot down a plane flying from Venezuela to the Colombian department of Arauca.⁸⁴ Military intelligence indicates that flights bringing weapons into Colombia from Venezuela and landing on

⁷⁷ The delimitation of the submarine seabed in the Gulf of Venezuela, also known as the Gulf of Coquivacoa, is particularly important for both countries considering the potential for petroleum reserves. The dispute, which arose a decade after the two countries defined their land borders in 1941, is centered on the status of Los Monjes, a group of islands located between the island of Aruba and the coast of the department of Guajira in Colombia. Venezuela claims Los Monjes is a ten-island archipelago that provides the country additional territorial rights over the marine and submarine areas surrounding it. Colombia argues that Los Monjes is only a group of rocky islands, virtually uninhabited except for an anchorage insufficient under international law to afford Venezuela any additional territorial rights. The issue remains in dispute. In 1990, a bi-national commission was established to negotiate five issues: delimitation of marine and submarine areas, cross-border rivers, hydrographic basins, migration and projects of demarcation and densification of landmarks. During the 1990s, the commission also tackled other issues, such as bilateral commerce and investment. Socorro Ramírez *et al.*, eds., *Colombia-Venezuela, Agenda común para el siglo XXI* (Bogotá, 1999), pp. 162-163.

⁷⁸ Project Counseling Service-Frontiers Program, *Frontiers Report* (Bogotá, July 2002).

⁷⁹ *El Tiempo*, 1 April 2002.

⁸⁰ It is believed that at least 150 metric tons of cocaine transit the country annually. United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report" (March 2003) <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/18169.pdf> p. IV – 53.

⁸¹ López Restrepo and Hernández Arvelo, "Colombia y Venezuela frente al narcotráfico", in Ramírez *et al.*, *Colombia - Venezuela: Agenda Común para el Siglo XXI*, (Bogotá, 1999), pp. 255-256.

⁸² During 2001, 28 illegal flights were detected from Colombia to Venezuela, comparable only with similar flights from Colombia to Brazil (25). There was only one flight detected to Peru and none to Ecuador or Panama. Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes, "La lucha de Colombia contra las drogas ilícitas: acciones y resultados 2001" (Bogotá, March 2002), p. 56.

⁸³ An article published earlier this year by the Colombian magazine *Cambio* reports that between 1999 and 2001, U.S. and Colombian radars detected more than 270 clandestine flights over Venezuela that were not challenged by the Venezuelan authorities. "Cielos Abiertos", in *Cambio*, N°458, 1 April 2002.

⁸⁴ The corridor Venezuela-Arauca became very popular for drug and weapon smuggling after the Venezuelan authorities relaxed interdiction activities in 1999 and then suspended them in April 2001. "Cielos Abiertos", *op. cit.*

clandestine runways in eastern departments like Arauca or Guainía are frequent.⁸⁵ The alleged involvement of members of the Venezuelan National Guard in weapons deals with the Colombian guerrillas is under investigation in Colombia and is politically controversial in Venezuela.⁸⁶ The Venezuelan army vehemently denies the accusations but says that it cannot guarantee that individuals within the armed forces are not involved.⁸⁷

As many as 1.5 million Colombians live in Venezuela, most near the border, but only a fraction can be considered refugees.⁸⁸ According to UNHCR, during the first three months of 2002, 387 Colombians sought refugee status in Venezuela, compared to 311 in 2001 and 75 in 2000.⁸⁹ The number who could be considered refugees, however, is far higher: 50,000 to 75,000.⁹⁰ Venezuela passed a refugee law in 2001 that, while well drafted, is ineffective because the National Commission for Refugees that is to implement it has not been created. Therefore, applications are not being processed and Colombians who apply are in a legal limbo. The Ministry of Foreign Relations and the National Prosecutor's Office are reviewing a limited number of individual cases on an ad hoc basis, but officially Colombians seeking refuge are labeled "displaced persons in transit", a concept that does not exist in international law.⁹¹ Venezuela deports 40 to 50 Colombians daily, which UNHCR fears may put the lives of some in danger.⁹² There is also alarm

over cases of violent deaths of Colombians living in Venezuela near the border.⁹³

Hugo Chávez has had a difficult relationship with Colombia throughout his troubled presidency.⁹⁴ The source of controversy is at least partly his world view, which involves a considerable dose of scepticism about the influence of the U.S. in Latin America in general, and in Colombia – through Plan Colombia – in particular. Chávez strengthened diplomatic relations with Cuba, but also with Iraq, Iran and Libya within the framework of OPEC where he advanced a policy aimed at augmenting the bargaining power of oil producing states.⁹⁵

Upon taking office in February 1999, Chávez offered to arrange peace talks between the ELN and the Colombian government in Caracas. This had occurred once before, in 1991, during President Carlos Andrés Pérez's second term. Nevertheless, when Chávez – in full military dress – declared Venezuela's neutrality in the conflict, Colombia's equally new president, Pastrana, interpreted the offer as an effort to elevate the guerrillas' status, postponed a scheduled summit, and began a serious downward spiral in relations. Exchanges of letters and protest notes became almost everyday occurrences. One of the most critical moments occurred early in 2001, when Chávez led a Venezuelan military exercise at Castilletes, a sensitive border region adjacent to the Gulf of Venezuela. The Bi-national Border Commission was suspended until the end of that year,⁹⁶ as was the so-called Current Operating Plan (POV), a 1997 agreement for coordinated border security action. The latter has still not been revived.⁹⁷

⁸⁵ "Las armas de Chávez", in *Cambio*, N°489, 19 August 2002. Brazilian drug lord Fernandinho claims that between 1999 and 2001 he smuggled around 150,000 rounds of ammunition by air from Paraguay and Brazil. "La Confesión de Fernandinho", in *Cambio*, N° 463, 6 May 2002.

⁸⁶ The Colombian authorities are investigating reports that high ranking officials of the Venezuelan army met with guerrillas in Arauca in 2001 to set up the delivery of weapons made in Venezuela. Similar claims are now being voiced by several Venezuelan army officers involved in efforts to unseat President Chavez.

⁸⁷ *El Universal*, "Baduel desconoce venta ilegal de armas", 5 November 2002.

⁸⁸ Project Counseling Service-Frontiers Program, Frontiers Report (Bogotá, October 2000). ICG interview, Washington, 14 February 2003.

⁸⁹ UNHCR, "Colombia: miles huyen en las regiones fronterizas", at www.acnur.org/index.php?id_pag=511.

⁹⁰ *El Colombiano*, "Lucha Antiterrorista opaca el drama de los refugiados" 15 September 2002.

⁹¹ Ibid. and ICG interview, Bogotá, 19 November 2002.

⁹² According to Ricardo Soberón at PCS, the National Guard in Venezuela tends to target the Colombians they believe are

illegal immigrants and not possible asylum seekers. ICG interview, Bogotá, 19 November 2002.

⁹³ For example, in the town of El Amparo, located near the Colombian department of Arauca, there have been over 40 violent deaths this year, mostly of Colombians. *El Tiempo*, 15 October 2002, p. 1/4.

⁹⁴ For a discussion of the ups and downs of the relationship during the Pastrana administration in Colombia, 1998-2002, see E. Cardozo, *Venezuela ante el conflicto colombiano*, typescript, 2002; Socorro Ramírez, "La compleja relación colombo-venezolana. Una mirada histórica a una conyuntura crítica", in *Análisis Político*, May/August 2002.

⁹⁵ See below and Juan Romero, *El dilema democrático en Venezuela* (Maracaibo, s.d.).

⁹⁶ ICG interview, Bogotá, 4 February 2003.

⁹⁷ *El Universal*, 25 August 2002.

The revolutionary left had a presence in Venezuela in the 1960s and sought to infiltrate the armed forces. Rising public disgust with the corruption of traditional parties provided an opening for its reemergence. The attempted coup against President Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1992 marked the first public appearance of Chávez, then a lieutenant colonel, as one of the conspiracy's most important and visible leaders. Many former guerrillas were part of the political coalition that supported his rise to power, and some occupy important positions within the current administration.⁹⁸ The philosophy of the movement emphasises Latin America's native Indian communities and has led to alliances and expressions of affinity with revolutionary movements in the region, but particularly in Colombia. Chávez held several meetings with Colombian guerrillas in August 1995. In 2000, a FARC delegation visited Caracas at the invitation of his supporters in parliament to attend a symposium on Plan Colombia, without the knowledge or consent of the Colombian government.⁹⁹

The Venezuelan government, even more than others in the region, has been critical of Plan Colombia as a justification for U.S. military intervention. One concern has been that the security assistance Colombia is to receive could give it local military dominance in any future bilateral border dispute.¹⁰⁰ A further concern has been that more active military

prosecution of the conflict augments the spillover; both of Colombians displaced by fighting and forced to flee across the border, and of the insurgencies themselves. Some of these concerns have been lessened – though by no means dissipated – by changes in the original Plan Colombia in 2001. The U.S.-sponsored Andean Counterdrug Initiative, as noted above, puts additional emphasis on social and environmental issues and envisages more assistance for the other countries of the region.¹⁰¹ So far, the spillover effects have not been as dramatic as critics feared.

