

Return of the National Security State?

by **George Kourous** | **November 18, 2002**

Introduction and Overview of Issues

Starting today, Defense Ministers, military commanders, and civilian experts will be meeting in Santiago, Chile, for the fifth Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA). The DMA process was established after the 1994 Summit of the Americas to promote greater cooperation on hemispheric defense and security issues in the new post-cold war context. Likely topics on the agenda this year: the U.S. war on terrorism, the conflict in Colombia, and the implications for the 1947 Inter-American Reciprocal Defense Treaty, commonly known as the Rio Treaty.

At the last summit of the Americas, held in Quebec some months before the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, the governments of the region agreed to hold a Special Conference on Hemispheric Security in 2004. Successful in its bid to host the event, Mexico has argued that the conference should be used to craft a replacement for the Rio Treaty, one that would mobilize the region's militaries to deal with nontraditional security issues, such as disaster-response, alongside traditional defense missions. This call reflected ongoing discussions over the preceding decade regarding the Rio Treaty, which was generally perceived as in need of revision.

However the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, and the subsequent U.S. response, once again changed the context. Today, capitalizing on the Bush administration's war on terror, the government of Alvaro Uribe in Colombia is arguing that the Rio Treaty should be modified to focus on internal regional threats, such as guerrilla insurgents, crime, and international drug syndicates.

Clearly, organized drug trafficking is having a destabilizing and corrosive affect on societies across the region, while Colombia's destructive civil war is

now spilling over across the borders of that Andean nation. There are, however, a number of pressing questions raised by current trends in hemispheric politics and security affairs:

- Whether or not a regional collective security pact should seek to do more than deter external attacks and provide for coordinated responses to such attacks.
- A related concern: if the only way to end the conflict in Colombia is via military action, should any coordinated military action occur under the auspices of the Rio Treaty, or under the auspices of the UN or OAS?
- Whether or not the Bush and Uribe administrations' classification of guerrilla groups as terrorists is entirely accurate.
- The implications of blurring the lines between anti-narcotic operations and anti-terror operations, and the proper roles of civilian police and military establishments in those operations.
- The impacts on ongoing, and still-needed, efforts to professionalize military institutions in Latin America, reduce the profile of those institutions in political affairs, and promote human rights.
- The dangers of involving the armed forces in internal security and intelligence operations, given the historical role of military establishments in Latin America and the legacies of the cold war's national security states.

A New Context, Mixed Signals

Since the Second World War, military establishments in the Western Hemisphere have had generally close ties, primarily under the auspices of United States training or assistance programs (established during WWII to prevent Axis influence from spreading in the region and continued during the cold war). The general thrust of U.S. security



Background on the DMA Process

The defense ministerial process is an outcome of the first Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in 1994, where the countries of the hemisphere agreed to enhance international cooperation and committed themselves to a range of mutual policy goals, in particular the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005.²⁰

With an eye to smoothing the way for the FTAA's creation, the Clinton administration perceived a need to resolve several long-running border disputes in Latin America, like that between Peru and Ecuador.²¹ The common assessment was that the consolidation of democracy and the retirement of the region's militaries from political affairs presented the opportunity to reorient the missions of those militaries away from internal security and counter-insurgency and reshape the fabric of inter-American defense cooperation to emphasize multilateral cooperation.

The first Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA), held in July 1995, resulted in an agreement to hold regular ministerials; to guide those discussions, attendees adopted the following six "Williamsburg Principles": 1) The preservation of democracy is the basis for ensuring mutual security in the Americas; 2) Military and security forces play a critical role in supporting and defending the legitimate interests of sovereign democratic states; 3) Armed Forces should be subordinate to democratically controlled authority, act within the bounds of national Constitutions, and respect human rights through training and practice; 4) Transparency in defense matters should be increased through exchanges of information, reporting on defense expenditures, and greater civilian-military dialogue; 5) Outstanding disputes in the hemisphere should be resolved by negotiated settlement and widespread adoption of confidence-building measures, all of this in a time-frame consistent with the pace of hemispheric economic integration. Development of economic security profoundly affects defense security and vice versa; 6) Promotion of greater defense cooperation in support of voluntary participation in UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations, and enhanced cooperation in a supportive role in the fight against narcoterrorism.²²