Venezuela refused to declare FARC and ELN insurgents to be terrorists after the U.S. declared its “war on terrorism”, and it has not acceded to President Uribe's more recent request, arguing that this could be interpreted as interference in Colombia's affairs. However, it does apply this label to the Colombian paramilitaries. After the 7 February 2003 bomb attack on the El Nogal social club in Bogotá, nevertheless, Venezuela supported Resolution 837 of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS), which condemned the action, identified the FARC as responsible, and obliged member states to take measures, including compliance with UN resolutions and international treaties on terrorism.¹⁰² Chávez sent Uribe a formal declaration of condolences and solidarity with Colombia in its fight against “terrorism”, but without expressly mentioning the FARC.¹⁰³

The grave internal crisis that Venezuela has fallen into – including the April 2002 coup that briefly toppled President Chávez and the widespread strikes over several months in late 2002 and early 2003 that have sought to force him prematurely from office – has required the Venezuelan administration to make at least substantial tactical adjustments in its attitude toward the Colombian conflict. It must calibrate all actions with regard to its neighbour in terms of the possible impact on its own political survival.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁸ See Alberto Garrido, *Guerrilla y conspiración militar en Venezuela. Testimonios de Douglas Bravo, William Izarra, Francisco Prada*. (Caracas, 1999) and Alberto Garrido, *Historia secreta de la revolución bolivariana. Conversaciones con Harold, Puerta Aponte y Camilo* (Mérida, 2000). One of the more prominent former guerrillas serving the government is Alí Rodríguez Araque, alias “Comandante Fausto”, who is now chief executive officer of the state-owned oil company PDVSA. He was once Venezuela's representative to OPEC and even served as president of the organisation.

⁹⁹ *El Tiempo*, 28 November 2000. Another incident that produced diplomatic difficulties involved José María Ballestas, a member of the ELN accused of kidnapping an Avianca plane and its 41 passengers in 1999. He was detained in March 2001 by agents of the Venezuelan police and Interpol but extradited to Colombia by order of the Venezuelan Supreme Court only after ten months of argument between the two governments. President Chávez created another diplomatic incident in April 2001 when, in the presence of Colombia's defence minister, he reaffirmed his opposition to a military solution to his neighbour's conflict and said Venezuela did not regard the insurgents as enemies provided they did not attack Venezuelan citizens. *El Universal*, 1 May 2001.

¹⁰⁰ ICG interview, Bogotá, 13 November 2002.

¹⁰¹ Yet, the amount earmarked for Venezuela in 2004, U.S.\$5 million, is considered to be too small to make a real difference. ICG interview, Bogotá, 29 March 2003.

¹⁰² OEA, *Resolución del Consejo Permanente* CP/RES. 837 (1354/03), *Condena a actos terroristas en Colombia*.

¹⁰³ ICG interview, Bogotá, 17 February 2003.

¹⁰⁴ For Colombia, the fallout of the Venezuelan crisis has meant, above all, a recession in exports to that country. During the first 53 days of the December 2002-February 2003 general strike, Colombian exports to Venezuela fell by 40 per cent. Further, the work stoppage in the Venezuelan oil

Chávez's return to the presidency in April 2002 only came about with the help of parts of the army and massive support from his followers and after the OAS and regional leaders rejected the challenge to constitutional rule.¹⁰⁵ Following his return to the presidency in April 2002, Chávez has adopted a less confrontational tone on Colombia and the U.S., the latter of which, after giving mixed signals in the immediate aftermath of the coup, eventually backed efforts through the OAS and elsewhere to support constitutional government.

Internal polarization at all levels of Venezuela appears to be the major factor that still restrains the Chávez foreign policy. There was no reconciliation at the end of the April 2002 crisis, and the situation was further aggravated in the months to follow. The opposition represents a convergence of business, labor, civil society, most political parties and some dissident military. It has been led since July 2002 by the Democratic Coordinating Committee (CD), which was established following signature of the Democratic Reconstruction Agreement, and is now recognized both internally and internationally, as the interlocutor for the opposition.¹⁰⁶

The CD has sat at the table with the OAS and the Tripartite Working Group of mediators (OAS, UNDP and the Carter Center), and the government. Its anti-constitutional course in April 2002 had lost

the opposition international sympathy. By focussing on an early vote to end the Chávez government, however, it was able to re-group domestically and internationally. Nevertheless, CD has been criticized, as has the government, for failing to accept reasonable compromises. While there is widespread criticism of Chávez's erratic governance and concerns about violations of civil liberties, the opposition has failed to define a convincing political proposal and strategy for post-Chávez stabilisation and reconstruction. His removal appears to be its only goal.¹⁰⁷

The opposition pursued this objective by presenting more than two million signatures to the National Electoral Board on 4 November 2002 in support of an early consultative referendum asking for the President to resign. The government's refusal to accept such a referendum led to a three-month general strike that crippled the oil industry, and resulted in lost revenue estimated at U.S.\$4 billion. Predictions are that GDP may drop as much as 17 to 20 percent in 2003.¹⁰⁸ The strike also led to rising threats of wide-scale civil violence that brought OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria (Colombia's former President) to Caracas repeatedly.¹⁰⁹

Gaviria and the Tripartite Working Group have virtually taken up residence in the capital, where they meet nearly daily in an effort to check the drift toward confrontation. Also now involved is the Venezuela support group, launched by Brazilian President da Silva during the inauguration of Ecuadorian President Lucio Gutiérrez and including Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Portugal, Spain and the U.S.¹¹⁰ The group's basic aim is to support Gaviria's attempt to find a negotiated and constitutional solution. While Venezuela's Foreign Minister Roy Chaderton welcomed the initiative, President Chávez expressed consternation that Venezuela had

sector produced gasoline shortages in some Colombian departments. See "El coletazo", in *Semana*, 27 January-3 February 2003, pp. 26-27.

¹⁰⁵ On 12 April 2002, amid much confusion, Chávez was replaced by a supposed transition government under Pedro Carmona, who was then the president of FEDECAMARAS, the federation of chambers of commerce. It was characterized as a coup after it issued a decree suspending all public powers. While Chávez returned to power fairly quickly, 85 died and 565 were wounded during the affair. For an analysis of the crisis, see A. Francés & C. Machado, eds., *Venezuela: La crisis de abril* (Caracas, 2002).

¹⁰⁶ The Democratic Reconstruction Agreement concluded by the anti-Chávez opposition contemplates the "construction of an efficient democracy in which the work of the institutions is carried out in circumstances of transparency, full liberty and accountability; the development of sustainable prosperity that promotes individual initiative, equality and social inclusion; the creation of spaces where citizens can meet and unite; the creation of a professional state apparatus not subjected to the rule and will of one party; respect for the achievements of democratic participation of the citizenry and Venezuela's participation in the international community, based on cooperation that promotes respect for human rights". In *Pais*, 6 July 2002.

¹⁰⁷ ICG Interviews, Washington, 20-21 March 2003. Also see Tomás Martínez, "Er wird bleiben", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 January 2003.

¹⁰⁸ "The Bolivarian revolution marches on", *The Economist*, 6 February 2003.

¹⁰⁹ Following the strike, four dissidents, including three soldiers, supporting it, were assassinated. Opposition leaders accused the government of not helping with the investigation of the suspects, who were alleged to be Chávez supporters. *El Tiempo*, 21 February 2003, pp. 1/4-5.

¹¹⁰ The U.S. supported the initiative after having decided against one of its own. See Karen De Young, "Venezuela Initiative Readied", *The Washington Post*, 10 January 2003, p. A1.

not been consulted prior to the group's establishment and said he wanted to include other countries such as China, Russia, and Algeria.¹¹¹

Nevertheless, Colombia remains an item on the "heated agenda" between the president and his opponents, albeit no longer a priority for the beleaguered Chávez.¹¹² As recently as 18 February 2003, as the general strike it had called was breaking down, the CD, organised a march to the Colombian embassy in Caracas to express solidarity with the Uribe government and condemn terrorism and – with a clear allusion to its own government – "those that support it".¹¹³ Indeed, the relationship between Chávez and Uribe is a delicate one in which the latter has most of the leverage. The Venezuelan leader dislikes Uribe's emphasis on increased military force to solve the Colombian conflict. He is uncomfortably aware however, of how much he needs support not only from the OAS but also from the U.S. and the EU and worries that if new bilateral difficulties should flare, the generally good impression Uribe has made abroad could lead quickly to Venezuela's isolation (and indeed his own).

This awareness of weakness is presumably responsible in the first instance for a number of policy adjustments the Chávez administration has made. By supporting OAS Resolution 837 following the El Nogal club bombing in February 2003, it has come closer than ever before to censuring the guerrillas and committing itself to cooperation with Colombia against them.¹¹⁴ Foreign Minister Chaderton attended the recent ministerial security gathering in Bogotá and signed the final accord.¹¹⁵ Even earlier, and with more practical effect, Venezuela reversed itself and resumed mixed-crew flights with the U.S. over Venezuelan territory in search of planes engaged in drug trafficking. When

Chávez took office in 1999, he refused permission for such flights, calling them inconsistent with national sovereignty. The policy switch came after a 22 September 2002 visit to Caracas by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon.¹¹⁶ The November 2002 meeting in Colombia between Chávez and Uribe has appeared to confirm a new spirit of greater pragmatism and cooperation.