Subsequent DMAs were held in Bariloche, Argentina (1996), Cartagena, Colombia (1998), and Manaus, Brazil (2000). Major issues discussed at these sessions include: bilateral, sub-regional, or regional exchanges between military and defense authorities of the hemisphere; cooperation in the area of natural disasters; creating new confidence-building and security measures; demining operations; enlisting the military in supporting education and health campaigns; exchanging information on defense and security matters; expanding cooperation in defense training; humanitarian relief; involving the military in reforestation projects; military confidence- and security-building measures; the role of armed forces in anti-drug efforts; participating in overseas peacekeeping operations; small arms and light weapons trafficking; special security concerns of the small Caribbean Island States; strengthening institutions within the Americas responsible for security issues; terrorism (defined as a "serious crime threatening hemispheric democracy" at the most recent DMA); and transparency on defense matters.²³

Feeding in to and supplementing the DMA process are dozens of security-related meetings convened by the Organization of American States (OAS), such as the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures, held in Santiago, Chile, in 1998, or the upcoming (Jan. 12-14, 2002) OAS meeting on Special Security Concerns of Small Island States. Since 1995, the OAS has adopted over 90 resolutions regarding regional arms control, demining, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and confidence- and security-building measures and other aspects of defense and security policy, as well as three conventions concerning illicit trafficking in firearms, transparency, and terrorism. U.S. government officials attribute many of these agreements to the DMA process.²⁴

The DMA process also supplements many long-standing mechanisms for hemispheric cooperation and discussion on security matters, in addition to OAS mechanisms. These include bilateral, regional, and continental programs and events, U.S.-sponsored military training and practice exercises, and institutions such as the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), the Conference of American Armies (CAA), the System of Cooperation of American Air Forces (SICO-FAA), the Inter-American Naval Conference, and the binational Mexican-U.S. Defense Commission.²⁵

Framing the DMA process is the upcoming Special Conference on Hemispheric Security, scheduled to be held in Mexico in 2004 by joint agreement of the governments of the Americas at the Third Summit of the Americas in Quebec in order to "consider both new and traditional approaches to international security."²⁶

policy in the Americas during this period was to prevent the spread of overseas (initially Axis, later communist) influence in the region. Distrustful of civilian governments, which it often viewed as populist, corrupt, incompetent, and ineffectual, the United States focused on nurturing ties with what it deemed to be the strongest, most effective institutions in the region—the armed forces. Armed invasion was not regarded as the primary threat, however. Rather, U.S. policymakers worried that nationalist and other popular movements in Latin America would—possibly abetted and directed by the Soviet Union or Cuba—establish left-leaning governments in the region. Under U.S. tutelage, militaries in the region assumed political control according to the principles of the “national security doctrine,” which held that the overall wellbeing of nations hinged on internal stability, and emphasized the repression of internal “subversives.” Ultimately, the focus of cold war proxy battles in the region was on suppressing internal threats, rather than resisting external attacks.

The end of the cold war and the return of civilian-led democratic governments saw Latin American militaries retreat from political affairs and “return to the barracks”—some less willingly than others, and by the early 1990s, a number of factors led to a change in the cold war status quo. These include: the pitched domestic debate in the United States over Central American policy during the 1980s and the end of the cold war, the gradual re-emergence of democratic forms of the governance in Latin America, and a renewed focus in the post-NAFTA era on trade and commerce.

Under the Clinton administration, U.S. security policy in the Americas continued to nurture close military ties with southern nations. However, a new focus was on professionalizing the region’s militaries and encouraging stronger regional communication and cooperation on security matters. This thrust was seen as necessary to democratization and putting Latin American militaries under the control of elected civilian governments.

It was also meant to pave the way for the changed profile of the U.S. military presence in region following the 1999 return of the Panama Canal, which housed the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM),

to that country’s control. This obligated a reconceptualization U.S. force projection in the Western Hemisphere. Instead of a major, centralized advance position in the southern Central American isthmus, U.S. forces are now spread out across the region via a series of small- and medium-sized installations, such as the new U.S. air base at Manta, Ecuador.