It is still too early to know if all this represents a substantial change in bilateral relations or only a temporary, cosmetic shift due to Venezuela's internal crisis and its need to avoid further alienating the international community. Speeches by Chávez and many official pronouncements still contain much of the old ideological fervour. Likewise, mutual accusations are still made that the other side is not doing enough to patrol and secure the common border.¹¹⁷

C. PANAMA

Relations have historically been distant owing to Colombia's discontent about Panama's secession, with U.S. backing, in 1903 as part of the manoeuvres to launch construction of the Panama Canal and the absence of any road connecting the two countries. During most of the twentieth century, the state's geo-strategic importance derived from the American-built and controlled Canal, which was turned over to Panama in 1999. With 78,200 square kilometres and 2.9 million inhabitants, Panama is by far Colombia's smallest neighbour. The conservative government of President Mireya Moscoso (1999-2004) is the second democratically elected administration since the U.S. ousted Manuel Noriega in 1989.¹¹⁸

The 225-kilometre border with Colombia runs across the mountainous jungle region of Darién and has long been a primary security concern. Following the

¹¹¹ *El Tiempo*, 13 January 2003, p. 1-4; *El Espectador*, 2 February 2003, P. 4A.

¹¹² ICG interviews with U.S. and Andean diplomats and with independent Venezuelan experts, February 2003.

¹¹³ *El Tiempo*, 19 February 2003, p. 1/8.

¹¹⁴ For example, on 30 March Chávez revealed in his weekly radio program that he had recently given orders to bomb an unspecified irregular armed group from Colombia that had crossed the border with Venezuela. The president emphasised that the operation had been successful and that the group had returned to Colombia. He further confirmed that a meeting with Uribe was being planned to discuss bilateral and border issues and overcome tensions. *El Tiempo*, 31 March 2003, p. 1/7.

¹¹⁵ *Declaración*, 12 March 2003, op. cit..

¹¹⁶ *El Universal*, 28 September 2002.

¹¹⁷ Incidents also continue. After Colombia's Minister of the Interior criticised Venezuela's failure to declare the FARC a terrorist organisation, for example, President Chávez responded angrily on 23 February 2003, and a day later a bomb went off at the Colombian Consulate in Caracas. Leaflets signed by a radical pro-Chávez group were found outside the building, though the group did not take credit for the violence. <http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/news/news-venezuela.html>.

¹¹⁸ Moscoso's predecessor, Ernesto Pérez, took over from interim President Guillermo Endara after winning the 1994 election.

defeat of the army in 1989 and its abolition in 1994, Panama has only a police force, the Panamanian Public Forces (PPF), albeit one with small naval and air components. The PPF, which is subordinate to the ministry of government and justice, lacks the capacity to patrol the eastern border effectively. Despite these concerns and the intensification of the Colombian conflict, security has not been a policy priority for Panamanian governments during the 1990s since the U.S. military presence in the Canal Zone was perceived both to provide protection and inhibit an indigenous defence structure.

The promulgation of the “Foundations of a Panamanian Security Policy” in June 2000, six months after the final U.S. withdrawal from Panama, was a first step to remedy this situation. In essence, Panama assumed responsibility for the security of the Canal without conceding the right of intervention to any foreign power – a marked difference from the plan put out six months earlier that still contemplated possible return of foreign troops. According to Minister of Government and Justice Winston Spadafora, the new policy aims to enhance coordination between the existing security services in order to protect the Canal and the borders, in particular with Colombia, and envisages a strong campaign against drug and arms trafficking as well as common crime.¹¹⁹

However, Panama remains vulnerable to incursions of irregular armed groups and drug and arms traffickers from Colombia. The latest in a long series of incidents was the killing of four civilians by Colombian paramilitary on 18 January 2003. The attack led some 600 people to flee villages and seek refuge in Boca de Cupé, a small town close to the Colombian border but with a police station. According to press and NGO reports, the paramilitaries accused their victims of collaboration with the FARC, which also roams the area.¹²⁰ This is a familiar justification for massacres of civilians committed by the paramilitary forces inside Colombia.

According to the NGO Project Counselling Service, 873 Colombians have applied for refugee status in Panama, 763 have received it, and another 2,000

would be eligible to apply. The majority of refugees are Afro or indigenous Colombians from the department of Chocó, where paramilitaries and the FARC have been disputing a strategic corridor for five years. Lack of resources and limited state presence in the Darién region are partially responsible for the government’s harsh policy toward Colombian refugees, that often disregards commitments under national and international law. Ill-treatment of refugees and forced repatriation was not uncommon until the signing of the “Declaration on Displacement in Border Areas between Panama and Colombia” in November 2000.¹²¹ It emphasised that repatriation had to take place on the basis of guaranteed rights and safe conditions.¹²²

However, Panama has shown little interest in humanitarian law issues. In the context of widespread public concern for rising crime and violence, perceived to be due to the influence of Colombian criminals, the emphasis has been on security. Refugees have been treated more as illegal immigrants.¹²³ According to one observer, “between 1995 and 1996 the official policy was to repatriate the refugees. Now, although humanitarian assistance is being offered, the strategy is to bore them”.¹²⁴

Following the January 2003 paramilitary incursion, Foreign Minister Harmodio Arias met in Bogotá with Colombian ministers about border security and arms trafficking.¹²⁵ They agreed to make additional patrolling efforts, and Foreign Minister Carolina Barco underscored the need for a Bi-national Border Commission such as Colombia already has with its other neighbours. The Colombian police announced

¹²¹ According to ICG sources, some arbitrary deportations have been carried out with the acquiescence of the Colombian consulate in Panama, apparently a clear violation, by both countries, of the Geneva Convention on Refugees.

¹²² ICG interview, Panama City, 3 April 2002.

¹²³ The Panamanian National Office for Refugee Affairs (OPNAR), for example, has no offices in the region of Darién, where most of the Colombians seeking protection are located, and concentrates its work in the area on meetings with the Panamanian authorities rather than the refugees. ICG Interview with Ricardo Soberón, Bogotá, 19 November 2002.

¹²⁴ For example, several hundred Colombians located in the Panamanian town of Jaqué are not allowed to work or study, and are locked indoors every night at 9 p.m. *El Colombiano*, “Lucha Antiterrorista opaca el drama de los refugiados”, 15 September 2002.

¹²⁵ On 26 January 2003, the Colombian coastguard seized a shipment of 81 AK-47 assault rifles, apparently coming from Panama and destined for the Colombian paramilitary forces. *El Tiempo*, 27 and 28 January 2003, pp. 1/9 and 1/2.

¹¹⁹ “Panamá: Plan de seguridad rechaza presencia militar extranjera”, in *Infopress Centroamericana*, N°1374, 30 June 2000.

¹²⁰ Consejo Noruego para Refugiados, “Incurción y asesinatos de líderes indígenas”, typescript (Bogotá, 23 January 2003); *El Tiempo*, 28 January 2003, p. 1/2.

plans to build fifteen new police stations in villages close to the Panamanian frontier.¹²⁶

Panama is a strategic transit point not only because of its busy maritime and air traffic but also because the Pan American highway connects it by land to Central and North America. Drugs are smuggled in across the Darién Gap on speedboats from either around the port of Turbo in the Urabá Gulf or locations along the Pacific Coast,¹²⁷ and from small planes that drop their loads in remote areas.¹²⁸

The Colón Free Zone, a duty free port on the Caribbean coast, has traditionally been a source of consumer goods smuggled into Colombia by boat and sold in the main cities at a fraction of the price of legally imported goods. Contraband smugglers move the merchandise out of Panama, or register it as exports to Colombia but smuggle it into Colombia without customs verification. In 2000, the gap between what Panamanian custom authorities recorded as exports to Colombia and their Colombian counterparts recorded was U.S.\$582 million.¹²⁹ In 2001, it fell to U.S. \$499 million. In the mid and late 1990s contraband from Panama averaged around U.S.\$1.4 billion per year, some 10 per cent of Colombia's total imports.¹³⁰

In November 2001, 3,000 AK-47 assault rifles and five million rounds of ammunition were delivered to a paramilitary group at the port of Turbo, near the Panamanian border. They were sold by the Nicaraguan army, which claimed it received a purchase order from the Panamanian police. The Panamanian authorities said the supporting documents were false.¹³¹ Since the countries are parties to the Inter-American Convention against

Illegal Traffic of Arms, the OAS investigated, found negligence on both sides and warned of the possibility of an even larger gun running operation to benefit the paramilitaries.¹³² Although cases on this scale are not common, several routes are used to smuggle weapons, as well as drugs and contraband goods – a main reason why the control of the relatively short frontier is fiercely disputed by FARC and the paramilitaries.

President Moscoso gave her government's support to the Uribe administration's security policy and efforts to combat drugs during a visit to Colombia in December 2002.¹³³ This is a change for Panama, which had expressed general support for the peace process of Uribe's predecessor, Pastrana, while emphasising human rights, humanitarian assistance to war victims – and non-intervention in Colombia's internal affairs. Although limited in resources and with no army, Panama's feelings of vulnerability have led its government to give priority to extending the state's presence along the border and developing the region.

Panama's new awareness of regional security, in particular after 11 September 2001, is reflected in the Becker-Salas accord of 2002. That agreement, while criticised by a former president (Jorge Illueca, 1984) as undermining sovereignty, allows U.S. law enforcement officials to conduct anti-drug operations and make arrests in Panama.¹³⁴ The government also indicates it wants to ratify an amended version of the "Framework Agreement on Democratic Security in Central America", conditionally signed by Panama in 1997. According to sources in the Panamanian foreign ministry, the amended Framework Agreement would contain specific stipulations on fighting terrorism in the region and world.¹³⁵ Four days after the 7 February bombing in the El Nogal club in Bogotá, Panama hosted the meeting of Central American heads of state, the Argentine foreign minister and President Uribe that produced the Panama Declaration condemnation of FARC terrorism discussed above. Of all the countries requested by President Uribe to declare the FARC a

¹²⁶ *El Tiempo*, 29 January 2003, p. 2/7.

¹²⁷ A round trip from Turbo to the port of Colón in Panama takes no more than eight hours by speedboat.

¹²⁸ United States Department of State - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report" (March 2002) p. V-44.

¹²⁹ National Customs and Income Taxes Directorate (DIAN), "Informe de Coyuntura sobre el contrabando" (Bogotá, September 2001).

¹³⁰ *Ibid.* The value of contraband from Panama in 1995, for example was U.S.\$1.4 billion, while the value of all imports into Colombia was U.S.\$12,929 billion.

¹³¹ The weapons left Nicaragua officially bound for Panama, but their final destination was Colombia, were they were disembarked hidden among a shipment of plastic balls. For details on this case, see *El Tiempo*, "Arsenal burló a 4 países" 25 April 2002, p.1-2

¹³² Basically, the 600-page OAS report attests negligence and corruption on part of the Nicaraguan and Colombian authorities. It also states that an even larger gun smuggling operation for the Colombian paramilitaries could be in the making. *El Tiempo*, 21 January 2003, p. 1/8.

¹³³ ICG interview, Bogotá, 18 February 2003.

¹³⁴ *Panamá América*, 18 March 2002.

¹³⁵ ICG interview, Panama City, 3 April 2002.

terrorist organization, only Panama has complied even indirectly.¹³⁶

D. PERU

Faced with its own stark internal challenges, the possibility of a direct spillover of the Colombian conflict is not a primary concern for Peru. An opinion poll, conducted during the visit of U.S. President Bush in March 2002, showed that for the inhabitants of Lima, economic issues were much more significant. However, one aspect of that conflict, its links to drug trafficking, does concern Peruvians, who suspect that a major reason for a rise in coca and opium poppy cultivation in 2002 is the increased pressure the Uribe administration has put on that activity inside Colombia.¹³⁷

Despite many historical and social ties, Peruvians perceive Colombia as a rather distant neighbour. In August 2002, when asked which Latin American country they most admired, 21 per cent said Brazil, 16 per cent Chile and only 2 per cent Colombia. Asked directly about Colombia, 34 per cent expressed a favourable view and 50 per cent an unfavourable one – a drop from 56 per cent favourable in 1996 that appears to be due to the worsening of the civil war.¹³⁸

The administration of Alejandro Toledo sees the prospect that Colombia's eradication of illicit crops will result in expanded coca cultivation in Peru as a threat because just such a migration was experienced in reverse in the 1990s – from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia. The first signs are already apparent, and there is some concern as well that links between Peruvian and Colombian irregular armed groups could develop although this has not happened in the past.¹³⁹ There are recent reports, not yet substantiated, that remnants of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), the once powerful Peruvian

insurgency, are working as paid escorts for Peru's own narco-traffickers as they move drugs into Brazil.¹⁴⁰

Despite the manual eradication of 80,000 hectares during the last six years, Peru is still the second largest producer of coca leaves in the world. Growers in Alto Huallaga, Ene and Apurimac valleys have been blocking roads and striking in the hope of halting eradication efforts. Cocaine base is transported to neighbouring countries, including Colombia and Brazil, for refinement. However, since the fall of the drug cartels in Colombia, some of this is now done within Peru before the product is shipped to the U.S. and Europe from fishing ports such as Callao and Chimbote.¹⁴¹ The Peruvian anti-drug police force, DINANDRO, estimates that there are approximately 1,200 hectares of opium poppy in the country, and this is expanding. DINANDRO has also located several morphine laboratories near the border with Colombia and Ecuador.¹⁴² There is even speculation that FARC has distributed opium poppy seeds to Peruvian peasants in the Huallaga Valley and actively encourages cultivation.¹⁴³

However, the authorities believe the rugged 1,600-kilometre border is a natural buffer zone in which Colombian armed groups will find operations very difficult. During the last months of 2002, the Toledo and Uribe administrations have broadened their security cooperation. In November 2002, the foreign ministers activated a Mechanism for Security and Judicial Cooperation,¹⁴⁴ contemplating bilateral cooperation against terrorism, drugs, corruption and arms trafficking. In addition, Peru and Colombia signed agreements on river and air interdiction and police cooperation. In October 2002, defence ministers created the Bilateral Defence Working Group to coordinate security cooperation at the highest political level.¹⁴⁵ The high commands of the

¹³⁶ *Declaración de Panamá*, 11 February 2002.

¹³⁷ ICG interviews with Peruvian diplomats, 19 February 2003.

¹³⁸ Figures provided by *Instituto Apoyo*, Lima.

¹³⁹ ICG interview, Bogotá, 7 February 2003. While 17,600 acres of coca crops were eradicated in Peru in 2002, cultivation has nonetheless increased to 90,400 acres today. Lucien Chauvin, "Peru's Coca Crops are up 28 per cent", in *The Miami Herald*, 23 January 2003. Peruvian government statistics acknowledge the rise in new cultivations but assert that when fields eradicated are taken into account, the net increase is eight per cent. ICG interview, 19 February 2003.

¹⁴⁰ ICG interview, 18 March 2003.

¹⁴¹ Caretas, "Otra vez, COCA PERU", 17 January 2002, at www.caretas.com.pe/2002/1704/articulos/coca.phtml

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Sharon Stevenson, "The FARC's Fifth Column", in *Newsweek*, 21 January 2002.

¹⁴⁴ ICG interview, Bogotá, 7 February 2003. The mechanism was created the previous year. It is meant to be utilised at the level of vice ministers of interior, defence, justice and foreign affairs, who are expected to meet in Lima late in 2003.

¹⁴⁵ Ministerio de Defensa, "Ministros de defensa del Perú y Colombia condenaron toda forma de delincuencia común", Nota de prensa N°055-02 OIP-MINDEF (Lima, 11 October 2002).

armed forces are to meet annually. Indeed, bilateral military cooperation is the best among Colombia's neighbours. This reflects considerable improvement from the days when the Fujimori administration tried to discredit Colombia in order to present itself to the U.S. as a more reliable regional ally, and Vladimiro Montesinos, Fujimori's security advisor and intelligence chief, was involved in arms sales to the FARC.¹⁴⁶

Peru's problems these days, however, are primarily internal, which will inevitably reduce both its inclination and ability to become involved in Colombia's difficulties except as they directly impact its own territory. President Toledo's electoral victory in June 2001, seven months after Fujimori's ten-year rule ended in disgrace, seemed to augur new opportunities for Peru. However, the lack of a clear strategy and a sharply divided parliament has eroded much of that optimism.¹⁴⁷ While President Toledo received a legitimate, if somewhat feeble, mandate in the 2001 election, many analysts agree that he has not controlled the political agenda during his first twenty months. Nor has his political organisation, *Perú Posible* (PP), been able to strengthen its precarious standing.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶ The discovery of those deals eventually led to the break between Montesinos and Fujimori, the fall of the regime, and Montesinos's imprisonment. One of the largest schemes for smuggling weapons into Colombia was coordinated by the FARC in early 2000, when boxes full of AKM-47 assault rifles, a modern version of the AK-47, were parachuted from an aircraft over the Guanía jungle. A total of 10,000 rifles were bought for a price of U.S.\$700,000 from the Jordanian army, which claimed that they were sold to accredited representatives of the Peruvian army. Subsequent investigation revealed that the men who claimed to represent the Peruvian armed forces were in fact retired army officials who had worked at the Peruvian National Intelligence Service with Montesinos. In fact, it was Montesinos, now directly implicated in the operation, who in August 2000 proudly announced that Peruvian intelligence had uncovered this network of arms smugglers.

¹⁴⁷ The president's party has managed to build a working alliance with one party and, for a limited number of issues with a few additional parliamentarians but the coalition lacks an absolute majority, as well as internal discipline and programmatic coherence. For example, five deputies from the president's party recently declared themselves "independents". A number of internal conflicts have also complicated parliamentary-executive relations and the taking of decisions.

¹⁴⁸ Toledo's, and PP's, political weakness is reflected in parliament. Out of 120 seats in Peru's one-chamber Congress, the PP occupies 45, the main opposition party,

PP, founded in January 1999, is more an improvised movement built around a single charismatic leader, than a solid political party. During the 2000 electoral campaign, Toledo trailed far behind the incumbent, Fujimori, and the two main opposition candidates, the mayor of Lima, Alberto Andrade, and the independent, Luis Castañeda. However, in January 2000 Toledo emerged as Fujimori's leading foe, largely due to a systematic campaign of defamation and character assassination unleashed by the government, first against Andrade, and then Castañeda. Toledo succeeded in presenting himself as the candidate of the opposition to the Fujimori regime by underscoring his commitment to "democracy", denouncing Fujimori's "dictatorship", and juxtaposing "past" vs. "future" and "capital" vs. "province". In a country where more than 50 per cent of the population is indigenous and poor, he also benefited from having emerged from that very background to become a World Bank economist.