Also as part of the effort professionalize Latin American militaries, over the past fifteen years with the encouragement of Washington, Latin American militaries began to define participation in international peacekeeping efforts as a new mission. The Venezuelan and Colombian militaries played a role in OAS peacekeeping in Nicaragua and El Salvador during the end of those countries’ civil wars. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay have participated in peacekeeping operations in Africa, the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Haiti. In support of this trend, in 1995 Argentina established the Centro Argentino de Entrenamiento Conjunto Para Operaciones de Paz (Caecopaz, Argentine Joint Peacekeeping Training) to prepare Latin American officers for overseas UN assignments.¹

In a similar vein, with the encouragement of the United States, since the 1990s national armed forces in the region have increased bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Examples include the regular meetings of defense ministers and joint practice maneuvers by nations in the southern cone and the six-country Military Observers Mission—Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP) to the border between those two countries after the 1995 Rio Protocol. Underlying goals behind U.S. policy in this regard were professionalization of the armed forces and promotion of regional stability via the creation of a multilateral framework for resolving defense and security issues.²

These mission shifts were dominant threads in inter-American interactions on defense matters for most of the 1990s, and continue to figure prominently on the radar screens of Latin America’s military leaders.

At the same time, however, U.S. policy sought to enlist Latin America’s armed forces in efforts to counter drug production and trafficking—yet the rising profile of military involvement in suppressing

the drug trade frequently ran counterpurpose to efforts to professionalize the region's militaries and orient them away from a focus on internal security.

Even more so than the war on drugs, the new U.S. war on terror—like the anticommunist crusade of past years—is promoting a focus on internal security threats. Colombia, for example, is employing a network of undercover civilian informers to counter guerrilla and other threats. Intelligence sharing on potential threats has increased. Migrants are being redefined as national security threats and countries are coordinating migration control efforts.

Implications for the Rio Treaty

Established during WWII and the early cold war, the Rio Treaty created a collective security mechanism for the Western Hemisphere. Under its terms, an armed attack by any state on one treaty member is considered an attack on all members. The treaty defines the measures and procedures governing a collective response to such attacks. It also allows the parties to meet to outline joint responses to “aggression which is not an armed attack,” “extra-continental” or “inter-continental” conflicts that affect “the inviolability or the integrity or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State,” or “other fact[s] or situation[s] that might endanger the peace of America.”³

The Rio Treaty has been invoked on 19 occasions since its inception, for example: in 1949, when Nicaraguan troops entered Costa Rican territory; in 1954, when the U.S. via the CIA orchestrated the overthrow of the Jacobo Arbenz government in Guatemala (the threat cited was intervention by the international communist movement); and in 1969, during the Honduras-El Salvador “Football War.” In 1982 Argentina tried to invoke the pact during the Falklands War but the United States supported Britain, and the rest of the treaty signatories abstained from voting.

Repeated manipulation of the Rio Treaty by the United States to forward its own purposes, as with the Falklands War incident, and then the 1989 invasion of Panama by the United States—which was not sanctioned by the OAS⁴—all contributed to the

groundswell to reconsider the 1947 pact. The end of the cold war made revision a real possibility.

In the days prior to the 9-11 terrorist attacks, Mexico announced its intention to pull out of the Rio Treaty and lead the creation of a replacement pact, calling the 1947 arrangement “obsolete.” After 9-11, Mexico backburnered its proposal, but this past September made the move official and formally initiated the two-year process of pulling out of the Rio Treaty. After Fox's 2001 announcement, Luigi Einaudi, assistant secretary-general of the OAS, commented to the *Los Angeles Times*: “There's no doubt that he's right. People have been talking about that behind the scenes for 10 years, and nobody's had the guts to come out and say it.”⁵

Fox argued, “We do not confront an extra-continental enemy that obligates us to defend ourselves through a military alliance. We have, on the other hand, common adversaries that we must confront... economic backwardness, extreme poverty, transnational organized crime, subversion of democratic processes, environmental destruction, and defenselessness in the face of calamities and natural disasters.” In its formal announcement of withdrawal from the Rio Treaty, issued Sept. 6, 2002, Mexico cited the need to create “a security structure that is multidimensional and modern.” According to Mexico, today “the vulnerability of nations does not hinge on purely military or ideological threats,” and a new security framework should consider social issues, or be subsumed within a larger hemispheric agenda addressing social issues, including: extreme poverty and social inequality; protection of public health in the face of AIDS and similar epidemics; combating organized transnational crime syndicates; coordinated action in the face of economic crises; and environmental protection.⁶