Although the government can point to relatively promising macro-economic indicators such as low inflation (2 per cent in 2002), a manageable fiscal deficit (2.2 per cent of GDP in 2002) and growth rate projections (5 per cent for 2003), the tight fiscal situation (increased foreign debt service payments) requires austerity.¹⁴⁹ The government is also paying the price for underestimating problems and overestimating its capacity to deal with them. President Toledo's approval rating plummeted from 59 per cent in August 2001 to 14 per cent in October 2002. Although it improved somewhat earlier this year, reaching 30 per cent in January, it has dropped again, to 21 per cent in March.¹⁵⁰ The opening up of space for political participation and dissent after Fujimori's fall has stimulated protests by social sectors aware that they are dealing with a weak government. The danger exists that this residue of protest, which at times has drifted into violence, could lead to serious problems across the country if

Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) 28, Unidad Nacional 17, and the Frente Independiente Moralizador (FIM) 11. The PP has managed to build a working alliance with the FIM and, on a small number of issues, a few other parliamentarians. However, even with that alliance it is short of a majority. The alliance also lacks discipline, making uncertain the President's ability to move his legislative program.

¹⁴⁹ Figures provided by the Ministry of Economics and Finance.

¹⁵⁰ <http://www.elcomercioperu.com.pe/online/html/2003%2D03%2D17/onlpolitica7021.html>; for the earlier period, *The Economist*, 14 November 2002.

it intersects with the difficulties the administration faces in efforts to develop an extensive system of regional governments.

President Toledo launched an initiative to elect regional governments shortly after his own inauguration.¹⁵¹ It responded to a widespread demand for decentralisation but was conducted rather precipitously, with regional governors and provincial and district mayors chosen on 17 November 2002 in an election that saw the president's party do poorly. APRA won 12 of the 25 new regional governments, independents eleven, and President Toledo's PP only one.¹⁵² The law creating the regions was barely in place by election day, and the relationship with existing departments remains undefined. While the central government insists that regionalisation should be gradual, with authority and functions assigned only after the new authorities have demonstrated their capabilities, the election results create incentives for the newly elected opposition regional government leaders to press for broader powers and larger budgets. The main opposition party (APRA) wants to claim as many revenue sources as possible in order to produce results in the regional governments it controls before the 2006 presidential and parliamentary elections. However, some circumstances have produced moderation on the part of APRA. Its standard bearer, former President Alan García, knows that he has to jettison the stigma of an irresponsible populist leader. To some degree, Toledo may benefit from an APRA and García strategy to avoid decisive confrontations. APRA could well have its best opportunity to recapture power in the event Toledo can finish his term, but not too successfully. Toledo's administration, beyond the partisan aspect, fears that too rapid an increase in the autonomy and financial base of the regions might create serious fiscal problems.

The internal political balance also tends to make Toledo think carefully about identifying himself more closely with Colombia and President Uribe's security strategy. The public opinion polling mentioned earlier indicates the lack of positive feelings toward Colombia. Also APRA's natural left constituency would like to add to its campaign rhetoric an identification of Toledo and his party with the U.S.-supported Plan Colombia, which is unpopular in Peru. Particularly with the rise of a

political constituency involving rural coca growers, Toledo has tried to balance a low profile with pragmatic, on-the-ground-security cooperation with Colombia.

E. BRAZIL

Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva, who was elected Brazil's 27th president in October 2002 with 61.3 per cent of the vote in the second round, has a strong mandate but needs to satisfy the enormous expectations of his supporters while meeting daunting domestic and international challenges. His Worker's Party (PT) is the strongest in the country but he needs to build a coalition in the National Congress as well as in the federal states, most of which are governed by opposition parties. This has to be achieved without forfeiting the support of the PT's more traditional roots in labor, in rural areas and among the poor and working classes in the large and medium sized cities. How he goes about this will have an important impact on foreign policy but Colombia's civil conflict is a relatively marginal consideration. International priorities are the difficult decisions that will have to be taken over the next four years on trade agreements (the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas and WTO negotiations), regional integration, and the global economy.¹⁵³ To achieve the flexibility it requires to make social investments, the Lula government will need a broad range of further international agreements, including on refinancing large debts that come due late in 2003.

However, the optimistic expectations as to Brazil's macro-economic performance in 2003 are still only expectations. With a public debt of more than U.S.\$260 billion (55 per cent of GDP) and national basic interest rates of more than 25 per cent per year, the external vulnerability of the economy will demand an austere fiscal policy during the first year in order to break the vicious circle of high inflation, high interest rates, more debt and greater balance of payment deficits. The Lula government may be helped in the short-term by an increase in the value of the currency, but will have to balance the social commitments made in the campaign with its stated willingness to maintain fiscal surpluses. To reassure

¹⁵¹ ICG interview, Bogotá, 7 February 2003.

¹⁵² Figures provided by the National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE).

¹⁵³ Interview with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and José Serra, in *Política Externa*, vol. 11, N°02, November 2002, pp. 5-11. Workers' Party (PT), *Government Program of the Lula Presidente Alliance: Foreign Policy for Regional Integration and Global Negotiation* (São Paulo, 2002).

observers, some of the main economists and political leaders of the new government announced that fiscal coherence may demand selective budget cuts and social security and tax reforms to obtain a surplus even larger than the one agreed with the IMF.¹⁵⁴ These circumstances make it very difficult to pay for a true social pact. To afford social investment, the Lula government will need a broad range of international agreements, including refinancing large debts that come due towards the end of 2003.

The new government is still formulating its policy toward Colombia. The complexity of the armed conflict and its centrality for Andean security is recognised, as well as its importance to the U.S. agenda in Latin America. The primary interest for Brazilian policy, however, is likely to be focused on the role of the Uribe administration in the economic negotiations between Mercosur and the Comunidad Andina (CAN).¹⁵⁵ The strengthening of Mercosur and the regional integration projects in Latin America are seen as the most effective way to assure that the negotiations of several commercial treaties currently underway¹⁵⁶ can be concluded on more favourable terms for Brazil.

Lula, of course, inherits a diplomatic history. Over the past four years, the Cardoso and Pastrana administrations showed only mild interest in developing a partnership. Although Brazil's concern about "regionalisation" of the Colombian conflict increased, Bogotá generally avoided outside involvement, whether from Brasilia or the UN.¹⁵⁷

Brazilian policy has been based on three pillars: 1) diplomatic support for the peace process; 2) the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention; 3) strengthening Brazil's capability to control drugs and

arms in the Amazon region. Its diplomatic support of the peace process with the FARC and the ELN was clear, but discrete. Until the Commission of Facilitating Countries (CFC), including Canada, Cuba, Spain, France, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Venezuela, was established in March 2001, it did little more than defend Colombia's sovereignty in international forums and refuse to designate the illegal armed groups as either "belligerent forces" or terrorists.¹⁵⁸ It has not altered this latter stance, even after President Uribe's request to designate the FARC a terrorist group following the 7 February 2003 bombing of the El Nogal club.¹⁵⁹

Over the past two years, Brazilian diplomatic initiatives toward Colombia have been aimed, without much result, at achieving bilateral agreements and technical cooperation on agriculture, administrative modernisation and the environment, to be financed from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Brazil reportedly told Pastrana it would join the CFC if invited but nothing came of it.¹⁶⁰ When the peace process with the FARC collapsed in January-February 2002, Brazil supported Pastrana's decision to retake the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ).

Plan Colombia has always been suspect in Brazil, partly because of the country's long tradition of defending the principle of non-intervention,¹⁶¹ and partly because public opinion tends to see it as a tool of U.S. intervention. For example, in a congressional debate on Plan Colombia in 2001, 58 per cent of government supporters and 92 per cent of the opposition called it a potential threat to Brazil's sovereignty.¹⁶² The government itself was more moderate but criticised the policy as too oriented toward the military side in tones similar to those heard at the time from several other Latin American states, the European Union and Japan. Among its

¹⁵⁴ See febraban.com.br/des_projecoes.asp.

¹⁵⁵ ICG interview, São Paulo, 8 November 2002.

¹⁵⁶ These include the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, the Doha Round of the WTO, Mercosur-European Union, and bilateral agreements with China and others.

¹⁵⁷ For a summary of the arguments and evidence available on the "regionalisation of the Colombian conflict", see Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *The Colombian Labyrinth: the synergy of drugs and insurgency and its implications for regional stability* (Washington, 2001). For a critique of this "Columbocentric" view of the Andean crisis, see Socorro Ramirez, "La Internacionalización del Conflicto y de la Paz en Colombia", in Luis Restrepo, *El Plan Colombia y la Internacionalización del Conflicto* (Bogotá, 2001), pp.13-114. See also Martha Ardila, (ed.), *Colombia y la Seguridad Hemisférica* (Bogotá, 2001).

¹⁵⁸ ICG interview, Bogotá, 6 February 2003.

¹⁵⁹ *El Tiempo*, 20 February 2003, p. 1/7.

¹⁶⁰ ICG interview, Bogotá, 6 February 2003.

¹⁶¹ Paulo Vizontini, "O Brasil e as Noções de Soberania e Não-Intervenção", in Wilhelm Hofmeister, *Segurança e Democracia*, (São Paulo, 2001), pp. 55-67.

¹⁶² On participation of Brazil in the conflict, half those interviewed (government and opposition) favoured making information from SIVAM/SIPAM available to Colombia, while half were against. On the sending of Brazilian troops to help the Colombian government fight drug trafficking and illegal armed groups, 86 per cent of the government congressmen were against and 97 per cent of the opposition congressmen. INESC, *Plano Colômbia: Perspectivas do Parlamento Brasileiro* (Brasília, 2002), pp. 65-76.

specific objections were that U.S. and Colombian justifications were constantly shifting – sometimes calling Plan Colombia a peace initiative, at other times a plan for economic and institutional reconstruction, then again a strategy for combating drug trafficking; that it was unclear how Colombia would finance its side of the arrangement; that aerial spraying's effectiveness was suspect, with high social and ecological costs; and that the separation of anti-narcotic and counter-insurgency military operations was artificial, increasing the risk that conflict would spread and the U.S. military presence grow.¹⁶³

With no consensus in the executive or legislative branch for how Brazil could support the peace process, and concern for the bilateral manner in which Bogotá and Washington were approaching the security aspects of the conflict, Brazil concentrated on self-help. An unusual convergence of the Left, opposing foreign intervention in the region's problems, and the extreme Right, supported efforts to improve Brazil's capability to defend its Amazonian border,¹⁶⁴ an issue made more acute because of skirmishes related to drug and arms trafficking involving the FARC and both Colombian and Brazilian troops.¹⁶⁵

The rain forest makes it difficult to monitor the border. Brazilian planes fly into Colombia to pick up drugs in the largely unpopulated departments of

Guainía, Vichada and Vaupés in eastern Colombia,¹⁶⁶ which are often exchanged for weapons, stimulating an illegal arms trade in Brazil. According to the Brazilian federal police, refined cocaine that enters Brazil by air is distributed in European and U.S. markets, while drugs intended for consumption within Brazil enter by boat along the network of rivers that connect the countries.¹⁶⁷ The United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNDCP) has also identified trafficking routes between Brazil and central and southern Africa.¹⁶⁸ Brazil has become the second largest consumer of cocaine in the hemisphere.¹⁶⁹ The government sees a clear link between the dramatic increase in crime rates in Brazil's major cities and the drug and arms trade with Colombia.¹⁷⁰ But this concern is relatively recent. Brazil long thought the rain forest was a sufficient barrier to force arms and drug smugglers to keep to easier routes.

Brazil has attempted to defend its Western Amazon border region with a combination of the military, the federal police and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN), which participate in an integrated plan called COBRA (Colombia-Brazil). To monitor and defend the 1,645-kilometre frontier with Colombia, it maintains eight military outposts, and draws on the 16th Jungle Infantry Brigade in Tefé, other specialised army units subordinated to the Amazon Military Command (CMA), with headquarters at Manaus, the Western Amazon Naval Command (CNAO), and the 7th Regional Air Command (VII COMAR). In addition to a permanent program for security and development of the northern border (the *Calha Norte* Plan), the armed forces regularly carry out exercises and operations in the region. In May 2002, for example, there was an integrated army-navy-air force operation (TAPURU) in the 252,000-

¹⁶³ For the beginning of Plan Colombia and a critical evaluation from a then Colombian opposition perspective, see Restrepo, *El Plan Colombia y la Internacionalización del Conflicto*, op.cit. Restrepo is now head of Colombia's peace negotiating team. For a view of the results, see Leonardo Carvajal & Rodrigo Pardo, "La Internacionalización del Conflicto Doméstico y los Procesos de Paz: evolución reciente y principales desafíos", in Martha Ardila, Diego Cardona and Arlene Tickner, eds., *Prioridades y Desafíos de la Política Exterior Colombiana* (Bogotá, 2002), pp. 181-236. On the presence of the United States in Colombia see www.stratfor.com. For an objective presentation of Plan Colombia from a U.S. perspective, see the Congressional Research Service Report RL30541, "Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance" (FY2000-2001).

¹⁶⁴ ICG Interviews, Washington, 14 March 2003.

¹⁶⁵ ICG interview, Bogotá, 6 February 2003. For example, in November 1998 FARC units attacked and temporarily occupied strategic positions in Mitú, the capital of the Colombian department of Vaupés. In the ensuing fighting, Colombian troops pursued the insurgents across the border with Brazil and used a Brazilian landing strip without prior permission from the authorities. This prompted the Brazilian army to respond, which in turn produced a diplomatic incident between the two countries.

¹⁶⁶ During 2001, 25 of these flights were detected by Colombian authorities. Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes, "La lucha de Colombia contra las drogas ilícitas: acciones y resultados 2001" (Bogotá, March 2002), p. 55.

¹⁶⁷ United States Department of State - Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report" (Washington, March 2002), p. IV-13.

¹⁶⁸ United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, "Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002" (June 2002), p. 116.

¹⁶⁹ ICG interview, Washington, 14 February 2003.

¹⁷⁰ ICG interview, 7 February 2003.

square kilometre region between Tefé, Tabatinga and São Gabriel da Cachoeira.¹⁷¹

On the police and law enforcement side, the capture of Luiz Fernando da Costa (alias Fernandinho Beira-Mar) in 2001 in Colombia and his rapid extradition to and imprisonment in Brazil marked a new quality in bilateral cooperation.¹⁷² Without large U.S. aid – the Bush administration has requested only U.S.\$29.5 million for Brazil under the Andean Regional Initiative in 2003 (compared to U.S.\$537 million for Colombia) and a similar level in the proposed FY 2004 budget¹⁷³ – the Brazilian government has managed to increase its own anti-narcotics operations. For instance, in 2001 the Federal Police seized 8.1 metric tons of cocaine, twice the amount of the previous year, and also increased the number of chemical products under federal control.¹⁷⁴

Brazil's most ambitious project is SIVAM/SIPAM (Amazon Surveillance and Protection System), which involves surveillance and early warning units composed of fixed radars (three based at Tabatinga, São José da Cachoeira and Tefé), aero-spatial image sensors, ground sensors and airborne surveillance and interception units. It is meant to be able to collect and process large amounts of information on flights, border violations, landing strips, plantations, laboratories, irregular prospecting and other illegal acts in the vast region of the Brazilian Amazon, the western part of which alone covers 2.19 million

square kilometres. Inaugurated in 2002, it is expected to be fully operational in 2004.¹⁷⁵

While the rain forest has been shown not to be impenetrable, the authorities still consider that it imposes drastic logistical limits on any attempt by illegal armed groups, drug traffickers or even regular armed forces to use the Amazon region. They are relatively relaxed, therefore, about the prospect that Colombia's conflict could be exported significantly onto Brazilian territory. Thus, the Cardoso government operated throughout 2002 on the assumption that while the conflict inside Colombia was deteriorating, it was not spilling over. Brazilian analysts interpreted the bomb attacks in Bogotá that punctuated Uribe's inauguration and the strong presence of the FARC in Medellín and Cali at that time as an internalisation of the conflict, in the face of which Brazil ought to maintain formal diplomatic support while distancing itself from any more direct involvement. This attitude was rationalised by the foreign ministry as giving Brazil a better chance to be of help to both sides if serious negotiations eventually were to begin on new terms.¹⁷⁶

Brazilian policy did undergo a review after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the collapse of the peace process in Colombia in February 2002 and the military offensive launched against the FARC and ELN by Uribe when he came to office. This produced a deliberate decision in the second half of 2002 to adopt an even more distant diplomatic posture of waiting to see how the new Colombian strategy developed and to evaluate the reactions of the Bush administration and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to the Colombian requests for more help.¹⁷⁷

President Uribe made no specific requests of Brazil until he asked it, along with other neighbours, to declare the FARC a terrorist organization following the EL Nopal bombing. Routine diplomatic relations and sharing of information between the security

¹⁷¹ For further information, see the Internet sites of the Division of the Americas of the Itamaraty – the Brazilian Foreign Office (www.mre.gov.br), of the Naval Command of the Western Amazon (www.cnao.mar.mil.br), of the Military Command of the Amazon (www.exercito.gov.br), of the Seventh Regional Air Command (www.aer.mil.br), of the Intelligence Agency (www.abin.gov.br) and of the Department of Federal Police (www.dpf.gov.br).

¹⁷² Fernandinho settled in the Colombian jungle, near the village of Barrancominas (Guainía), after escaping from the authorities in Brazil and Paraguay. From there, he smuggled out cocaine by plane to Brazil and flew in weapons and ammunitions from Brazil and Paraguay for the FARC.

¹⁷³ FY2004 Budget, International Affairs Accounts, op. cit.

¹⁷⁴ On the Andean Initiative and the emphases on development and anti-narcotics operations, see Larry Storrs and Nina Serafino, "Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY 2002 Supplemental and FY 2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbours" (Washington, July 2002). For a full outside report on the performance of Brazilian anti-narcotics policy, see U.S. Department of State, "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Brazil" (Washington, December 2001).