Like its push to win a temporary seat on the UN security council, Mexico's decision to pull out of the Rio Treaty, host the 2002 Special Conference on Hemispheric Security, and play a “central role in the construction and codification of the new [hemispheric security] architecture” reflect the Fox administration's desire carve out a greater foreign policy role for Mexico. This larger profile would complement Mexico's roster of bilateral free trade

agreements and could also provide useful leverage in negotiations with the United States on issues like NAFTA trucking or migration policy. Mexico charted this course prior to the 2001 terrorist attacks in Washington and New York. With the 2004 special conference already in the works and expecting that ongoing conversations regarding the future of the Rio Pact would be on the table there, it was a thrust that was both safe and seemingly bold.⁷

Mexico's decision to pull out of the Rio Pact is not likely to affect U.S.-Mexican collaboration on security matters.⁸ However, the push for a more ambitious reconfiguration of inter-American security issues, especially the inclusion of social issues in the agenda, is not likely to be well received by the Bush administration. More likely is a modification to the Rio Treaty to make it more explicit about terrorist threats and to clarify the treaty's definition of "inter-continental conflict" and "other fact[s] or situation[s] [that] might endanger the peace of America."

This is the argument that Colombia's president Alvaro Uribe has made. The conflict between the military, guerrillas, drug cartels, and paramilitary units in that Andean nation is increasingly spilling over into neighboring countries, particularly Ecuador and Venezuela, but also Panama and Brazil. In late September 2002, Uribe told the *Miami Herald* that he would like to "modernize" the Rio Treaty, arguing that that the biggest threats to regional democracies today are internal, not external. He added that Colombia needs "concrete help" from other Latin countries in its counterinsurgency efforts. According to Uribe, a new security cooperation agreement should allow such joint action, and could also involve increased intelligence sharing on the activities and movements of guerrilla groups, stronger border controls, and cooperation in intercepting and even shooting down drug flights that leave Colombian territory.⁹

"The first thing we have to do is identify common enemies," Uribe told the paper. "The Colombian problem is a common enemy to this continent's democracy. These violent groups in Colombia have the potential to destabilize all democracies in the region."¹⁰ Uribe did not discuss the possible creation of a regional military force, but Argentina's

ambassador to the United States, Diego Guelar, told the *Herald* he is "personally convinced that it would be reasonable to start thinking about creation of a joint South American security force."¹¹

Uribe's call for a coordinated regional response to the conflict in Colombia reflects comments made in 2000 by then-U.S. Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen, at the fourth DMA in Manaus, Brazil. There, Cohen expressed "hope that we can bring this spirit of cooperation [marking the DMA process] to the challenges now facing our friend, Colombia, where the drug trade, insurgency, and paramilitary forces threaten one of South America's oldest democracies and stable economies. The U.S. is concerned," he added, "that the 'spillover' of those problems to neighboring states, which has been increasing in recent years, will only worsen if we do nothing."¹²

Tensions and Issues

Not all Latin American countries are convinced that military involvement in "gray areas" such as anti-drug operations should be expanded. At the Williamsburg Ministerial, many participants argued that these are issues of crime, not war, and that civilian police forces, rather than military establishments, should be tasked with handling them.¹³ (A related tension, reflected in Mexico's proposal for a new Rio Treaty, involves the call by some countries to involve militaries in internal development, versus those who resist any expanded role for the military.)¹⁴

The renewed focus on internal threats under the U.S. war on terrorism adds to the blurring of lines already engendered by the war on drugs. Latin American militaries, always well-attuned to shifts in U.S. strategic policy and working within the framework of U.S. political and economic dominance in the region, may temper their resistance to that blurring.

So far, despite misgivings about U.S. foreign policy after 9-11 and concerns that relations on other fronts, especially trade, have suffered as a result of the White House's focus on Al Qaeda and Iraq, on the diplomatic front Latin America has been largely supportive of the U.S. war on terror. On September 21, 2001, Brazil led the Rio Treaty signatories in

defining the terrorist attacks as “attacks against all American States” and invoking the treaty. They further declared that “all States party to the Rio Treaty shall provide effective reciprocal assistance...to maintain the peace and security of the continent” and “use all legally available measures to pursue, capture, extradite, and punish” anyone suspected in involvement with the attacks.¹⁵ Several months later, on June 3, 2002, the entire OAS adopted the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism.¹⁶

Still, there are undercurrents of disquiet regarding the U.S. war on terror. Before voting to invoke the Rio Treaty, Mexico issued a statement saying the pact was not the “ideal mechanism” for dealing with the terrorist attacks. Venezuela’s foreign chancellor indicated his country’s decision to invoke the treaty was tempered by “serious concerns,” and Chile noted that “in moments of crisis like what we are currently experiencing, we must resort to the tools we have, for all that we recognize their limitations.”¹⁷

The position that Brazil will take in future discussions on hemispheric security is a significant question mark. Despite long-standing close U.S.-Brazilian military ties, South America’s largest nation has generally pursued a relatively independent foreign policy vis-à-vis the United States, both in terms of FTAA negotiations and the United States’ Plan Colombia. In 2000, a high-ranking Brazilian security official told that country’s congress that while spillover sparked by Plan Colombia would require Brazil undertake police, environmental, and social action programs in the border area, “the idea of a multinational military operation in the Brazilian Amazon is unacceptable.” Over the past several years, Brazil has undertaken a unilateral military buildup on its border with Colombia, including the inauguration this past summer of its \$1.4 billion Amazon-wide radar system, SIVAM (Sistema de Vigilância da Amazonia).¹⁸

More recently, however, Brazilian willingness to cooperate regionally, and with the United States, to stem spillover from Colombia has markedly increased.¹⁹ But with executive power transferring to a new administration, headed by Inacio Lula da Silva of the Workers Party, Brazil’s stance on security issues and U.S. security policy is likely to become even more independent.

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RESOURCES

WEBSITES

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (CHDS)
<http://www3.ndu.edu/chds/>

Center for International Policy (CIP)
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¹ “Partnerships Grow in Western Hemisphere.” Prepared remarks by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen to the Western Hemisphere Symposium, Miami, April 15, 1997. (<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1997/s19971231-index.html>). United Nations website (<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml>). Paul J. Buchanan, “U.S. Defense Policy for the Western Hemisphere: New Wine in Old Bottles, Old Wine in New Bottles, or Something Completely Different?” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, vol. 38, no. 1, 1996 pp. 8-16.

² “Defense Ministerial of the Americas IV, Opening Plenary Session.” Remarks as prepared for delivery by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Manaus, Brazil, Tuesday, October 17, 2002. (<http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2000/s20001017-secdef.html>). Buchanan pp. 16-17.

³ The groundwork for the Rio Treaty was laid during the Second World War. It was not adopted until the Third Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Americas, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1947, and didn’t enter into force until 1948. Of the 34 active members of the OAS, 23 have ratified the Rio Treaty. Signatories include: Argentina, the Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Cuba is also a party, although its current government has been suspended from participating in the OAS since 1962. Organization of American States website (<http://www.oas.org/>).

⁴ The OAS did adopt, by a vote of twenty to one with six abstentions, a resolution calling for U.S. withdrawal, but took no action to enforce it.

⁵ Mary Anastasia O’Grady. “A Low Blow from Mexico, Badly Timed.” *The Wall Street Journal*, September 13, 2002. James Smith. “Fox Tells the OAS its Defense Pact is Obsolete.” *Los Angeles Times*, September 8, 2001. Buchanan p. 8.

⁶ At the 32nd OAS General Assembly Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Casteñeda explained Mexico’s position by arguing that the community of American nations should redefine its approach to security and include

themes such as poverty and inequality, AIDS, and natural disasters in discussions on the issue. “We all have to confront the challenge of creating new rules that allow us to maintain peace and security in a world that grows more complex every day,” he said. “Mexico Seeks New Defence Treaty,” BBC News online, (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/>). “Casteñeda Calls for New Examination of Security in the Americas.” *The News Mexico*, June 4, 2002. “Mexico Se Retira Del Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Reciproca.” Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations (SRE). Press Release no. 194/02, September 6, 2002.

⁷ *Mexico Se Retira*, SRE.

⁸ A U.S. State Department spokesperson indicated the administration was disappointed by the move, but insisted that “bilateral cooperation with Mexico in the areas of defense and security continues to be excellent.” He also added: “We believe that the [Rio] treaty remains a vital in ensuring hemispheric security” and that the United States will work with Mexico and other Latin American governments “to strengthen hemispheric security arrangements across the board.” “Mexico Resigns from Americas Defense Treaty, Calling it Cold War Relic.” The Associated Press, September 6, 2002. Similarly, U.S. ambassador to Mexico Jeffery Davidow told the *Miami Herald*’s Andres Oppenheimer: “We don’t agree with Mexico’s decision, but we don’t see it as a major step away from hemispheric cooperation on security issues.” Andres Oppenheimer. “U.S. Mexico Ties no Longer as Close Following Sept. 11.” *The Miami Herald*, September 12, 2002.