¹⁷⁵ For a list of the types of information that will be produced by the meteorological, environmental and territorial modules of SIPAM, see www.sipam.gov.br.

¹⁷⁶ ICG interviews, Brasília, 22 October 2002. The scepticism of the Left and extreme Right to current international approaches to the conflict provides a further reason for Brasília to avoid an activist policy.

¹⁷⁷ STRATFOR, "Colombian News Leaks May Be Aimed at Washington", 8 October 2002, at www.stratfor.com.

services have continued¹⁷⁸ while the new Brazilian government rearranges its foreign policy structure¹⁷⁹ and policy toward Colombia is again reviewed.¹⁸⁰ Brazil has indicated it does not intend to declare FARC a terrorist organization because it wants to be able to play a facilitating role in any subsequent negotiations.¹⁸¹

There are indications that the relationship will be somewhat upgraded.¹⁸² Some of this can be attributed to the direct contacts between President Uribe and President da Silva at the recent inauguration of President Gutiérrez in Ecuador when they discussed the conflict and potential cooperation, including alternative development and more aggressive counter drug activities. It likewise reflects the discovery in October 2002 of efforts by narco-traffickers to establish laboratories on Brazilian territory, as well as one or two clashes with FARC

forces in the same time frame, and, in February 2003, reports of FARC safe houses.

General concern about the direct impact on Brazil of drug trafficking originating in Colombia, from drug-related violence in the cities to increased drug use by citizens, to the corrupting influence of drug money, thus is rising. The exploration of possible cooperation also relates to the new Brazilian government's stated intention to play a larger role in South America.¹⁸³ A further discussion between the presidents in March produced a decision to expand Colombia's access to the SIVAM/SIPAM program and a promise from Lula to give his counterpart more political support – but not a declaration that Brazil considers the FARC a terrorist group.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁸ According to Colombia's ambassador to Brazil, Jorge E. Garavito Mejia, the Colombian government was satisfied with the degree of cooperation of the Brazilian authorities in the surveillance and repression of drug trafficking and arms contraband and chemical precursors. The main issue in this area was that of costs and procedures for access to the SIVAM/SIPAM information. Jorge Garavito, lecture delivered at the seminar "Missions of Peace, Security and Defence" (Rio de Janeiro, 25-27 November 2002).

¹⁷⁹ The ministry of foreign affairs is working on the creation of an under-secretary's office for South America.

¹⁸⁰ ICG interview, Bogotá, 6 February 2003.

¹⁸¹ www.estadao.com.br/eleicoes/governolula/noticias/2003/ma/27/118.htm.

¹⁸² In representative polls conducted by the Brazilian Centre for International Relations (CEBRI) between January and September 2001, virtually all interviewees (99 per cent) stated that Brazil should involve itself more in international issues, while 83 per cent believed Brazil should be more aggressive in commercial negotiations. This opinion is compatible with the threats facing Brazil as perceived by the interviewees, 75 per cent of whom declared that the protectionism of the rich countries is today the greatest threat to Brazil, followed by economic and technological inequality between the nations (52 per cent) and drug trafficking (49 per cent). In the Western Hemisphere, the countries considered most important to Brazil were the United States (99 per cent), Argentina (96 per cent) and Colombia (61 per cent). According to the same research, the conflict between the guerrillas and the government of Colombia was seen as a critical threat to Brazil by 27 per cent of respondents and as an important, but not critical threat by 52 per cent. The conclusion drawn was that there is a clear concept of the importance of Colombia in Brazil's plans for international participation. Amaury de Souza, *A Agenda Internacional do Brasil: Um estudo sobre a Comunidade Brasileira de Política Externa* (Rio de Janeiro, 2002).

¹⁸³ ICG interviews, February 2003.

¹⁸⁴ "Brazil's Lula Pledges Solidarity with Colombia War", 7 March 2003, http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&cid=574&ncid=574&e=5&u=/nm/20030307/wl_nm/brazil_colombia_dc_2.

III. CONCLUSION

The Colombian conflict is producing significant negative repercussions in the five bordering states, each of which is affected according to its unique circumstances. There is little likelihood that Colombia's illegal armed groups will target any of the five governments, nor do they have strong ties with a local group that poses a real revolutionary challenge. However, the conflict is increasing internal pressures. The other side of the coin is that Colombia's own counter-insurgency and counter narcotics policies are hampered by insufficient support from its neighbours.

- Ecuador and Panama are the most apprehensive about the insecurity of their border regions with Colombia, because those regions are among their poorest and least developed and abut major centres of Colombian coca cultivation. So far refugee flows as a result of intensified aerial spraying and violence in Colombia have not been as extensive as some observers had foreseen but there is still concern that the instability will worsen already bad local economic situations. If Ecuador's fragile political and economic balance comes undone in a worst case scenario, Colombian armed groups and drug traffickers alike would have opportunities to obtain more access and influence. Already the relative freedom they enjoy to transit Ecuador with narcotics is sufficiently serious to have caused President Gutierrez to adopt a much stronger line in his first months in office.
- Brazil also has reacted to the negative impact of the conflict at home – basically an increase in crime in its large cities fuelled by drugs from Colombia – but is much more relaxed about the possibility that serious spillover scenarios could endanger its national security or stability. It relies heavily on its rain forests and the large-scale SIVAM/SIPAM surveillance system that is nearing completion to give it a measure of protection.
- Peru likewise counts on rugged border terrain to shield it partially from both armed groups and refugees but has also recently stepped up military and security cooperation with Colombia because it believes it sees a direct knock-on effect from its neighbour's counter drug measures in the form of increases in drug-

crop cultivation and transit of final product on and through its territory. Its greatest fear is to lose the benefits of its own eradication gains of the last decade. How much President Toledo can respond to Colombia's call for more border security cooperation will depend substantially on how he handles internal political problems created by the new coca cultivator constituency as well as regionalisation.

- The “neutral” stance of the Chávez administration on the conflict and especially toward the FARC has made Venezuela a case apart. In effect, the government tolerated and, occasionally, fomented the presence of Colombian insurgents in Venezuela as long as they did not harm Venezuelan nationals. A clear ideological predisposition motivated the Chávez government in its early years to distance itself from the Pastrana counter-insurgency effort, to permit a FARC “diplomatic” presence in Caracas and a FARC military presence in the border region, and to provide some logistical support. Its capability, even with political will, to monitor and patrol the border efficiently is questionable but it could do more than it has. The presence and criminal activities of FARC contingents in Venezuela has been one argument used by the extensive opposition movement to press for a change of government, even by constitutionally questionable means, during the political crisis of the past fifteen months. That crisis, including its severe economic effects, has caused Chávez to distance himself at least temporarily from the insurgents and resume some important cooperation with Colombia and the U.S. against drug traffickers.

The Colombian conflict is fuelled by the inflow of arms, explosives, chemical precursors and, at times, cocaine base, and the outflow of refined drugs, mostly cocaine but increasingly also heroin, destined for foreign markets. Official elements at one level or another in all five regional countries have been caught up in this illegal activity but the great bulk of the transactions are commercial rather than political. With the exception of some sectors of Venezuela's government, nobody in the bordering states has been helping the Colombian armed groups out of ideological affinity. Nor do those armed groups move into neighbouring states for political reasons. Counterpart groups either do not exist or where they might (Ecuador and Peru), they are at most remnants

or still in embryonic form.¹⁸⁵ The presence abroad of Colombia's irregular armed groups has only logistical, economic, and tactical reasons.¹⁸⁶

President Uribe has had limited success with diplomatic efforts to get more regional support for his stepped up efforts against the insurgents. After the major bomb attack on the El Nogal club in Bogotá on 7 February 2003, only Panama complied with his request to label the FARC officially as a terrorist group.¹⁸⁷ This caution applies even more when it comes to implementing concrete measures that might prevent the insurgents from obtaining what they need to maintain their armed struggle in exchange for drugs or drug-dollars. Ecuador and Panama do not want to be drawn deeper into the conflict owing to their own vulnerability. Brazil and Venezuela are reluctant to make a formal declaration about the FARC in part because they do not want to be drawn into the global U.S. "war against terrorism", especially while Washington pursues an unpopular campaign of that war in Iraq. President Chávez also has an ideological reservation, and Brazil is concerned that such a move could make its assistance in any future peace effort harder.¹⁸⁸ Peru has been more responsive but its president's relatively weak political position and its internal preoccupations make it unlikely it will be able to do much more than at present.

Nevertheless, the Colombian conflict is a regional, not merely a national problem, and the regional implications go both ways. While it obviously affects Colombia's stability most directly and extensively, it also affects the capacity of all the Andean countries to cope with their own serious internal challenges. Colombia and its neighbours need to do more to advance peace and stability together, regardless of whether the FARC are

officially declared terrorists. The way forward includes ending mutual recriminations and accusations, and initiating more comprehensive and effective cooperation in border control and development, intelligence sharing and judicial cooperation, confidence-building between security services and in the fight against drugs and drug trafficking.