⁹ Andres Oppenheimer. “Uribe Wants Colombia’s Neighbors to Help in War.” *The Miami Herald*, September 22, 2002. “Talk of a South American Military Force Emerges.” *The Miami Herald*, Oct. 3, 2002.

¹⁰ Andres Oppenheimer. “Uribe Wants Colombia’s Neighbors to Help in War.” *The Miami Herald*, September 22, 2002.

¹¹ *Miami Herald*, “Talk of a South American Military Force.”

¹² Cohen, Remarks at Manaus.

¹³ Ronald J. Morgan, “Brazil’s Escalating Role in the Drug War,” Colombia Report (New York: Information Network of the Americas, July 15, 2002). Report on the First Defense Ministerial of the Americas. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, September 1995). Online at <http://www.summit-americas.org/Williamsburg-spanish.htm>.

¹⁴ One working group at the 1995 DMA argued in favor of an expanded role for the military by saying “Without security there can be no peace, and without peace, no development. The new concept of security should

cover aspects such as democracy, poverty, human rights, drug trafficking, the environment, education, culture, an opening of international markets, fair and balanced rules of participation, disarmament, and migration.” DOS, Report on the First Defense Ministerial.

¹⁵ Karen DeYoung. “OAS Nations Activate Mutual Defense Treaty.” *The Washington Post*, September 20, 2001.
Kevin Sullivan. “U.S. Relations Suddenly Change for Mexico.” *The Washington Post*, September 21, 2001.
Juan Pablo Soriano. “La Respuesta de American Latina y el Caribe al 11 de septiembre.” Working Paper. (Barcelona: Observatori Política Exterior Europea, Institut Universitari d’Estudis Europeus, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2002).

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ New facilities in the region include airforce base Sao Gabriel da Cachoeira and a string of barracks manned by 2,500 troops. Brazil has also deployed a 200-man federal police task force known as Operation Cobra to its border with Colombia to support security and counter-narcotics operations. These efforts represent an escalation of an older initiative, dubbed Calha Norte (northern gutter). Launched in 1985, this economic development initiative established a network self-sustaining civilian-military settlements in the remote, undeveloped stretches of Brazil’s Amazon and involved the construction of transportation and social service infrastructures projects (roads, bridges, schools, health clinics, water wells, and riverboat docks) throughout the region. As a result of both the older and newer buildup, Brazil has organized around 30,000 soldiers in the Amazon, including a battalion of 5,000 trained in jungle combat, supported by navy ships patrolling the region’s rivers. Morgan, *Brazil’s Escalating Role*. Communication with Mathew Flynn, freelance journalist based in Brazil, October 3, 2002.

¹⁹ Brazil has already discussed sharing intelligence gathered under SIVAM with the Uribe administration, and

last year, after opening a regional intelligence center at Tabatinga, agreed to share intelligence gathered there with Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and the United States. Also last year, U.S. DEA agents toured Brazil’s Amazon operations, and Brazilian Federal Police and the DEA also cooperated in the arrest in Colombia of Brazilian drug lord Luis Fernando da Costa as well as a later operation in Paraguay that snared a senior member of da Costa’s organization. DEA agents in Colombia and Brazil have cooperated with national officials to target members of Colombia’s FARC, and the agency is also fielding joint U.S.-Brazilian teams to investigate money laundering. The Bush administration’s Andean Regional Initiative calls for Brazil to receive \$6 million in counterdrug assistance and \$12.6 million in social development funds this year, while a 2003 Bush administration request calls for another \$12 million in counternarcotics funds. Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador have also cooperated to jointly request \$1.3 billion from the Inter-American Development Bank for use in border social programs aimed at dealing with the spillover from Colombia. Morgan, *Brazil’s Escalating Role*. *Miami Herald*, Talk of a South American Military Force.

²⁰ *History of the Department of State During the Clinton Presidency (1993-2001)*. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/c6059.htm>).

²¹ DOS, *Report on the First Defense Ministerial of the Americas*.

²² Ibid.

²³ U.S. Department of State website (<http://www.state.gov/>)

²⁴ “Miami to Host OAS Conference.” *Washington File*, Nov. 7, 2002, U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs (<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/>).

²⁵ Buchanan pp. 17-18.

²⁶ Summit of the Americas Information Network (<http://www.summit-americas.org/>).

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