It would be beneficial to devise a regional security strategy within the framework of the Community of Andean Nations (CAN) and on the basis of cooperation agreements between the CAN and Brazil and Panama, but joint action should also be taken immediately via ad hoc political agreements. Colombia had hoped for this very result when it convened its neighbours at ministerial level following the adoption of OAS Resolution 837 and UN Security Council resolutions of support in the wake of the El Nogal atrocity. While that initiative fell short, the May 2003 hemisphere security summit in Mexico offers another opportunity.

The following are areas in which the six states should concentrate their efforts:

Border control and operational support. All of Colombia's borders need to be better monitored and patrolled. If its army acquires the increased mobility and capacity Uribe seeks for it, having operational allies that deny the illegal groups sanctuary would become a vital element of a more effective military strategy. This may be the single most important action that Colombia's neighbours could undertake. Joint contingency plans should be developed to minimise the risk of misunderstandings and enhance the chances of success in the event of larger-scale military encounters with irregular armed groups close to the border. Priority should be given to the most vulnerable parts of the Colombian border, those with Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela.

In view of the magnitude of their task, adverse geographic conditions, and personnel shortages, it is paramount that Colombia's border guards keep in constant contact with their counterparts. With the aim of better coverage, patrolling should be shared. Border guards on both sides of the frontier should be better equipped with speed boats and, where necessary, helicopters so as to be able to move quickly to an incident.

It might also be easier politically if it were made clear that this increased security cooperation

¹⁸⁵ The fledgling paramilitaries in Venezuela are perhaps an exception but such groups exist in many countries, including in the southern U.S. states that share a border with Mexico.

¹⁸⁶ One reason for this may be the conservative nature of the largest of these groups, the FARC, as an insurgent organisation. Its leadership does not trust most members enough to send them abroad. Desertions of members on missions abroad have heightened FARC's sensitivity. ICG interview, Bogotá, 19 February 2003.

¹⁸⁷ For the consternation this has produced in Bogotá, see the recent statements of Minister of the Interior Fernando Londoño and Minister of Defence Martha Ramírez, Radio Caracol, 21 February 2003 and *El Tiempo*, 21 and 23 February 2003.

¹⁸⁸ ICG interview, Bogotá, 6 February 2003.

presupposes a strategy aimed at driving the illegal armed groups to the negotiating table.

Border development. Security also hinges on fostering the development of border regions that are mostly very poor and structurally underdeveloped. The Ecuador-Peru experience in border development and the Colombia-Ecuador Border Integration Zone program could provide important lessons. The work of the five bi-national border commissions should be intensified and put on a higher political level. Where population centres exist near frontiers, emphasis should be placed on building infrastructure and on social and economic development and humanitarian assistance. This could include tax benefits for investors, "soft credit" schemes for farmers and artisans, and the extension of basic health and educational services. In other regions, ecological programs, such as reforestation or establishment of cross-border nature reserves, may be alternatives that could gain the support of international technical cooperation agencies, the IDB and the World Bank.

Intelligence sharing, law enforcement and judicial cooperation. Enhanced border control and security assumes an advanced intelligence capability. Border guards can only interdict arms and drug traffickers and irregular armed groups if they know where they are. It is crucial that Colombia and Brazil agree soon on the terms by which Colombia can access more fully the information being generated by SIVAM/SIPAM. More intelligence sharing by the U.S. and cooperation between the region's intelligence agencies should also be fostered.

Cooperation between the law enforcement and justice sectors is another pillar of the fight against drug and arms trafficking and Colombia's irregular armed groups. In order to take more effective action against money laundering schemes and regional drug and arms trafficking rings, more information should be shared among law enforcement agencies, legal norms should be made compatible and judicial procedures in general should be expedited.

Confidence-building between the military and police forces. The delivery of sophisticated U.S. military equipment to Colombia under Plan Colombia has not been well received by neighbouring militaries, particularly Venezuela's. It produces concerns about a regional military imbalance tilted in favour of Colombia. The shift to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, with some extension of military, economic and social assistance to the regional states, may have

offset this concern to a degree but in the context of existing border disputes and political tensions between Colombia and Venezuela, it is important to enhance confidence between the two states' security forces. The more or less regular meetings between the military and police leaderships of Colombia and its neighbours should be held more frequently and specifically address defence and security cooperation and confidence-building measures.

To the degree possible, clear rules need to be established for what the neighbouring militaries are prepared to do when advised by Colombia that it will be conducting military action against guerrilla or paramilitary groups on the border. But that assumes confidence in the response, in the security and veracity of the information being shared, and in the capacity to act on the information. A meeting of defence and foreign ministers or their representatives of the Andean nations, Brazil and Panama hosted by President Uribe on 12 March 2003 facilitated some such exchanges.

Concerted regional action in the fight against drugs and drug trafficking. Colombia's recent counter drug policy, epitomized by Plan Colombia, has met with reservations from its neighbours. Colombia itself was criticised in particular for the heavy concentration on aerial spraying as the preferred tool for eradication. The U.S. was criticised for putting too much weight on military aspects and too little on human rights violations, while focusing too exclusively on Colombia. Shifts toward an Andean approach in the past two years have eased some concerns but not the criticism that the policy is unbalanced toward military aid, even as the regional states seek increased military assistance themselves. Part of the problem, however, relates directly to concerns about drug cultivation and trafficking, in particular that unless a broader approach is adopted whatever gains Colombia makes in eradicating coca cultivation will spur new pressure for illicit plantings in Peru and Ecuador and that whatever success Colombia has in interdicting direct routes to the north, will drive more drugs to new transit points in their own countries.

The need is for an Andean region counter drug program, encompassing also Brazil and Panama that complements Plan Colombia and has the full support and engagement of the U.S., the EU and others. Both the UN drug control office (UNDCP) and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the Organisation of American States (CICAD) can play roles in helping to achieve this goal. Such a program


inevitably would retain as key components eradication, interdiction, law enforcement and alternative development, but should perhaps assign alternative development a higher priority and more resources. It also might seek consensus on the importance of designing a longer term focus on the need for all the regional countries, with U.S., EU, other donor and international financial institution collaboration, to re-think the priority assigned to

combating rural poverty. Removing the obstacles to economic opportunity for the rural poor, while extending the state's presence to assure access to schools, health care, legal protection and physical security, may be the missing long-term counter drug policy component.

Bogotá/Brussels, 8 April 2003

APPENDIX A

MAP OF COLOMBIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS



APPENDIX B

COLOMBIAN REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS

	As of December 2000			As of December 2001			As of December 2002		
	Refugees	Asylum Seekers	Total	Refugees	Asylum Seekers	Total	Refugees	Asylum Seekers	Total
Ecuador	1602	150	1752	1957	2472	4429	3517	7441	10958
Panama	1381	90	1471	1474	63	1537	1573	88	1661
Peru	687	7	694	683	63	746	693	83	776
Venezuela	132	101	233	59	311	370	58	1019	1083
REGIONAL	3802	348	4150	4173	2909	7082	5841	8637	14478

(1) Sources: Annual Statistical Reports, UNHCR (2000, 2001). Figures for 2002 are preliminary pending completion of Annual Statistical Report.

(2) People under Humanitarian Temporary Protection are included in the category "Refugees"

APPENDIX C

GLOSSARY OF ACROYMNS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABIN	Brazilian Intelligence Agency	FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
APRA	Popular American Revolutionary Alliance, Peru	FIM	Independent Moralising Front, Peru
ARI	Andean Regional Initiative	FOL	Forward Operating Location
AUC	United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia	FTAA	Free Trade Association of the Americas
AVC	Alvaro Vive Carajo, Ecuador	GTT	Tripartite Working Group, Venezuela
CAN	Community of Andean Nations	INE	National Bureau of Statistics, Venezuela
CD	Democratic Coordinating Committee, Venezuela	OAS	Organization of American States
CFC	Commission of Facilitating Countries, Colombia	ONPE	National Bureau of Electoral Processes, Peru
CMA	Amazon Military Command, Brazil	PCS	Project Counselling Service
CNAO	Western Amazon Naval Command, Brazil	POV	Current Operating Plan
COMAR	Regional Air Command, Brazil	PP	Perú Posible
CTV	Confederation of Venezuelan Workers	PPF	Panamanian Public Force
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone, Colombia	PT	Workers' Party, Brazil
DNE	National Directorate of Illicit Drugs, Colombia	SIVAM	Amazon Surveillance and Protection System
ELN	National Liberation Army	UNDCP	UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
FAN	Armed Forces of Venezuela	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
		WTO	World Trade Organization

APPENDIX D

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 90 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

ICG's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers.

ICG's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via the organisation's Internet site, www.crisisweb.org. ICG works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

ICG's international headquarters are in Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York and Paris and a media liaison office in London. The organisation currently operates eleven field offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogota, Islamabad, Jakarta,

Nairobi, Osh, Pristina, Sarajevo, Sierra Leone and Skopje) with analysts working in over 30 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents.

In *Africa*, those countries include Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone-Liberia-Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe; in *Asia*, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Kashmir; in *Europe*, Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; in the *Middle East*, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in *Latin America*, Colombia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governments currently provide funding: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Foundation and private sector donors include The Atlantic Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, The Henry Luce Foundation, Inc., John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The John Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, The Ruben & Elisabeth Rausing Trust, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, the Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish Community Endowment Fund and the United States Institute of Peace.

April 2003

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* The Algeria project was transferred from the Africa Program in January 2002.

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